Essays on Parental Leave and Family Labour Supply by Choi, Youjin
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
9-13-2018 11:00 AM 
Essays on Parental Leave and Family Labour Supply 
Youjin Choi 
The University of Western Ontario 
Joint Supervisor 
Bowlus, Audra 
The University of Western Ontario Joint Supervisor 
Caucutt, Elizabeth 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Economics 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Youjin Choi 2018 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Choi, Youjin, "Essays on Parental Leave and Family Labour Supply" (2018). Electronic Thesis and 
Dissertation Repository. 5718. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5718 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
Abstract
This thesis studies married couples’ decisions regarding labour supply, fertility, and take-up
of parental leave. Importantly, it emphasizes household interactions in a family labour supply
framework where husbands and wives jointly make decisions.
In Chapter 2, I describe how differences in married individuals’ time allocations between
Canada and the U.S. may be related to different parental leave policies in the two countries.
First, I document background information on parental leave policies and take-up behaviour in
the two countries. Second, I analyze married individuals’ time allocations using data from the
General Social Survey (GSS) for Canada and American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the U.S.
I examine the role of having children on their parents’ time allocations across market work,
child care, household chores, and leisure and make cross-country comparisons.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effects of maternity leave policies on married couples’ fer-
tility and employment decisions. I develop and characterize a unique household search model
that features home production and endogenous fertility choice. I characterize reservation rules
in the household search model and find that this model can generate patterns that cannot be
generated by an individual search model. In particular, I parameterize a benchmark model that
provides 12 weeks of unpaid leave as in the U.S. I use a parameterized model to examine the
impact of an extended paid maternity leave policy on fertility rates and household employment.
I find that a longer paid maternity leave increases fertility rates, lowers fraction of dual-earner
couples, and increases the fraction of single-earner couples.
In Chapter 4, I examine what prevents married fathers from taking parental leave despite its
availability in Canada. As possible explanations, I consider gender differences in rental rates
of human capital, wage growth processes, wage penalties for time off from work, preferences
for leisure, and productivity in home production. I document supporting empirical evidence for
the possible explanations. Next, I develop a life-cycle model of family labour supply that fea-
tures learning-by-doing human capital accumulation and time allocations across market work,
leisure, and home production. Then, I quantify the relative importance of these explanations
within the model. I find that lower home productivity in the presence of an infant, higher rental
rates of human capital, and higher wage penalties for not working for fathers are the main
contributors to the low take-up of fathers. Finally, I conduct policy experiments to highlight
the role of cash benefits and paternity leave on fathers’ take-up of leave. The results show that
fathers’ take-up rates are responsive to an increase in an income replacement rate combined
with the introduction of paternity leave.
Keywords: Family labour supply, parental leave, time allocation, fertility, household search
model, human capital, home production
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
As more married women participate in labour markets, the balance between work and family
has become increasingly important. Many countries have introduced various family-friendly
policies to help parents balance their work and family lives. In this dissertation, I focus on
parental leave policies. Parental leave is often called maternity leave or paternity leave when it
is specific to mothers or fathers, respectively. Parental leave aims to help working parents after
the birth of a child by providing them time off work to bond with their child while guaranteeing
their return to the pre-birth job. When parental leave is paid leave, it provides financial support
as well as job protection.
Parental leave is an interesting topic for economic research. First, take-up of parental leave
can be formalized as economic decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis. Whether to take
parental leave or not can be considered as a decision of whether to spend time at work or at
home during a period of time after birth of a child. As Becker (1965) formalized the allocations
of time as economic decisions, take-up decisions can be formalized as an economic decisions.
Second, parental leave is closely related to parents’ labour market behaviour. For example,
parental leave influences parents’ attachment to the labour market. A longer parental leave
has been found to increase mothers’ job continuity with their pre-birth employer (Baker and
Milligan, 2008). Parental leave also influences working parents’ subsequent wages after the
birth of a child. Compared to the case where no parental leave is available and many mothers
quit a job after childbirth, increased job continuity due to parental leave may help mothers keep
firm-specific human capital and maintain wage levels. Compared to the case where parents do
not stop working after childbirth, taking parental leave incurs career interruptions. In this case,
taking parental leave may have a negative impact on subsequent wages. In particular, fathers
who take parental leave has been found to have a larger negative effect on subsequent wages
than mothers (Albrecht, Edin, Sundstrom, and Vroman, 1999).
This thesis studies married couples’ decisions regarding labour supply, fertility, and take-up
2of parental leave. Importantly, it emphasizes household interactions in a family labour supply
framework where husbands and wives jointly make decisions.
As parental leave aims to help working parents take time off work to care for their newborn
child at home, take-up of parental leave is possibly related to parents’ time allocations. In
Chapter 2, I describe how differences in married individuals’ time allocations between Canada
and the U.S are related to different parental leave policies. First, I document background
information on parental leave policies and take-up behaviour in the two countries. Second, I
analyze married individuals’ time allocations across market work, child care, household chores,
and leisure using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) for Canada and American Time
Use Survey (ATUS) for the U.S. I examine the role of the youngest child’s age on parents’ time
allocations for each country and make comparisons between the two countries. Also, I explore
the role of the extensive and the intensive margins in shaping the unconditional average time
allocations by analyzing participation and the conditional averages separately.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effects of maternity leave policies on married couples’ fertil-
ity and employment decisions within a household search framework. I consider decisions re-
garding job search, fertility, and take-up of maternity leave as joint decisions within a married
couple. To emphasize household interactions in these decisions, I develop a unique household
search model that features home production and endogenous fertility choice. I characterize
reservation rules in my household search model and find the model can generate patterns that
cannot be generated by an individual search model. My model generates a case in which a
breadwinner in a household shifts from one spouse to the other spouse when an unemployed
spouse accepts an offer. In particular, I parameterize a benchmark model that provides 12
weeks of unpaid leave as in the U.S. I use the parameterized model to examine the impact of
an extended paid maternity leave on fertility rates and household employment. I find that a
longer paid maternity leave increases fertility rates, lowers the fraction of dual-earner couples,
and increases the fraction of single-earner couples.
In Chapter 3, only mothers have access to maternity leave while fathers do not have access
to parental leave. However, in Chapter 2, I document that a few married men take paid parental
leave in Canada. In Chapter 4, I extend the scope of my research and examine why only a few
married men take paid parental leave in Canada despite its availability. First, I document sup-
porting empirical evidence for the possible explanations using Canadian micro-data sets. Next,
I develop a life-cycle model of family labour supply that features learning-by-doing human
capital accumulation and time allocations across market work, leisure, and home production.
Then, I quantify the relative importance of the possible explanations within the model. I find
that lower home productivity in the presence of an infant, higher rental rates of human capi-
tal, and higher wage penalties for not working for fathers are the main contributors to the low
3take-up of fathers. Finally, I conduct policy experiments to highlight the role of cash benefits
and paternity leave on fathers’ take-up of leave. The results show that fathers’ take-up rates
are responsive to an increase in an income replacement rate combined with the introduction of
paternity leave.
Bibliography
Albrecht, James W., Per-Anders Edin, Marianne Sundstrom, and Susan B. Vroman. 1999.
“Career Interruptions and Subsequent Earnings: A Reexamination Using Swedish Data.”
The Journal of Human Resources 34 (2):294–311.
Baker, Michael and Kevin Milligan. 2008. “How Does Job-Protected Maternity Leave Affect
Mothers’ Employment?” Journal of Labor Economics 26 (4):655–691.
Becker, Gary S. 1965. “A Theory of the Allocation of Time.” The Economic Journal
75 (299):493–517.
4Chapter 2
Parental Leave and Married Individuals’
Time Allocations in Canada and the U.S.
2.1 Introduction
Paid parental leave, including maternity and paternity leave, is a family policy that helps work-
ing parents care for a newborn or newly adopted child by guaranteeing their return to the
pre-birth job and providing financial support. Canada and the U.S. have very different parental
leave policies. While the U.S. provides 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave after the birth of
a child, its northern neighbor provides a much longer paid parental leave. This difference in
parental leave policy may play a role in how married couples allocate their time after a child is
born and how married parents maintain work-life balance across countries.
The goal of this chapter is to describe how differences in married individuals’ time alloca-
tions between Canada and the U.S. may be related to different parental leave policies in the two
countries. To do so, this chapter is divided into two parts. First, I document background infor-
mation on parental leave policies and take-up behaviour in the two countries. This includes a
brief history, the details of the policies during the period of interest, and current discussions on
policy reforms. I mainly focus on policies at the federal level. Then, I document the take-up be-
haviour in the two countries. For Canada, I focus on take-up behaviour of married individuals
using data from the Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (EICS) as in Marshall (2008) and
McKay, Mathieu, and Doucet (2016).1 While McKay et al. (2016) address income inequality
in take-up of parental leave, I discuss differences in take-up by gender and education in the two
countries. For the U.S., due to lack of a comprehensive survey, I review recent studies on take-
up behaviour of leave after the birth of a child. Using these studies, I am able to document that
1Hou, Magolis, and Haan (2017) use linked administrative data to examine take-up rates in Canada.
5the fraction of married individuals eligible for a statutory parental leave is smaller in the U.S.
than in Canada and that most mothers in Canada take up 12 months of parental leave. Given
the finding in the literature that most mothers in the U.S. return to work within 6 months, I
conclude that differences in statutory parental leave policies influence parents’ labour supply
after the birth of a child.
In the second part, I analyze married individuals’ time allocations using data from the Gen-
eral Social Survey (GSS) for Canada and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the U.S.
I examine the role of having children on their parents’ time allocations across market work,
child care, household chores, and leisure for each country and compare the time allocations be-
tween the two countries. In time allocation literature, Kimmel and Connelly (2007) distinguish
care-giving time from household chores and leisure. They study the role of economic and de-
mographic factors such as the number of children and age of children on mothers’ time choices
in the U.S. My study explores the role of children characteristics on time allocations of fathers
as well as mothers. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) document trends in time allocations across the
four time use categories within the U.S. My classification of four time use categories is based
on the measures defined in their study. Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) document educa-
tional differences in care-giving time using data from the ATUS and corroborate their finding
by showing that the same finding is observed in other countries including Canada. Cardia and
Gomme (2018) develop a life-cycle model that distinguishes childcare from household chores
and emphasize the role of childcare in matching the life-cycle patterns of women’s market
work in the U.S.
For Canada, data from the GSS have been used to document time use patterns (McFarlane
and Tedds, 2008, Hilbrecht, 2009, Patnaik, 2016). McFarlane and Tedds (2008) document
trends in time allocations within Canada and compare the Canadian trends to the U.S. trends
in Aguiar and Hurst (2007). Patnaik (2016) studies the long run consequences of a paternity
leave policy in Quebec on fathers’ time use. My study is similar to Patnaik (2016) in that I
relate parental leave policies with time allocations of parents with a young child. However,
my work differs in that I focus on the role of the youngest child’s age on parents’ time choices
and makes comparisons between Canada and the U.S. I also consider both the extensive and
intensive margins and examine which margin drives patterns in parents’ time allocations by
age of the youngest child.
From the time use analyses, I find several interesting results. First, Canadian mothers
with an infant spend fewer hours on market work and more hours on other categories than U.S.
mothers with an infant. It may be due to differences in parental leave policies in Canada and the
U.S. Second, while high-educated mothers in Canada and the U.S. display very similar patterns
in time allocations when the youngest child is two years old or older, low-educated mothers
6show distinct differences in time allocations between the two countries until the youngest child
is aged 6 or older. In particular, low-educated mothers of the youngest child aged 2–5 in the
U.S. spend fewer hours on market work and child care and more hours on leisure than the
Canadian counterparts. I also document that the average child care hours of mothers with an
infant are lower in the U.S. than in Canada.
Third, I find that both the intensive and extensive margins play a role in shaping the patterns
in parents’ time allocations by age of the youngest child. For wives’ market work, cross-
country differences are explained mostly by participation. For child care time of mothers with
an infant, a cross-country difference among the high-educated are accounted for entirely by
the intensive margin, whereas a substantial cross-country difference among the low-educated
is explained not only by the intensive margin but also by the extensive margins. I also show
that both extensive and intensive margins contribute to gender differences in market work and
child care time.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I document background about parental
leave policies and patterns of take-up behaviour in Canada and the U.S. In Section 2.3, I ex-
amine the role of children on married individuals’ time allocations in each country and make
comparisons between the two countries. I relate cross-country differences in the take-up of
parental leave to cross-country differences in time allocations among married individuals with
an infant. I conclude in Section 2.4.
2.2 Parental Leave Policy in Canada and the U.S.
This section briefly documents the background information for the parental leave policy and
patterns of married couples’ take-up behaviour in Canada and the U.S. Currently, parental leave
benefits in most of Canada are paid under Employment Insurance (EI), a public insurance sys-
tem at the federal level. The exception is Que´bec. In 2006, Que´bec developed its own public
insurance system for parental leave, called Que´bec Parental Insurance Plan (QPIP). The rules
under QPIP are different from the rest of Canada under EI.2 As of today, in the U.S., the federal
parental leave policy is based on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, while a
small number of states have state paid family leave programs and some firms voluntarily pro-
vide family leave. This study focuses mainly on the federal parental leave policies, especially
under EI from 2001 until 2016 in Canada and under the FMLA in the U.S.
2A key feature of QPIP is five weeks of paternity leave that is reserved for fathers. Compared to EI, QPIP has
higher cash benefits with a higher replacement rate of 70% and a higher maximum insurable income. Also, EI
and QPIP have different work requirements for eligibility.
72.2.1 Canadian Parental Leave Policy
In 1971, Canada’s policy allowed for fifteen weeks of maternity benefits. Maternity benefits
could be used only by birth mothers under Unemployment Insurance, the public insurance sys-
tem at the federal level preceding EI. In 1990, ten weeks of parental leave that could be shared
by parents were added to fifteen-week-long maternity leave. A mother could use maternity and
parental leave for at most six months including a two week waiting period.3 A father could use
at most ten weeks of parental leave at the expense of his wife’s portion of parental leave.
To help parents spend more time with their newborn children, in 2001, Canada extended
statutory parental leave from 10 to 35 weeks. Overall, parents to a newborn child can spend
up to a combined total of 52 weeks off work while receiving financial support. Between 2001
and 2017, the maximum lengths of maternity and parental leave remained the same. As of
December 2017, a parent has an option of extended parental benefits for 61 weeks with a lower
rate of income replacement. The 2018 Canadian federal budget includes a proposal to add 5
weeks of take-it-or-leave-it leave for the second parent who is likely to be a father for many
couples.
In Canada, the maximum duration of job protection is the same as the maximum duration
of parental benefit payments.4 The federal Canadian Labour Code guarantees an employee the
right to be reinstated in a position the same as or comparable to the pre-birth position when
the employee returns to work after parental leave (Section 209.1). The Canadian Labour Code
provides employees 17 weeks of maternity leave and 35 weeks of parental leave. While the
Canadian Labour Code only applies to employees in federally regulated businesses and indus-
tries, most workers in Canada get job-protected unpaid leave under provincial and territorial
Employment Standards. Although provincial jurisdictions have slight variations in lengths of
job-protected leave, they are fairly similar across jurisdictions because they follow the Cana-
dian Labour Code (Pulkingham and Van Der Gaag, 2004).5 The federal EI pays at most 15
weeks of maternity benefits and 35 weeks of parental benefits after a two week waiting period.
During parental leave, a worker who is eligible for parental benefits under EI receives cash
benefits. To be eligible for parental benefits under EI, a worker must have accumulated at
least 600 hours of insurable employment during the 52-week period immediately before the
3This two week waiting period before a claimant can start receiving the benefits plays the role of an insurance
deductible.
4Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2014) study reforms in German parental leave policy that changed the duration of job
protection and the duration of benefit payments. Their study highlights the relative importance of job protection
and benefit payments in mothers’ labour market outcomes.
5Baker and Milligan (2008) exploited provincial variation in durations of job protection around the introduction
and extension of statutory parental leave. The 17 weeks of job-protection for birth mothers is called “preg-
nancy leave” in Ontario and “maternity leave” in other jurisdictions and at the federal level. In this paper, I use
“maternity leave” to indicate the non-transferable leave for birth mothers following the federal EI.
8Table 2.1: EI Premiums Rates and Maximum Insurance Earnings and Benefits
Year EI premium
rates (%)
Maximum
annual
insurable
earnings ($)
Maximum
weekly
benefits ($)
Maximum
annual
insurable
earnings
(2002$)
Maximum
weekly
benefits
(2002$)
2001 2.25 39,000 413 39,877 422
2002 2.20 39,000 413 39,000 413
2003 2.10 39,000 413 37,938 401
2004 1.98 39,000 413 37,249 394
2005 1.95 39,000 413 36,449 386
2006 1.87 39,000 413 35,747 378
2007 1.80 40,000 423 35,874 379
2008 1.73 41,100 435 36,021 381
2009 1.73 42,300 447 36,976 391
2010 1.73 43,200 457 37,082 392
2011 1.78 44,200 468 36,864 390
2012 1.83 45,900 485 37,716 399
2013 1.88 47,400 501 38,599 408
2014 1.88 48,600 514 38,818 411
2015 1.88 49,500 524 39,100 414
2016 1.88 50,800 537 39,564 418
2017 1.63 51,300 543 39,340 416
Average 1.89 43,429 460 37,777 400
Data source: EI premium rates and maximum annual insurable earnings are from Government
of Canada (https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/payroll/payroll-
deductions-contributions/employment-insurance-ei/ei-premium-rates-maximums.html) and CPI index
is from Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 326-0021).
start date of parental leave. Also, a worker must have paid employment insurance premiums.6
Before 2011, only paid employees were covered by EI. From 2011, self-employed people can
access EI special benefits, which include maternity and parental benefits, by opting in the EI
program and paying the EI premium voluntarily.
Parental benefits under EI are funded by employer’s and employee’s EI premiums as with
regular unemployment benefits. The average EI premium rate between 2001 and 2017 was
1.89% per $100 of earnings (Table 2.1). Employer’s premiums are 1.4 times the amount of the
employee’s premiums.
There is a maximum for annual insurable earnings. The maximum insurable earnings
amount remained at $39,000 a year between 2001 and 2006. In 2005, the maximum insur-
able earnings were slightly below the median earnings of Canadians employed on a full-time
basis for a full year, $41,401 in 2005 constant dollars. The maximum amount was adjusted up
in 2017 to $51,300 in nominal values, while it went down from $39,877 in 2011 to $36,865 in
6For more details, see Service Canada: http://www.esdc.gc.ca/en/reports/ei/maternity parental.page
92002 dollars.
Parental benefits are calculated as a weekly amount. The basic income replacement is 55%
of a recipient’s average weekly insurable earnings, up to a maximum amount. Between 2001
and 2006, the maximum amount of benefits was set at $413 Canadian dollars. In 2002 dollars,
the average maximum amount of benefits between 2001 and 2017 was $400 per week.
2.2.2 U.S. Parental Leave Policy
Currently, the U.S. federal parental leave policy is based on the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) enacted in 1993. Before this federal law was introduced, some workers had access
to job-protected leaves through collective bargaining or under state laws (Han and Waldfo-
gel, 2003).7 Under the FMLA, eligible employees have access to up to 12 weeks of unpaid,
job-protected leave after the birth of a newborn child as well as to care for a family member
experiencing a serious health condition or for their own serious health condition (U.S. De-
partment of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 2012a). Mothers can take a FMLA leave for
incapacity related to pregnancy or for her own serious health condition following the birth of
a child. Fathers can use a FMLA leave to care for his spouse who is unable to work normally
due to pregnancy or child birth. Family leaves to bond with a newborn child must conclude
within 12 months after the birth. Unlike in Canada, both mothers and fathers in the U.S. have
the same right to take a FMLA leave. So a mother and a father each can use up to 12 weeks.
When 12 weeks of unpaid family leave became statutory at the federal level in the U.S.,
Canada’s then federal policy provided 17 weeks of paid maternity leave and 10 weeks of paid
parental leave. While Canada has extended its parental leave policy two times in 2001 and
2017, since then the U.S. federal policy has not changed.
The FMLA applies to private-sector employers with 50 or more employees, public agen-
cies, including government agencies at all levels, and all public and private elementary and sec-
ondary schools (U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 2012a). These employers
must provide an eligible employee with an unpaid leave and guarantee his or her original job
or a comparable job with equivalent compensation when the employee returns to work after a
FMLA leave. The FMLA also requires employers to continue health insurance coverage for an
employer on leave (U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 2012b). To be eligible
for parental leave under the FMLA, an employee must have worked for their employer at least
12 months and at least 1,250 hours within the past 12 months immediately before the start date
of the leave (U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 2012a).8
7See the Appendix in Han and Waldfogel (2003) for details of state laws. Also, see Gault et al. (2014) for a
detailed history of parental leave in the U.S.
8Additional eligibility requirement is to work at a location where the employer has at least 50 employees within 75
10
As of 2018, paid parental or family leave programs has been put in place in California,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York. In the 1940s, these four states established a state
temporary disability insurance (TDI) system that provides partial wage replacement for wage
losses due to temporary sickness or injury unrelated to a worker’s job. Because eligibility
reasons for TDI entitlement include temporary disability due to pregnancy, paid leave has been
available to pregnant women in these states through TDI even before the states introduced a
paid parental leave program. In 2002, a paid parental or family leave law was enacted by
California, followed by New Jersey in 2008, Rhode Island in 2013, and New York in 2016.
The laws became effective in 2004 in California, 2009 in New Jersey, 2014 in Rhode Island,
and 2018 in New York. The District of Columbia passed a law for a paid parental leave program
in 2017 with the law becoming effective in 2020 (Ruhm, 2017).
Benefits and eligibility requirements in these state laws vary a great deal. The length of
paid leave ranges from 4 weeks in Rhode Island, to 6 weeks in California and New Jersey, to
8 weeks in New York. The income replacement rate of average weekly wages ranges from
55% in California to 66% in New Jersey. The maximum weekly benefit amount ranges from
$615 in New Jersey to $1,173 in California. These programs are financed by payroll taxes paid
by employees. Because eligibility requirements are less strict under state laws than under the
FMLA, the coverage of these state leave programs is greater than that of the FMLA. While
the paid leave programs in Rhode Island and New York guarantees job protection, those in
California and New Jersey do not guarantee job protection. Thus, in California and New Jersey,
those who satisfy FMLA requirements are guaranteed to return to the pre-birth job (Ruhm,
2017).9
In recent years, there have been discussions of paid parental leave in the U.S. In December
2013, members of Congress introduced a proposal for the Family and Medical Leave Enhance-
ment (FAMILY) Act, which would create a national insurance fund to make FMLA leaves paid.
This bill made no progress and was reintroduced in March 2015. As part of his support for the
bill, President Obama proposed US$2.2 billion for the federal Department of Labor’s Fiscal
Year 2016 budget (Gabel, Waldfogel, and Haas, 2015). However, the bill made no progress
again and was reintroduced in February 2017 (Gabel and Kaufman, 2017).
President Trump promised to introduce legislation to make paid parental leave available in
the U.S. His budget plan for fiscal year 2019 proposed six weeks of fully paid family leave
to new mothers and fathers using the Unemployment Insurance system as a base. The budget
plan proposed $1 to 2 billion for funding to provide paid parental leave each year and a total of
miles. The minimum 12 months of tenure is not necessarily consecutive. Paid leave and unpaid leave, including
FMLA leave, are not included.
9See Ruhm (2017) for more details.
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$7 billion between 2019 and 2023 (United States. Office of Management and Budget, 2018).
2.2.3 Take-up of Parental Leave in Canada
I now document patterns of take-up behaviour among married parents in Canada, using the
Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (EICS), which is an annual cross-sectional survey
that studies the coverage of the EI program in Canada.10 To examine the coverage of maternity
and parental benefits, the survey includes a subsample of mothers of infants less than one year
old as a part of its target population. These mothers are either working, unemployed, not in
the labour force, or on leave. This survey collects information about whether the mothers
were eligible for EI, whether they received maternity and parental benefits, and whether their
spouses claimed or intended to claim parental benefits. This survey also collects information
about duration of leave. From 2004, the survey started collecting duration of parental benefits
claimed by fathers.
I use data from the surveys collected between 2004 and 2011. The sample of interest is
restricted to 24- to 42-year-old mothers who have an infant less than one year old and live with
their spouse. I exclude mothers living in Que´bec between 2006 and 2011 because different
rules applied to them under QPIP. I also exclude mothers who are students. I do not include
male respondents who answer that they were receiving parental benefits under EI because of the
small sample size. I apply the weights provided in the survey data. These sample restrictions
result in 6,326 mothers. This sample is about 81% of the mother respondents living in Canada
outside Quebec under EICS.
Among the mothers in the sample, 67% were eligible for EI. EICS asks eligibility status
of the mothers who are not working at the time of the survey. Because the eligibility status of
working mothers is not collected, researchers cannot distinguish working mothers who did not
use parental leave because of ineligibility from those who choose not to take up or who have
returned from leave. I assume all of the working mothers in the data were eligible. Therefore,
the universe of “eligible” mothers includes all mothers, except the non-working mothers who
did not use parental leave because they were ineligible. Thus, the eligibility rate of mothers
may be overstated.
Among the mothers in the sample, 85% had a husband who was eligible for EI. EICS
does not directly ask mothers about their spouse’s eligibility for EI. The universe of “eligible”
fathers includes all fathers, including the fathers who used or planned to use parental leave,
except the fathers whose wives answered that their husbands did not use parental leave because
they were ineligible.
10People living in a common-law relationship are classified as “married” in this survey.
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Table 2.2: Take-up Rates by Eligibility and Education (%)
Fathers Mothers
All parents 11.1 67.6
Eligible parents 13.1 90.8
Low-educated 11.8 90.6
High-educated 13.6 90.8
Data: Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (2004–2011).
Table 2.3: Take-up Rates by Household Educational Type
Husband’s Low High
Wife’s Low High Low High
Fathers 11.2 12.3 10.2 14.2
Mothers 89.6 91.2 91.8 90.7
Data: Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (2004–2011).
Table 2.2 shows a stark difference in take-up rates between married fathers and mothers.
Among mothers with an infant, 68% answered that they received maternity and/or parental
leave after the child was born. In the survey, most mothers who did not receive parental benefits
answered they did not because they have not worked within the past two years, did not pay EI
premium, or did not accumulate enough hours to meet the work requirement. Conditional on
eligibility, 91% of mothers took paid leave. Meanwhile, only 13% of mothers answered that
their eligible husbands had used or planned to use paid parental leave. For the rest of this
section for Canada, I report take-up rates conditional on eligibility.
One feature of take-up is that the statistics do not vary much by educational attainment.
Throughout this paper, educational attainment is grouped into two levels. The low-educated,
denoted by “Low”, are some college, high school graduates, and those who have less than
twelve years of schooling. High-educated people, denoted by “High”, are those who received
a certificate, diploma, or degree from a trade school, community college, or university. While
there is almost no variation among mothers, there is a small variation among fathers by educa-
tional attainment.
The variation in fathers’ take-up rates by the wife’s education is clearer when I condition
on husbands’ own education. In particular, among high-educated fathers, their take-up rate
increases with their wife’s education. Their take-up rate is 10% for those with a low-educated
wife and 14% for those with a high-educated wife (Table 2.3).
A similar pattern emerges in durations of parental leave in Table 2.4. The average duration
of fathers’ parental leave conditional on take-up is 14 weeks, whereas the average duration
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Table 2.4: Average Durations of Leave by Individual Educational Level
Fathers Mothers
All Low High All Low High
Number of weeks 14.1 14.9 13.9 46.3 46.6 46.2
Data source: Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (2004–2011).
Table 2.5: Average Durations among Couples Sharing Leave
Household education
(Husband’s, Wife’s)
Husband Wife Total
All types 10.2 38.6 48.8
(Low, High) 10.7 35.6 46.3
(High,High) 10.4 39.0 49.4
Data source: Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (2004–2011). Statistics for couples
with a low-educated wife are not reported due to a small sample size.
of mothers’ parental leave including maternity leave is 46 weeks or 11 months.11 Among
couples where a husband and wife share parental leave, on average, a wife received maternity
and parental benefits for 39 weeks, and a husband received parental benefits for 10 weeks. On
average, a couple used paid parental leave for 49 weeks in total (Table 2.5).
Some mothers received additional financial support from other sources. While take-up
rates and durations of parental leave barely vary by individuals’ educational attainment, the
statistics for additional payments among mothers show clear variation by mothers’ educa-
tion. Among mothers who took paid parental leave, 30% answered they received additional
payments from their employers, insurance or other benefits other than EI maternity/parental
benefits. High-educated mothers are more likely to receive additional payments: 13% of low-
educated mothers and 35% of high-educated mothers received additional payments. Table 2.6
shows that, among mothers who took paid parental leave and received additional payments,
about two-thirds of them received additional payments during a period shorter than or equal
to the maximum length of maternity leave. Similarly, two-thirds of low-educated mothers re-
ceive additional payments for a period shorter than maternity leave. However, compared to
high-educated mothers, more are likely to have less than 8 weeks of additional payments.
11I use variable ALLEAVE recording the length of all leave before they returned or expect to return. This variable
includes not only maternity and parental leave but also other types of leave such as sick leave. Thus, some
recorded responses are longer than the maximum length of 52 weeks. When calculating average duration, I
replace the values greater than 12 months with 12 months. I also apply 12 months to those who answered that
they do not plan to return.
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Table 2.6: Mothers’ Duration of Additional Payment (%)
Duration All Low High
0–8 weeks 34.5 41.5 33.8
9–17 weeks 34.5 24.8 35.4
18+ weeks 31.0 33.7 30.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Data source: Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (2004–2011).
2.2.4 Take-up of Parental Leave in the U.S.
In the U.S., there is no comprehensive annual survey on FMLA leave coverage and usage
unlike EICS in Canada. Researchers have used data from various surveys such as the National
Compensation Survey, a leave module in the 2011 American Time Use Survey (ATUS), a
fertility topical module in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the
Current Population Survey (CPS).12
The 2011 ATUS includes leave module supplements that provide detailed information on
access to paid and unpaid leaves and usage of unpaid leave after the birth of a child. Although
the survey does not limit the type of leaves to FMLA leaves, data from this survey are infor-
mative in understanding how many people in the U.S. have access to some kind of leave when
their child is born. Using the data, I calculate the fraction of married workers who answered
they could take up a leave after the birth of a child. I focus on the sample of 23- to 42-year-
old, working married individuals with spouse present.13 Table 2.7 shows that the fractions for
husbands and wives are very similar. Among the sample, 69% of husbands and 73% of wives
reported they had access to unpaid leave, and about 50% of each gender reported access to paid
leave. By education, a high-educated subsample is more likely to have access to unpaid and
paid leave than a low-educated subsample. About three-fourths of the high-educated and two-
thirds of the low-educated respondents reported that they could take unpaid leave. Educational
differences in access to paid leave are greater that educational differences in access to unpaid
leave, especially among husbands.
Leaves in the ATUS leave module may include vacation, sick leave, or disability leave.
To describe the eligibility rates for a FMLA leave, I take a similar approach to Waldfogel
(1999) using data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) collected between 2011
and 2016. Because this survey does not directly collect information on respondents’ eligibility
for a FMLA leave, I impute respondents’ FMLA eligibility using available information in the
data. I count respondents as working for a covered employer if, in the past year, they were
12Gault et al. (2014) summarize features of the commonly used data sets.
13The sample includes private and public sector employees plus incorporated self-employed and excludes unpaid
workers and unincorporated self-employees.
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Table 2.7: Fraction of Married Workers with Access to a Leave after Birth of a Child (%)
Husbands Wives
Total Low-edu High-edu Total Low-edu High-edu
Unpaid leave 69.3 65.1 73.9 73.1 66.1 77.3
Paid leave 47.6 35.9 60.6 49.1 40.5 54.1
Data: 2011 American Time Use Survey - Leave Module.
Table 2.8: Fraction of Married Individuals Eligible for a FMLA Leave by Education (%)
Husbands Wives
Total Low-edu High-edu Total Low-edu High-edu
All 53.6 44.2 64.4 36.0 26.2 44.4
Data: March Current Population Survey (2011–2016).
1) paid employees in the public sector, 2) elementary and secondary school teachers, or 3)
paid employees for an employer with 50 or more employees.14 Also, the minimum work
requirement is viewed as satisfied if the product of weeks worked last year and usual hours
worked per week is at least 1,250 hours and the number of weeks employed last year is at least
50 weeks.15 The sample of interest is restricted to 23- to 42-year-old married individuals living
with their spouse. Table 2.8 shows that, among this sample, 54% of husbands and 36% of wives
are eligible for a FMLA leave. The remainder is not eligible because they were not employed
last year, they were self-employed last year, or they are paid employees who do not meet the
FMLA requirements. The eligibility rates show large differences by sex and by education.
Overall, husbands’ eligibility rates are 20 percentage points higher than wives’ eligibility rates.
By education, for both husbands and wives, the eligibility rates of the high-educated are about
20 percentage points higher than those of the low-educated.
Compared to Canada, the eligibility rates for FMLA in the U.S. are low. This likely stems
from less coverage. For example, unlike in Canada, small employers with fewer than 50 em-
ployees are not covered by the FMLA and the minimum work hours for FMLA eligibility are
twice the minimum for an EI parental leave. This implies that, compared to parents in Canada,
parents in the U.S. have a much shorter, unpaid job-protected leave after the birth of a child
and are less likely to have access to a statutory leave.
For U.S. take-up rates of leaves after birth of a child, Han, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2009)
used the panel structure of the CPS and its fertility supplements collected in June. Because
households are interviewed for four consecutive months and for another four consecutive
months after an 8-month-long break, the authors could follow parents for up to three con-
14The March CPS before 2011 groups employers with 25 to 99 workers in one category.
15Waldfogel(1999) restricted her analysis to full-time workers who work 35 or more hours per week.
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secutive months after the birth of a child. In their study, absence from work around the birth of
a child for “other reasons”, other than vacation, own illness, labor dispute, or layoff is viewed
as a proxy for take-up of maternity or paternity leave.16 According to their results, in 2004,
45% of mothers and 91% of fathers were employed during the month of birth, and the share
of parents who are employed and absent for “other reasons” was highest one month after the
birth for mothers at 63% and during the birth month for fathers at 6%. The share went down
to 17% three months after birth for mothers and below 1% two months after birth for fathers
(Han et al., 2009). These patterns imply that employed parents in the U.S. return to work in a
relatively short period of time after the birth of a child.
The figures from Han et al. (2009) need to be treated with caution for two reasons. First,
maternity or paternity leave in the survey is not limited to a FMLA leave but can come from
collective bargaining. Second, the absence rates are conditional on employment during the
reference period for the survey, rather than employment at the moment of the birth. A decrease
in the rates may be due to a decrease in employment.
Although the SIPP also does not limit the type of leaves to FMLA leaves and does not
include fathers’ take-up behaviour, data from the survey are informative in understanding edu-
cational differences in mothers’ take-up behaviour. Using data from the SIPP, Laughlin (2011)
reported take-up behaviour of mothers who worked during pregnancy for their first child. She
reported that, among those who worked during pregnancy before the first birth between 2006
and 2008, 51% and 42% used paid and unpaid leaves around the birth, respectively, and 22%
quit their job.17 By education, a larger fraction of higher educated mothers used paid leave
compared to lower educated mothers (32% of high school graduate vs. 66% of a bachelor’s
or degree), and a larger fraction of lower educated mothers quit their jobs compared to higher
educated mothers (33% of high school graduate vs. 13% of a bachelor’s or degree). For unpaid
leave, lower educated mothers were more likely to use unpaid leave than high-educated moth-
ers, but the educational gradient was quite flat. For the duration of leave, this report also finds
evidence that most mothers in the U.S. return to work within a short period of time. Among the
sample, 59% started working within 3 months after the birth. By 6 months after the birth, 73%
had returned to work. Only 6 % started working between 6 and 12 months after the birth. By
education, high school graduates were more likely to start working within 3 months after the
birth than college graduates, and college graduates were more likely to start working within 3
16Since 1994, the CPS has collected maternity or paternity leave as a separate reason. However, as Han et
al. (2009) include a period before 1994 in their study, “other reasons” was used as a proxy for maternity or
paternity leave.
17Multiple answers were allowed. Paid and unpaid leaves include a maternity, sick, and vacation leaves. Among
the sample, 41% and 36% used paid maternity leave and unpaid maternity leave, respectively. The type of a
leave is not limited to a FMLA leave. Also, their sample is not limited to married individuals.
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to 5 months after the birth compared to high school graduates.18
2.3 Understanding Married Individuals’ Time Allocations
The purpose of parental leave is to help parents take time off work and to spend their time
at home with their newborn child. I conjecture that take-up of parental leave is closely re-
lated to parents’ time allocations. Therefore, patterns of married people’s time allocations are
informative in understanding their decisions regarding parental leave. In this section, I docu-
ment patterns of married people’s time allocations particularly by the characteristics of their
children.
This analysis is done with data from the GSS for Canada and data from the ATUS for the
U.S. These two time use surveys collect cross-sectional data which measure individuals’ time
use in various activities. GSS collects this information every five to six years, and ATUS is an
annual survey. For these surveys, individuals record a retrospective 24-hour time diary during
a day of the week. Recorded activities include detailed items related to paid work, housework,
recreation, personal care, and so on. Also, the survey collects respondents’ demographic and
household characteristics, such as age, marital status, the number of children, and the age of
the youngest household member. I use data from GSS collected in 2005 and 2010 and data
from ATUS collected between 2003 and 2016.19
I characterize four major uses of time: market work, child care, household chores, and
leisure. My definition of market work is comparable to the category of core market work in
Aguiar and Hurst (2007). This category includes all time spent working in the market sector
on main jobs, second jobs, and overtime, but it excludes commuting time. Child care includes
child care for young children and reading to and playing with children. Household chores
include activities such as housework, shopping, repairs, and maintenance. Leisure is defined
as time endowment remaining after subtracting the time spent on market, child care, household
chores. In my classification, commuting time is included in leisure. The time endowment is
discretionary time that excludes time dedicated to sleeping and other necessary personal care.
Because I assume that a person spends 8 hours per day on necessary personal care and sleeping,
the time endowment is equivalent to 16 hours per day or 112 hours per week in calendar time.
For both surveys, the amount of time spent in an activity is recorded in minutes. By averaging
all records on weekdays and a weekend and multiplying the averages by 7/60, following Aguiar
and Hurst (2007), I report weekly time allocations for each time-use category.
18See Laughlin (2011) for detail statistics.
19The most recent time use data from GSS were collected between 2015 and 2016. I do not use this cycle because
changes of classifications in the public-use micro data from the previous two cycles cause difficulties in creating
consistent measures of time use.
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Table 2.9: Summary Statistics – Canada
High-educated Low-educated
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Respondent’s Age
25–34 0.245 0.297 0.220 0.232
35–44 0.398 0.372 0.327 0.327
45–54 0.357 0.331 0.453 0.441
Have children under 18 0.623 0.626 0.599 0.513
Number of children
One 0.168 0.180 0.178 0.130
Two 0.309 0.323 0.271 0.250
Three+ 0.146 0.123 0.150 0.132
Youngest child aged
0–1 0.108 0.118 0.102 0.069
2–3 0.101 0.085 0.080 0.062
4–5 0.069 0.058 0.045 0.055
6–8 0.088 0.104 0.080 0.081
9–11 0.088 0.093 0.091 0.091
12–14 0.091 0.096 0.104 0.076
15–17 0.077 0.072 0.097 0.078
N. Obs. 2852 3623 1781 1985
Data: General Social Survey (2005, 2010).
The sample of interest is restricted to married individuals aged between 25 and 54. As in
the previous section, educational attainment is grouped into two levels. I exclude observations
whose records do not sum to 1440 minutes which is a full day. For the Canadian sample, peo-
ple who live in Que´bec and whose youngest child is born in 2006 or afterwards are excluded
from the sample. Observations missing information about respondent’s education, age of the
youngest child, and main activity in the last 7 days and observation missing information about
their spouse, such as spouse’s education and main activity in the last 7 days, are excluded.
Also, students and retirees are excluded. This sample restriction results in 6,475 high-educated
observations and 3,766 low-educated observations for Canada. For the U.S. sample, observa-
tions missing information about spouse’s education and employment status in the last 7 days
are excluded. Also, retirees are excluded. These restrictions result in 28,270 high-educated
respondents and 26,009 low-educated respondents for the U.S.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 display summary statistics for these two samples by sex and education.
Across the sample, about 60% have children under 18 living in their household. The remainder
has no children under 18 living in the household either because they have not yet had a child or
because their children have grown up. A noteworthy difference between Canada and the U.S.
is that the U.S. has a higher fraction of people who are low-educated than Canada, as seen in
OECD (2018b). Also, the U.S. sample has a higher fraction of people living with children,
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics – The U.S.
High-educated Low-educated
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Respondent’s Age
25–34 0.276 0.329 0.288 0.279
35–44 0.368 0.361 0.344 0.336
45–54 0.356 0.310 0.368 0.385
Have children under 18 0.658 0.640 0.665 0.623
Number of children
One 0.225 0.240 0.233 0.226
Two 0.291 0.276 0.258 0.231
Three+ 0.142 0.124 0.174 0.166
Youngest child aged
0–1 0.151 0.138 0.128 0.108
2–3 0.111 0.102 0.107 0.090
4–5 0.076 0.073 0.086 0.077
6–8 0.097 0.100 0.107 0.102
9–11 0.089 0.087 0.092 0.091
12–14 0.074 0.076 0.077 0.085
15–17 0.059 0.064 0.068 0.071
N. Obs. 12,858 15,412 12,735 13,274
Data: American Time Use Survey (2003-2016).
people living with one child, and people with an infant, compared to the Canadian sample.
These differences are related to the fact that the mean age of mothers at childbirth is higher in
Canada than in the U.S. (OECD, 2018a).
2.3.1 Presence of Children
First, I examine how the presence of children is related to married individuals’ time alloca-
tions. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 report coefficients from a linear regression of total time spent on
each category on sex, presence of children under 18, and their interaction terms for the U.S.
and Canada, respectively. Regressions are separately estimated by education group for each
country. A constant term shows the average hours per week spent by husbands not living with
children. The coefficient on “Wife” represents the gender difference in the amount of time
spent on a category. The coefficients on “HaveChildren” and “Wife×HaveChildren” show the
impact of living with children on their parents’ time allocation and a gender difference in its
impact, respectively.
The tables show that specialization between the two categories is stronger among the low-
educated than among the high-educated. For example, in Canada, high-educated wives spend
4 fewer hours on market work and 6 more hours on household chores than high-educated
husbands. Among the low-educated, wives spend 11 fewer hours on market work and 12
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Table 2.11: Average Hours per Week by Sex and Presence of Children – Canada
(a) High-educated
Market Work Child Care Household
Chores
Leisure
Constant 36.669** 0.033 16.767** 58.531**
(1.165) (0.028) (0.683) (1.022)
Wife -4.454** 0.026 5.880** -1.452
(1.508) (0.044) (0.922) (1.296)
HaveChildren 3.688* 7.260** -1.199 -9.750**
(1.455) (0.290) (0.867) (1.250)
Wife×HaveChildren -13.401** 6.804** 4.997** 1.600
(1.875) (0.522) (1.175) (1.592)
(b) Low-educated
Market Work Child Care Household
Chores
Leisure
Constant 37.833** 0.085 15.847** 58.235**
(1.417) (0.078) (0.811) (1.313)
Wife -11.291** 0.097 11.171** 0.022
(1.774) (0.112) (1.172) (1.612)
HaveChildren 1.930 5.546** -0.553 -6.923**
(1.861) (0.409) (1.062) (1.701)
Wife×HaveChildren -8.339** 7.402** 2.509 -1.572
(2.372) (0.731) (1.554) (2.140)
Data: General Social Survey (2005, 2010). Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. **Significant at the 1%
level. *Significant at the 5% level. +Significant at the 10% level.
more hours on household chores. On average, husbands and wives have almost the same
amount of leisure time. For the U.S., the time allocations among those with no children show
similar patterns to the time allocations in Canada in terms of gender differences. A noticeable
difference between the two countries is that, for high-educated husbands without children,
those in the U.S. spend more time on market work and less time on leisure than those in
Canada.
The presence of children within a household does influence married individuals’ time allo-
cations in both countries. In particular, specialization between market work and home produc-
tion, such as child care and household chores, is stronger among those with children than those
with no children. For Canada, although high-educated husbands in Canada increase child care
time by 7 hours per week by reducing leisure time, wives spend twice as much time on child
care as husbands. Furthermore, while the presence of children barely changes high-educated
husbands’ time on household chores, it significantly increases high-educated wives’ time on
household chores. To increase time spent on home production by such a large amount, high-
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Table 2.12: Average Hours per Week by Sex and Presence of Children – The U.S.
(a) High-educated
Market Work Child Care Household
Chores
Leisure
Constant 40.562** 0.240** 16.302** 54.896**
(0.734) (0.058) (0.411) (0.633)
Wife -7.407** 0.397** 5.678** 1.332
(0.980) (0.098) (0.587) (0.835)
HaveChildren 0.947 8.513** -1.910** -7.550**
(0.816) (0.149) (0.453) (0.695)
Wife×HaveChildren -9.322** 6.746** 4.627** -2.051*
(1.093) (0.243) (0.649) (0.919)
(b) Low-educated
Market Work Child Care Household
Chores
Leisure
Constant 37.966** 0.394** 16.554** 57.087**
(0.769) (0.060) (0.451) (0.664)
Wife -11.948** 0.904** 9.350** 1.694+
(1.002) (0.137) (0.650) (0.873)
HaveChildren 0.396 5.812** -1.484** -4.724**
(0.868) (0.152) (0.498) (0.745)
Wife×HaveChildren -7.094** 5.486** 4.220** -2.613**
(1.135) (0.269) (0.730) (0.985)
Data: American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. **Significant at the
1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. +Significant at the 10% level.
educated mothers reduce additional market hours.
Overall patterns for U.S. high-educated parents are similar to those in Canada, but the
two countries show differences. High-educated parents in the U.S. spend more time on market
work and child care and less time on household chores and leisure than those in Canada. For the
impact of living with children on parents’ leisure time, a decrease in leisure time is statistically
significantly greater for mothers than for fathers in the U.S. while it is smaller for mothers than
for fathers in Canada.
Similarly, the low-educated show stronger specialization among those with children than
those without children in both countries. A noteworthy difference from the high-educated is
that the low-educated increase child care time by a smaller amount as seen in Guryan et al.
(2008). Another difference from the high-educated is that changes in market work and house-
hold chores due to the presence of children are smaller for low-educated parents. Two countries
show different impact of living with children on parents’ household chores and leisure. The
presence of children does not add a significant amount of time on household chores in Canada.
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However, U.S. mothers living with children under 18 spend significantly more time on house-
hold chores than those living with no children under 18. For leisure time, a decrease in leisure
time is statistically significantly greater for mothers than for fathers in the U.S. while a gender
difference in the impact on leisure is not statistically significant in Canada.
2.3.2 Time Allocations by Age of the Youngest Child
I now discuss how the age of the youngest child is related to married parents’ time allocations
in more detail. Using the subsample of married individuals living with children under age 18,
I estimate ordinary least squares regressions with time spent in each category as the dependent
variable. I control for age, sex, number of children, and age of the youngest child, as dummy
variables. I also include interaction terms between sex and number of children and between
sex and age of the youngest child. These regressions are estimated separately by education for
each country. Complete results are presented in Tables A.1 – A.4 in Appendix A.
Figure 2.1 displays how high-educated parents’ time allocations depend on age of the
youngest child for Canada in the left panel and for the U.S. in the right panel. The base group
for this figure is 35- to 39-year-old parents living with one child. High-educated husbands’
time allocations in Canada and the U.S. are quite similar. Those with an infant spend roughly
40 hours per week on market work and 14 hours per week on household chores, and these
categories show little or no changes by age of the youngest child. Those with an infant spend
roughly 12 hours per week on child care and 45 hours per week on leisure. As the youngest
child gets older, high-educated husbands gradually reduce child care time and increase leisure
time. Thus, the results Kimmel and Connelly (2007) found for mothers hold for fathers as well.
High-educated wives in Canada and the U.S. also have similar patterns, except for those
with an infant. Those with no children work almost the same hours in the two countries (Tables
2.11 and 2.12). In contrast, among those with an infant under age two, the average market hours
in the two countries display a large difference. On average, those in Canada work 7 fewer hours
than their U.S. counterparts. They allocate the 7 hours across all the other time-use categories.
Compared to U.S. mothers, Canadian mothers spend 3.5, 2, and 1.5 more hours on child care,
household chores, and leisure, respectively. This result confirms that parents who have access
to a longer parental leave allocate time taken away from market work between home production
and leisure. When the youngest child is two years old or older, the average market hours of
high-educated mothers look similar in the two countries.
As a result, specialization between market work and home production, such as child care
and household chores, is stronger among parents with an infant than among parents with
only older children. In addition, specialization among high-educated parents with an infant
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Figure 2.1: Time Allocations by Age of the Youngest Child – High-educated Parents
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(b) US
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Source: General Social Survey (2005, 2010) and American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). These figures
plot adjusted predictions from OLS regressions of each time-use category. The representative group is
parents aged 35–39 with one child.
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is stronger in Canada than in the U.S., while time allocations of high-educated parents with
only older children look alike in the two countries. It is plausible that the large Canada-U.S.
differences among parents with an infant are related to major differences in parental leave poli-
cies and take-up behaviour between the two countries. For Canada, a relatively more generous,
extended parental leave policy allows mothers to take more time off from work and spend more
time at home to care for their babies. This may imply that while the Canadian mothers benefit
from a longer job-protected leave, many high-educated mothers in the U.S. maintain their job
by taking a leave under the FMLA or collective bargaining and returning to work within a short
time after the birth of a child.
Figure 2.2 reports low-educated parents’ average weekly hours as a function of the youngest
child’s age for Canada in the left panel and the U.S. in the right panel. For low-educated hus-
bands, overall patterns by the age of the youngest child are very reminiscent of time allocations
in Figure 2.1. However, while the average weekly hours of high-educated fathers are more or
less the same in the two countries, low-educated husbands in the two countries show differ-
ences in levels of the means. Canadian low-educated fathers spend 5 more hours on market
work and 5 fewer hours on household chores than their U.S. counterparts. Another interest-
ing Canada-U.S. difference is that, in Canada low-educated fathers to an infant spend time on
child care as much as high-educated fathers, whereas those in the U.S. spend 3 fewer hours on
child care and have more leisure time than high-educated fathers in the U.S. and low-educated
fathers in Canada.
For low-educated wives, there are greater differences in time allocations between the two
countries. Those with an infant allocate their time remarkably differently in the two coun-
tries. Those in Canada spend 5 fewer hours on market work than those in the U.S. A more
dramatic difference is observed in child care time. For Canada, low-educated mothers spend as
much time on child care as high-educated mothers in Canada do. Meanwhile, in the U.S. low-
educated mothers spend 11.5 fewer hours on child care than their Canadian counterparts. The
Canada-U.S. difference in child care time is more than twice the difference in market hours.
In addition, Canadian mothers spend more time on household chores than U.S. mothers. As a
result, Canadian mothers have significantly less leisure time than U.S. mothers.
Interestingly, Canada and the U.S. show opposite relationships between education and
leisure time. For Canada, the low-educated have less leisure time than the high-educated
mainly because the low-educated do more household chores than the high-educated. In con-
trast, for the U.S. the low-educated have more leisure time than the high-educated mainly
because they spend less time on market work and child care than the high-educated.
Next, unlike high-educated wives, low-educated wives with children aged 2 to 5 also dis-
play interesting differences in time allocations between the two countries. The low-educated
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Figure 2.2: Time Allocations by Age of the Youngest Child – Low-educated Parents
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Source: General Social Survey (2005, 2010) and American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). These figures
plot adjusted predictions from OLS regressions of each time-use category. The representative group is
parents aged 35–39 with one child.
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wives show a lasting impact of leave on time allocations. When the youngest child’s age in-
creases from 0–1 to 2–3, the average market hours of low-educated wives increases by 12 hours
per week in Canada and only by 2 hours per week in the U.S. The statistics barely change when
the youngest child is aged 4–5. I conjecture that the difference between the two countries may
be related to greater coverage of paid, job-protected leaves in Canada. As seen in the previous
section, only 26% of low-educated wives meet the eligibility requirements for FMLA leaves.
Also, low-educated wives are more likely to quit their job and stop working after birth of a
child, compared to high-educated wives. Therefore, low-educated mothers in the U.S. may be
less likely to return to the pre-birth job. They may face difficulties in returning to the labour
market.20
Extensive Margin vs. Intensive Margin
The average time allocations I reported in the previous analysis include zeros in the calculation
because not all respondents report positive minutes in all four categories. Therefore, a differ-
ence in the statistics between two groups can be due to a difference at the extensive margin or
one at the intensive margin. I now consider the extensive and intensive margins and examine
which margin drives the patterns in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
For the extensive margin, I estimate the probability of participation in each time-use cate-
gory using a logit regression with a binary variable indicating a non-zero duration as a depen-
dent variable. For the intensive margin, I estimate ordinary least squares regressions with time
spent in each category conditional on participation. The same set of control variables are used
as before. A regression is estimated separately for each category by education and country.
For high-educated parents, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display predicted probabilities of participa-
tion and average time allocations conditional on participation as a function of the age of the
youngest child, respectively. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 display the results for low-educated parents
for Canada in the left panel and for the U.S. in the right panel.
The patterns by the age of the youngest child and cross-country differences in high-educated
mothers’ market work are explained mostly by participation. Among high-educated mothers
with an infant, a participation rate in market work is 20 percentage points lower in Canada than
in the U.S., while the conditional average hours show only a small difference (about 40 minutes
per day). When the youngest child is two years old or older, participation rates look alike in
the two countries. As seen among high-educated mothers, Canada-U.S. differences in market
hours among low-educated mothers are largely due to participation. In particular, the pattern of
low-educated mothers’ participation in market work is very reminiscent of the average market
20Another possible reason is how affordable child care services are in the two countries compared to the average
earnings of the low-educated. This discussion is beyond the scope of this study.
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Figure 2.3: Participation Rates by Age of the Youngest Child – High-educated Parents
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Source: General Social Survey (2005, 2010) and American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). These figures
plot margins from logit regressions of each time-use category. The representative group is parents aged
35–39 with one child.
hours in Figure 2.2. Among those with an infant, a larger fraction of the U.S. mothers report
market work than the Canadian mothers. Among those with the youngest child aged 2–5, a
higher fraction of the Canadian mothers report market work, and they also work roughly 30
more minutes per day than the U.S. mothers. These findings suggest that high-educated moth-
ers in the U.S. maintain similar job continuity rates as those in Canada while low-educated
mothers in the U.S. may have difficulties in securing jobs possibly due to lower eligibility rates
for a FMLA leave.
In Figures 2.1 and 2.2, Canada and the U.S. show differences in child care time among
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Figure 2.4: Conditional Average Hours by Age of the Youngest Child – High-educated parents
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Source: General Social Survey (2005, 2010) and American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). These figures
plot adjusted predictions from OLS regressions of each time-use category conditional on reporting non-
zero durations. The representative group is parents aged 35–39 with one child.
mothers with a young child. For high-educated mothers with an infant, the entire cross-country
difference is accounted for by the intensive margin. In both countries, 97% of the mothers
report child care time. Conditional on participation, those in Canada spend 30 more minutes
per day, or 3.5 hours per week, on child care than those in the U.S. In contrast, for low-educated
mothers, the differences are explained by not only the intensive margin but also the extensive
margin. For Canada, almost all low-educated mothers with a young child aged under 4 report
child care time. However, for the U.S., only 88% of those with an infant and 82% of those with
the youngest child aged 2–3 report child care time. In addition, conditional on participation,
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Figure 2.5: Participation Rates by Age of the Youngest Child – Low-educated Parents
(a) Canada
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Source: General Social Survey (2005, 2010) and American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). These figures
plot margins from logit regressions of each time-use category. The representative group is parents aged
35–39 with one child.
those in the U.S. spend on child care one hour less per day than those in Canada.
In addition, this analysis of the intensive and extensive margins illustrates that in both coun-
tries, both extensive and intensive margins play a role in explaining gender differences in time
allocations, especially on market work and child care. High-educated husbands’ probability of
reporting market work is about 0.71, which implies that they work 5 days a week, on average.
Compared to high-educated husbands, a smaller fraction of high-educated wives report mar-
ket work. Also, conditional on participation, the wives work fewer hours than the husbands.
Among high-educated parents with a young child in the U.S., conditional on participation,
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Figure 2.6: Conditional Average Hours by Age of the Youngest Child – Low-educated Parents
(a) Canada
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Source: General Social Survey (2005, 2010) and American Time Use Survey (2003–2016). These figures
plot adjusted predictions from OLS regressions of each time-use category conditional on reporting non-
zero durations. The representative group is parents aged 35–39 with one child.
wives work 12–15% fewer hours than husbands. This finding for market work is consistent
with Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2016). While participation differences between the hus-
bands and the wives are greater in Canada, gender differences in conditional means are greater
in the U.S.
For child care time, a smaller fraction of high-educated fathers report child care than high-
educated mothers at all ages of the youngest child, and the conditional average child care
time is significantly lower for the fathers than for the mothers. Among those with an infant,
while almost all mothers report child care, one in five fathers report no child care time in
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both countries. Among those who report child care, the fathers spend on average 2 hours
per day, which is a half of the time spent by mothers. When the youngest child is under 4,
the gender differences in both participation and the conditional averages remain significant in
both countries. When the youngest child is 4 years old or older, gender differences in the
unconditional average child care time are mainly due to differences in participation between
mothers and fathers.
It is also noteworthy that both the extensive and the intensive margin contribute to educa-
tional gradients in husbands’ child care time. Figure 2.2 showed that for Canada the average
child care time spent by low-educated and high-educated fathers are almost the same and that
for the U.S. low-educated fathers spend fewer hours than high-educated fathers. Figure 2.5
displays, in both countries, a much smaller fraction of low-educated fathers reporting child
care time than high-educated fathers even when they have a young child. Among Canadian
fathers with an infant, the educational gradient in child care time is flat because despite the
lower participation rate, low-educated fathers spent 30 more minutes than high-educated fa-
thers conditional on participation. Meanwhile, for the U.S. fathers with an infant, differences
in participation by educational attainment shape the educational gradient in unconditional av-
erage time spent in child care.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I document differences in statutory parental leave policies and take-up be-
haviour in Canada and the U.S. and relate the differences to married parents’ time allocations
across market work, child care, household chores, and leisure. In particular, I examine the role
of the age of the youngest child on parents’ time allocations in the two countries and make
cross-country comparisons. Also, I explore the role of the extensive and the intensive margins
in determining the unconditional average time allocations by analyzing participation and the
conditional averages separately.
I find several interesting patterns from the analyses. First, I document that the fraction of
married individuals eligible for a statutory parental leave is smaller in the U.S. than in Canada
and that differences in statutory parental leave policies appear to influence parents’ take-up
of parental leave and labour supply after the birth of a child. Second, controlling for the
presence of children, high-educated parents show different patterns and low-educated parents
show similar patterns in the two countries. Meanwhile, high-educated parents show similar
patterns and low-educated parents show different patterns in the two countries when controlling
for number of children and the age of youngest child. This implies that, in aggregate, the
average child care hours of U.S. low-educated parents are comparable to the figure in Canada,
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but it is due to higher fertility rates in the U.S. Controlling for the number of children, parents
in the U.S. spend significantly less time caring for children than those in Canada.
Third, I find that the two countries display a large difference in high-educated mothers’
market work only in the presence of an infant, whereas they show significant differences in
low-educated mothers’ market work until the youngest child is aged 6 or older. From this
finding, I conjecture that a great number of high-educated mothers in the U.S. maintain job
continuity as successfully as those in Canada possibly though employers’ voluntary provision
of job-protected maternity leave as well as the FMLA. Another conjecture from the finding is
that many low-educated mothers in the U.S. may have difficulties in securing their jobs after
the birth of a child due to lower eligibility rates for a FMLA leave. There are, of course,
other cross-country differences that can results in the same patterns. A difference in taxation
for married couples between the two countries is another possible explanation for the finding.
Canada has a system based on individual taxation of spouses, whereas the U.S. features joint
taxation. Joint taxation in the U.S. may disincentivize the labour supply of mothers with a
young child, especially for low-educated mothers, as net benefits of working are relatively
small considering all the cost of working such as daycare costs. Another possible explanation
is differences in preferences among the low-educated between the two countries. Identifying
reasons for the finding is an interesting area for future research.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Child-related Leaves on a
Married Couple’s Fertility and Labour
Decisions in a Household Search
Framework
3.1 Introduction
Childbirth and childcare have been crucial to women’s labour supply decisions, while women’s
labour supply decisions significantly affect fertility decisions. Some women postpone child-
birth to keep their careers, whereas some women give up their careers to raise children. As
more women, particularly married women, participate in labour markets, the balance between
work and family has become increasingly important. Many countries have introduced child-
related leave policies, such as maternity and parental leaves, to help mothers balance their work
and family lives. In terms of length and benefits, there is considerable variation in child-related
leave policies across countries. Sweden provides 16 months of paid parental leave.1 Parents
are entitled to 80 percent of their usual salary for 13 months and a fixed amount of benefits for
three months. In Canada except Quebec, parents are entitled paid maternity and parental leave.
Mothers are entitled to 55 percent of their usual salary for 12 months or 33 percent of their
usual salary for 18 months. In the United States, parents are entitled to 3 months of unpaid
1Among 16 months, two months are eligible only for fathers
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Table 3.1: Employment Statistics of Married Couples with Young Children
Sweden† vs. U.S. Canada vs. U.S.
(children under 3) (children under 6)
Sweden U.S. Canada U.S.
Dist. by employment pattern (%)
Both spouses employed (a) 71 53 67 56
Only husband employed (b) 24 (=b+c) 40 21 38Only wife employed (c) 4 10 4
Neither spouse employed (d) 5 3 2 3
Employment/Population ratio (%)
Male (a+b) at most 95 94 88 93
Female (a+c) at least 71 57 77 59
Source: U.S: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007); Sweden: OECD Family Database (2008); Canada:
Marshall (2009) (Original data from Labour Force Survey). †The Swedish statistics are for couples
with youngest child under 3.
leaves through the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).2,3
This variation in child-related leave policies is seemingly related to married couple’s em-
ployment patterns and employment rates across countries. Table 3.1 shows employment statis-
tics of married couples with young children in Sweden, Canada, and the United States. In
Sweden, which has the most generous child-related leave policy among the three countries,
married couples with young children under the age of three are more likely to be dual-earner
couples than those in the United States. A higher fraction of married couples with children
under the age of six are dual-earners or designate the wife as a primary breadwinner in Canada
than in the United States, which has the least generous policy among the three countries and
even among all developed countries. This pattern leads to lower employment-to-population
ratio of married women in the United States, compared to Sweden and Canada. In this paper,
I investigate the effects of child-related leave policies on married couples’ fertility and labour
supply decisions in a household search framework.
Married women’s labour supply decisions have been studied in individual labour supply
models (Hotz and Miller, 1988, Van der Klaauw, 1996, Hyslop, 1999, Francesconi, 2002),
family labour supply models (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999), and collective household models
(Chiappori, 1992, 1997). However, these neoclassical labour supply models are problematic
in studying parental leaves in that these models categorize work in specific jobs under the one,
broad classification “working.” One aim of parental leaves is to help a mother keep her job,
while she is temporarily away from work raising her newborn child. This is especially the
2In the United States, there are large variations in family leave policy at the state level or firm level. Unlike other
states, California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island provide mandated paid maternity leaves. Also, some companies
voluntarily provide paid leaves. Some mothers take paid sick leave instead of taking unpaid maternity leave.
3For cross-country comparison of child-related policies, see Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017).
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case if a married woman has a job paying a high wage as she may want to retain that job.
These neoclassical labour supply models lacking distinction between two jobs with different
wages cannot explain this benefit of parental leave.4 Thus, a job search model that can make a
distinction between the two cases seems appropriate to use in studying parental leaves.
In the search literature, a single-agent search framework has been typically applied in study-
ing the behavior of married individuals (Bowlus, 1997, Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia, 2002,
2010, Zhang, 2012). Erosa et al. (2010) examine the effects of variations in parental leave
policies on fertility rates, labour market outcomes, and social welfare in a general equilibrium
model based on an individual search framework. The authors find that introducing statutory
paid maternity leave decreases overall social welfare because welfare losses of men dominate
welfare gains of low-income mothers. This application of a single-agent search model to a
married couple’s decisions presumes that a married individual does not interact with his or her
spouse in their labour supply decisions. Even an individual search model of a married woman
with her husband’s employment status and labour income exogenously given does not fully
describe interactions between a husband and wife. This model can describe the effect of the
husband’s employment status and labour income on his wife’s decision, but cannot describe
the reciprocal effect of the wife’s decision on her husband’s employment status. If interactions
between spouses are considered, the welfare analysis of paid maternity leaves may prompt a
different conclusion.
One merit of a household search model is the ability to explain the interdependence be-
tween a husband and a wife. However, in the search literature, the joint labour supply deci-
sions of two household members have not attracted researchers’ interests until recently.5 The
household search literature suggests there is strong interdependence between married individ-
uals’ labour supply decisions and their spouse’s wage and employment status (Dey and Flinn,
2008, Gemici, 2011, Guler, Guvenen, and Violante, 2012, Choi and Valladares-Esteban, 2016,
Mankart and Oikonomou, 2017, Flabbi and Mabli, 2018). In this literature, interdependence
between a husband’s and a wife’s decisions is derived by a household’s risk averse preference
over household consumption and sharing of labour incomes.
I develop and characterize a household search model that features home production and
endogenous fertility choice. My household search model is unique in the household search
literature in that I focus on home production as a driving force for household interactions. In
4Bernal and Fruttero (2008) studied the effects of parental leaves in a model with the neoclassical labour supply
feature by setting the function of parental leaves as lowering the minimum hours of work required to keep a job.
This function allows parents to assign their time in both working and child care. However, this function seems
closer to the function of flexible work hours. Yamaguchi (2018) estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of
female labour supply and fertility decisions incorporating parental leave policies and finds little effect of parental
leave policies on fertility.
5The multi-agent search models were first introduced about three decades ago by Burdett and Mortensen (1978).
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my model, home production requires both a husband’s time and a wife’s time, and output from
home production is a public good within a household.6 By eliminating the assumption of a risk
averse preference for household consumption, I focus on household interactions which can be
explained solely by home production.
My household search model is able to show interactions between a husband and wife in
labour supply and fertility decisions. I contribute to the literature in that it is the first to provide
a household search model that includes endogenous fertility choices. I find that the model
generates a case in which a breadwinner in a household shifts from a spouse to the other
spouse when an unemployed spouse accepts an offer. Also, my household search model can
generate a pattern that a wife may quit her job to raise her children even if the productivity
of her job is higher than that of her husband’s job. This intra-household interaction cannot be
shown in an individual search model. This model is appropriate for understanding the effects
of family-related leaves on a married couple’s fertility and labour supply decisions and further
evaluating the effects of parental leaves on social welfare.
The model is parameterized to generate similar patterns to the cross-sectional employment
patterns of married couples in the United States with twelve weeks of unpaid maternity leave.
By varying related parameters, I examine the effects of the generosity of maternity leave poli-
cies on married couples’ fertility and labour supply decisions. The policy experiments suggest
that the introduction of an extended paid parental leave provides married couples an incen-
tive to have more children and raises fertility rates. Also, the model predicts that an extended
paid parental leave lowers the fraction of dual-earner couples and increases the fraction of
single-earner couples in the economy. This is because as married couples have more children,
a husband and a wife are more likely to specialize either in market production or in home
production.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I present my household search model
and characterize a married couple’s labour supply decisions. I also show household interactions
between a husband and wife in the household search model and contrast the household search
model with an individual search model. In Section 3.3 and 3.4, I parameterize the model,
present quantitative analyses, and carry out policy experiments. In Section 3.5, I present con-
clusions.
6Dey and Flinn (2008) also include a public good for household interactions. However, the public good is in the
context of health insurance in their paper.
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3.2 Household Search Model
This section describes a household search model. Key features of the model are home produc-
tion and endogenous fertility choices. The model economy is populated with infinitely-lived
married couples in continuous time. A married couple consists of a female spouse, denoted as
a superscript f , and a male spouse, denoted as a superscript m.
A couple is either younger or older depending on their children’s ages. A younger couple is
defined as a couple with children under 18. Also, a younger couple is fertile. A younger couple
stochastically faces an opportunity for a fertility decision (a fertility shock). When having a
fertility opportunity, a younger couple decides whether or not to have one more child. Let
the number of children a younger couple has be k. A younger couple derives utility from their
children and from home production. A couple becoming older means that the couple’s children
are all grown up and, at the same time, a couple becomes non-fertile. An older couple, which
does not have children to take care of, does not derive utility from their children nor from home
production.
A married individual has one of two labour states: either employed or non-employed. Thus,
a married couple has one of four labour states: both spouses employed, only a husband em-
ployed, only a wife employed, and neither spouse employed. A non-employed individual
searches for a job. One job offer stochastically arrives at a time. While receiving a fixed
amount of unemployment benefits, z, a non-employed individual participates in home pro-
duction. An employed individual spends all available time in market work and earns labour
income. On-the-job-search is allowed. A worker can be stochastically laid off. An employed
mother is eligible for maternity leave after childbirth. If paid leave is available, a mother on
leave receives maternity leave benefits partially replacing her usual wage until her paid leave
expires.
A married couple has unitary utility from consumption, the number of children, and output
from home production:
u(w f ,wm,h f ,hm,k,ν) = w f +wm−g · k+ γ ln(1+ k)+Z(g,h f ,hm,k,ν).
The first part of the household utility is gained from consumption. Let w f be a wife’s wage
and wm be a husband’s wage. Household incomes consist of wages, unemployment benefits,
and maternity leave benefits. When both spouses are employed, household income is the sum
of a husband’s and a wife’s wages. When only one spouse is employed, household income is
the sum of an employed spouse’s wage and a non-employed spouse’s unemployment benefit,
z. When neither spouse is employed, household income is the sum of unemployment benefits,
2z. When an employed wife is on leave after childbirth, leave benefits replace her wage at the
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rate of ρ until her leave expires with probability ψ . I assume stochastic expiration of leaves to
keep the model stationary. A couple purchases a fixed amount of goods for each child, g, as
a sunk cost. A couple with k children spends g · k to purchase market goods for children and
consumes the remaining household income.
The second part of the household utility is the utility from having children, which is the
happiness parents feel after having their children. Marginal utility from children is positive
and decreasing. The third part is the utility from output of home production. This third part
is the key feature of this model to generate the interdependence of a husband and wife in their
labour supply decisions.
3.2.1 Home Production
Home production in this paper is related to raising children in a household. Output from home
production includes domestic child-care services, children’s health, and child development. If
parents take care of their children themselves, they can save on day-care costs. Home pro-
duction requires inputs of market goods for children and parents’ time spent at home. In this
model, parents cannot perfectly substitute market goods for parents’ time. Parents purchase
fixed amount of goods, g, for each child. To produce output from home production, at least one
parent needs to spend his or her time at home. When both parents work in the labour market,
the parents do not produce any output from home production. As a couple has more children,
the parents produce more output from home production.
Following the literature on home production or child development, a home production
function is assumed as a Cobb-Douglas function in market goods and parents’ time (Cau-
cutt, Guner, and Knowles, 2002, Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan, 2015, Albanesi and Olivetti,
2009, Knowles, 2013). Let Z(g,h f ,hm,k,ν) be the output from home production. I use the
following home production technology:
Z(g,h f ,hm,k,ν) = ν · [g · k]α [t(h f ,hm)]1−α (3.1)
where ν is a couple-specific efficiency factor of home production.
The time input from each spouse is aggregated into the time input of a married couple in a
CES form (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2009, Knowles, 2013):
t(h f ,hm) = [θ · (h f )ζ +(1−θ) · (hm)ζ ]1/ζ .
Let h f and hm be a wife’s time and a husband’s time spent at home, respectively. An employed
spouse i ∈ { f ,m} contributes no time to home production (hi = 0), whereas a non-employed
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spouse spends all available time at home with children (hi = 1). Let θ represent a wife’s home
productivity relative to her husband’s home productivity. Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) interpret
the parameter as reflecting women’s contribution to home production such as the ability to
breast feed children. If θ = 1/2, this implies that a wife and a husband are equally productive
in home production. When θ > 1/2, a wife is more productive in home production than her
husband. In this case, a wife is more likely to stay at home than her husband.
The efficiency factor of home production ν is specific to a married couple. An initial value
of ν is randomly drawn from an exogenous distribution, and its value evolves over time follow-
ing a stochastic process given in Equation (3.2). The efficiency factor is updated with probabil-
ity η . The productivity tends to be persistent. Those parents who are good at raising children
today are likely to be good at childcare in the future as well. To capture this persistence, ν is
assumed to follow a Markov chain approximating an AR(1) process:
ν ′ = (1−λ )ν¯+λν+ e where e∼ N(0,σ2e ) and ν¯ = E(ν). (3.2)
The unconditional distribution of ν is a Normal distribution with mean, ν¯ , and variance,
σ2e /(1− λ 2). When the efficiency factor becomes higher, a couple is more likely to prefer
having one spouse stay at home to having both spouses work in the market. Also, a couple is
more likely to decide to have one more child when having a fertility shock.
3.2.2 Value Functions
An older couple’s value functions are simpler than a younger couple’s value functions because
an older couple makes only labour supply decisions. Also, older married individuals are
independent from each other in their labour supply decisions, because an older couple does not
derive utility from home production. Thus, in this section, a younger couple’s value functions
are mainly discussed, while an older couple’s value functions are presented in Appendix B.
Three types of stochastic events affect a married individual. First, when a married indi-
vidual i ∈ { f ,m} is non-employed, the individual receives a job offer from an employer with
probability piu. A job offer is represented by a worker i’s match-specific productivity with an
employer. Let qi be the match-specific productivity, which is randomly drawn from a distri-
bution G(qi). Second, an employed spouse i receives a new job offer with probability pie. A
new match-specific productivity q′i with a new employer is drawn from the distribution G as
well. Lastly, job separation happens to an employed spouse with probability δ i. An employed
spouse facing a job separation shock becomes non-employed.
In addition, three stochastic events affect a younger couple at the household level. First,
a married couple’s efficiency factor of home production ν changes with probability η . A
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new efficiency factor of home production ν ′ is stochastically determined following a Markov
process. Second, a married couple has a fertility choice with probability pi and decides whether
or not to have one more child. Third, a younger couple becomes older with probability φ . This
shock is called a children-aging shock. The fertility shock and the aging shock do not affect a
couple in which a married woman is on leave after childbirth.
Time is continuous. In continuous time, only one stochastic event happens at any given
time. Before a stochastic event is realized, a couple’s value stays the same. Once a shock
occurs, a couple updates labour supply and/or fertility decisions.
A younger couple makes decisions taking a household employment state, Ω, and a set of
state variables S as given. The household employment state takes one of the four states:
neither spouse is employed, U ; only a wife is employed, W ; only a husband is employed, T ;
and both a husband and wife are employed, V . A set of state variables S = (q f ,qm,k, l,ν)
indicates employed wife’s and husband’s match-specific productivity with their own current
employer, q f and qm, the number of children, k, take-up of maternity leave, l, and an efficiency
factor of home production, ν . If a spouse is non-employed, his or her q is zero. A value to a
couple is denoted as Ω(S ).
The value to a younger couple when neither spouse is employed, denoted as U , is defined
as follows:
U(0,0,k,0,ν) = (β + p fu + p
m
u +η+pi+φ)
−1{
2z−gk+ γlog(1+ k)+Z(g,1,1,k,ν)
+ p fu Eq f
[
max{W (q f ,0,k,0,ν),U(0,0,k,0,ν)}
]
+ pmu Eqm [max{T (0,qm,k,0,ν),U(0,0,k,0,ν)}]
+η Eν ′|ν
[
U(0,0,k,0,ν ′)
]
+pi max{U(0,0,k,0,ν),U(0,0,k+1,0,ν)}
+φ Uo(0,0,0,0,0)
}
.
The second line of the value function shows an instantaneous utility. When neither spouse
is employed, both wife’s and husband’s match-specific productivity with their own current
employer are zero. Both spouses spend their time in home production. A wife (a husband)
receives a job offer at a job arrival rate of p fu (pmu ), and then she (he) decides whether or not to
accept the job offer. When a couple faces a shock to the efficiency factor of home production
with probability η , the couple updates the efficiency factor. When a fertility shock happens
with probability pi , a couple decides whether to have one more child or not. When an aging
shock occurs with probability φ , all children are grown up and thus the number of children and
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the efficiency factor of home production become zero. Let Uo be the value function of an older
couple when neither spouse is employed.
The value to a couple in which only a wife is employed is denoted as W . First, the value to
the couple when the wife is not on leave is defined, l = 0, as follows:
W (q f ,0,k,0,ν) = (β +δ f + p fe + p
m
u +η+pi+φ)
−1{
w f (q f )+ z−gk+ γlog(1+ k)+Z(g,0,1,k,ν)
+δ f U(0,0,k,0,ν)
+ p fe Eq′ f
[
max{W (q′ f ,0,k,0,ν),W (q f ,0,k,0,ν)}
]
+ pmu Eqm
[
max{V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν),T (0,qm,k,0,ν),W (q f ,0,k,0,ν)}
]
+η Eν ′|ν
[
max{W (q f ,0,k,0,ν ′),U(0,0,k,0,ν ′)}
]
+pi max{W (q f ,0,k,0,ν),W (q f ,0,k+1,1,ν),W (q f ,0,k+1,0,ν),
U(0,0,k+1,0,ν)}
+φ W o(q f ,0,0,0,0)
}
.
Let q f be an employed wife’s match-specific productivity with her current employer. Her wage
w f is determined by her productivity q f . This couple earns the wife’s wage and her husband’s
unemployment benefit z. Only the non-employed husband spends time in home production. If
a wife faces a job separation shock, neither spouse is considered to be employed. When she
is given a new job offer, she decides whether to accept the offer with match-specific labour
productivity q′ f with a new employer. When a non-employed husband receives a job offer, a
couple decides whether to have him accept the offer and, if accepting it, whether both spouses
work or only the husband works. If a shock increases a couple’s efficiency factor of home
production, a wife may quit her job to participate in home production. When a couple has a
pregnancy opportunity, a couple decides whether to have one more child and, if so, whether
the wife will take leave, continue working, or quit. Lastly, a younger couple may face an aging
shock. Let W o represent the value to an older couple when only a wife is employed.
The value to a couple in which only a husband is employed, denoted as T , is defined in a
similar way to the value to a couple in which only a wife is employed and she is not on leave.
Next, the value to a couple with only a wife employed when the wife is on leave after
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childbirth, l = 1, is defined as follows:
W (q f ,0,k,1,ν) = (β + pmu +η+ψ)
−1{
ρ ·w f + z−gk+ γlog(1+ k)+Z(g,1,1,k,ν)
+ pmu Eqm
[
max{V (q f ,qm,k,1,ν),T (0,qm,k,0,ν),W (q f ,0,k,1,ν)}
]
+η Eν ′|ν
[
max{W (q f ,0,k,1,ν ′),W (q f ,0,k,0,ν ′),U(0,0,k,0,ν ′)}
]
+ψ max{W (q f ,0,k,0,ν),U(0,0,k,0,ν)}
}
.
The couple’s income is the sum of a wife’s leave benefits ρw f and her husband’s unemployment
benefits. When a husband receives a job offer, the couple makes a decision about the couple’s
employment status. A shock may occur to a couple’s efficiency factor of home production. On
the one hand, when the shock lowers the efficiency factor, a wife may return to work. On the
other hand, when the shock increases the efficiency factor, a wife may quit her job to participate
in home production. Lastly, when a wife’s leave expires with probability ψ , a couple decides
whether a wife returns to her pre-birth job represented by a match-specific labour productivity
q f with her pre-birth employer or whether a wife quits and stays at home to raise children.
While a wife is on leave, she does not face a job separation shock and a couple does not face
fertility and aging shocks.
Finally, the value to a dual-earner couple is denoted as V . The value to a dual-earner couple
when a wife is not on leave, l = 0, is defined as follows:
V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν) = (β +δ f +δm+ p fe + p
m
e +η+pi+φ)
−1{
w f +wm−gk+ γlog(1+ k)+Z(g,0,0,k,ν)
+δ f T (0,qm,k,0,ν)
+δmW (q f ,0,k,0,ν)
+ p fe Eq′ f
[
max{V (q′ f ,qm,k,0,ν),V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν)}
]
+ pme Eq′m
[
max{V (q f ,q′m,k,0,ν),V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν)}
]
+η Eν ′|ν
[
max{V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν ′),W (q f ,0,k,0,ν ′),T (0,qm,k,0,ν ′)}
]
+pi max{V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν),V (q f ,qm,k+1,1,ν),V (q f ,qm,k+1,0,ν),
T (0,qm,k+1,0,ν),W (q f ,0,k+1,1,ν),W (q f ,0,k+1,0,ν)}
+φ V o(q f ,qm,0,0,0)
}
.
A couple with both spouses employed earns income and does not produce output from home
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production. When an employed spouse encounters a job separation shock, the spouse becomes
unemployed and the other spouse remains employed. When an employed spouse receives a
new job offer, a couple makes an acceptance decision. When a shock to the efficiency factor
of home production happens, a couple adjusts its employment status. A couple may remain as
a dual-earner couple or switch into a single-earner couple. Neither spouse being employed is
dominated by these two cases. When a fertility shock occurs, a couple decides whether to have
one more child, which spouse works after childbirth, and whether a wife takes a leave. Lastly,
a younger couple becomes older with probability φ . Let V o represent the value to an older
couple when both spouses are employed.
The value to a dual-earner couple when a wife is on leave, l = 1, is defined as follows:
V (q f ,qm,k,1,ν) = (β +δm+ pme +η+ψ)
−1{
ρ ·w f +wm−gk+ γlog(1+ k)+Z(g,1,0,k,ν)
+δm max{W (q f ,0,k,1,ν),W (q f ,0,k,0,ν)}
+ pme Eq′m
[
max{V (q f ,q′m,k,1,ν),V (q f ,qm,k,1,ν)}
]
+η Eν ′|ν
[
max
{
max
l∈{1,0}
V (q f ,qm,k, l,ν ′), max
l∈{1,0}
W (q f ,0,k, l,ν ′),
T (0,qm,k,0,ν ′)
}]
+ψ max{V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν),T (0,qm,k,0,ν)}
}
.
A wife on leave receives leave benefits replacing her usual income at a rate of ρ , while she
stays at home to take care of her children. When her husband is laid off, she has an option
to return to work. Also, a husband may receive a new job offer. When a shock occurs to a
couple’s efficiency factor of home production, a couple updates their employment status. A
couple may remain as a dual-earner couple or switch into a single-earner couple. Also, a wife
on leave may remain on leave or return to work. When her leave expires with probability ψ , a
wife may return to work or quit to raise children.
3.2.3 Wage Determination
In this partial equilibrium economy, a worker’s wage is proportional to the worker’s match-
specific productivity with his or her employer. Particularly, a male worker’s wage, wm, is equal
to his match-specific productivity, qm. However, a female worker’s wage, w f , is lower than her
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match-specific productivity, q f , if gender wage discrimination exists in the labour market.
wm(qm) = qm and w f (q f ) = (1−ω)q f ,
where ω is the degree of gender wage discrimination in the labour market.
3.2.4 Characterization of a Younger Couple’s Labour Supply Decisions
Next, I characterize accept/reject decisions made by a younger couple who can produce output
from home production, and explain interactions between spouses in their decisions. A job offer
given to a married individual i∈ { f ,m} is represented by his or her match-specific productivity
qi. A couple’s acceptance rule for a job offer given to an employed worker is simple in this
model. An offer is accepted and a worker switches his or her job if and only if a new offer
brings a new match-specific productivity higher than the current job. Thus, in this subsection,
I mainly discuss a young couple’s acceptance decisions when a non-employed spouse receives
a job offer.
Reservation productivity summarizes a married couple’s acceptance decision rules when a
job offer arrives. A non-employed spouse accepts a job offer if and only if the match-specific
productivity of the job offer is higher than his or her reservation productivity. Without gender
wage discrimination, reservation productivity is the same as reservation wages. For this part of
the analysis, I assume no gender wage discrimination in the labour market and use reservation
productivity and reservation wage interchangeably.
Let us start with defining notation used in the reservation productivity characterization. Let
RiΩ(S ) be the reservation productivity of a spouse i ∈ { f ,m} in a younger couple, which has
a vector of state variables S and a value in status quo equal to Ω(S ), where Ω represents a
couple’s value function in their current employment status (Ω ∈ {U,W,T,V}).
A. Couple with Neither Spouse Employed. For a couple with neither spouse employed, a
married individual’s reservation wage is a function of the number of children and the couple’s
efficiency factor of home production. A couple will accept an offer if the value from acceptance
is greater than the value from rejection. The reservation productivity is determined by these
equations:
R fU(0,0,k,0,ν) : W (R
f
U ,0,k,0,ν) =U(0,0,k,0,ν)
RmU(0,0,k,0,ν) : T (0,R
m
U ,k,0,ν) =U(0,0,k,0,ν).
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The reservation productivity increases as a couple has more children and as a couple’s effi-
ciency factor of home production increases.
B. Couple with Only One Spouse Employed. The reservation productivity of a non-employed
married individual when only his or her spouse is employed shows interesting interdependence
between a husband and wife in their labour supply decisions. This interdependence is a dis-
tinguishing feature of a household search model, compared to an individual search model. To
address the interdependence, let us consider a married couple in which only a husband is em-
ployed and his match-specific productivity is qm. This couple’s current value is represented
by T (0,qm,k,0,ν). When his wife receives a job offer bringing a new draw of match-specific
productivity, q f , they make an acceptance decision. The wife will accept the job offer if and
only if acceptance results in a higher value to the couple than rejection does. When the wife
accepts the offer, the couple chooses either for both spouses to work or for only the wife to
work while her husband quits his job to raise their children. When only a husband works in the
labour market, his non-employed wife accepts a job offer given to her if and only if
V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν)> T (0,qm,k,0,ν) or W (q f ,0,k,0,ν)> T (0,qm,k,0,ν).
Thus, the reservation productivity is defined as follows:
R fT (0,q
m,k,0,ν) : max{V (R fT ,qm,k,0,ν), W (R fT ,0,k,0,ν)}= T (0,qm,k,0,ν). (3.3)
If the match-specific productivity of a job offer given to a wife, q f , is so low as to satisfy
T (0,qm,k,0,ν)> max{V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν), W (q f ,0,k,0,ν)}, then the wife rejects the offer and
the couple remains in the status quo.
I define r fV (0,q
m,k,0,ν) as the lowest productivity of a new offer given to a non-employed
wife at which a couple weakly prefers both spouses working to rejecting the offer, satisfying
V (r fV , q
m,k,0,ν) = T (0,qm,k,0,ν). (3.4)
Similarly, r fW (0,q
m,k,0,ν) is defined as the lowest productivity of an offer given to a non-
employed wife at which a couple weakly prefers only the wife working to rejecting the offer,
satisfying
W (r fW ,0,k,0,ν) = T (0,q
m,k,0,ν). (3.5)
The reservation productivity of a non-employed wife when only her husband is employed,
48
R fT (0,q
m,k,0,ν), can be defined as
R fT (0,q
m,k,0,ν) = min{r fV (0,qm,k,0,ν), r fW (0,qm,k,0,ν)}, (3.6)
as well. This reservation productivity of a non-employed wife depends on her husband’s pro-
ductivity as well as the number of children and the couple’s home production productivity.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a threshold of an employed husband’s productivity q¯m(k,0,ν)
such that 1) if an employed husband’s productivity qm < the threshold q¯m, then V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν)<
W (q f ,0,k,0,ν), ∀q f ; and 2) if qm > q¯m, then V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν)>W (q f ,0,k,0,ν), ∀q f .
Proof Given the number of children k, the leave status l, and home production productivity ν ,
the value W (q f ,0,k,0,ν) is constant in qm and the value V (q f ,qm,k,0,ν) is strictly increasing
in qm. Therefore, there exists the unique threshold satisfying the property.
In words, if an employed husband’s match-specific productivity qm is greater than the
threshold q¯m, the couple prefers both spouses working to only the wife working and her hus-
band quitting. However, when his productivity qm is lower than the threshold q¯m, the couple
prefers only the wife working to both spouses working and giving up home production.
Corollary 3.1 There exists a threshold of an employed husband’s productivity q¯m(k,0,ν) such
that 1) if qm < q¯m, then R fT = r
f
W , which satisfies W (r
f
V ,0,k,0,ν) = T (0,q
m,k,0,ν); and 2) if
qm > q¯m, then R fT = r
f
V , which satisfies V (r
f
V ,q
m,k,0,ν) = T (0,qm,k,0,ν).
Proof Directly from the definition of equations (2), (3), (4), and (5).
The solid line in Figure 3.1 is the reservation productivity of a wife in a couple in which
only her husband is employed when the husband and the wife are equally productive in home
production (θ=0.5), given the number of children k and the efficiency factor of home pro-
duction, ν . A husband would accept a job offer given to him in the first place only when
match-specific productivity qm of the offer is greater than his reservation productivity when
neither spouse is employed, RmU .
In the area (b) where an employed husband’s productivity is greater than the threshold q¯m,
the couple have dual earners if the wife accepts a job offer. In this area, a wife’s reservation
productivity is flat. However, when a husband’s productivity at work has a value between RmU
and the threshold q¯m, which happens in the area (a), the wife’s reservation productivity is not
flat any more. It is strictly increasing in her husband’s productivity. In this case, the wife
who accepts a job offer given to her becomes the breadwinner in the couple. This shift of a
breadwinner in a household is the noteworthy interaction in the area (a).
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Figure 3.1: Reservation productivity of a wife when only her husband is employed (θ=0.5)
The same explanation is applied to the reservation productivity of a husband when only his
wife is employed. For a couple with only a wife employed, her husband’s reservation wage is
similarly determined:
RmW (q
f ,0,k, l,ν) : max{V (q f ,RmW ,k, l,ν), T (0,RmW ,k,0,ν)}=W (q f ,0,k, l,ν).
However, the non-employed husband’s reservation wage also depends on whether his employed
wife is on leave (l = 1) or not (l = 0).
3.2.5 Comparison to an Individual Search Framework
I compare my household search model including home production and endogenous fertility
choice to individual search models which lack the concept of a married couple. I mainly discuss
an individual search model corresponding to Erosa et al. (2010). Let the economy be populated
by two types of married individuals: females f and males m. In this economy, only females
have children, gain utility from having children, and produce output from home production.
Females face stochastic shocks to their efficiency factor of home production. Males make only
labour supply decisions.
A married individual i ∈ { f ,m} is either employed or non-employed. A non-employed in-
dividual receives unemployment benefit z. Also, a job offer arrives to the individual with prob-
ability piu. After observing match-specific productivity q
i of the offer, the individual makes an
acceptance decision. An employed individual earns wages. The employed individual receives
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a new job offer with probability pie. In addition, an employed worker faces a job separation
shock with probability δ and becomes non-employed. When a female with children is not em-
ployed, she spends her time raising her children at home. Her home production technology is
summarized by the function Z(k,g,h f ,ν) = ν(kg)α(θh f )1−α .
In this individual search model, the two types of married individuals independently make
their labour supply decisions. A non-employed male’s reservation productivity depends only
on the amount of unemployment benefits z, because he does not have an outside option of home
production. A non-employed mother’s reservation productivity depends on the number of her
children and her home production productivity.
I call a pair of one married male and one married female a couple, even though they do
not share their labour incomes, to compare this couple’s decisions to a couple’s decisions in
a household search framework. The reservation productivity of a married individual does not
depend on his or her spouse’s employment status or productivity. For a couple in which only a
husband is employed, when the wife accepts a job offer, both members always work. A shift of
a breadwinner from a husband to the wife does not exist in this individual search model. The
reservation productivity of a non-employed wife R f (k,0,ν) satisfies the following condition
which is written in terms of the value functions in my household search model:
V (R f ,qm,k,0,ν) = T (0,qm,k,0,ν).
Because a wife’s reservation productivity does not depend on the husband’s employment status
in the individual search model, the reservation productivity R f (k,0,ν) also satisfies
W (R f ,0,k,0,ν) =U(0,0,k,0,ν).
In an individual search model, a married person’s reservation productivity is flat against his
or her spouse’s productivity, whereas it is not flat in a household search model. This contrast
is shown in Figure 3.2. A solid line is a wife’s reservation productivity and a dashed line is her
husband’s reservation productivity when only his spouse is employed. This contrast between a
household search model and a individual search model is similar to that in Guler et al. (2012).
In particular, reservation wage functions for my model look very similar to the case with the
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility in their paper.
Another individual search model which can be used to study married women’s labour sup-
ply decisions is the model where married women take their husband’s employment status and
income as exogenously given. In this model, a married woman’s reservation productivity is
positively related to her husband’s income through an income effect. However, his employ-
ment status does not respond to his wife’s decisions, because a husband’s employment status
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Figure 3.2: Household search model vs. Individual search model
and income may be fixed or exogenously change. This individual search model cannot describe
the reciprocal effect of the wife’s decisions on her husband’s employment status.
3.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, I parameterize the household search model described in the previous section
to numerically characterize the model. Within the parameterized model, I discuss the role of
wife’s relative advantageousness in home production, θ , in a married couple’s labour supply
decisions, especially reservation productivities.
3.3.1 Parameterization
In this analysis, a unit of time is a month. Table 3.2 displays the parameter values used to char-
acterize the model. Some parameter values are borrowed from previous studies. Job arrival
rates and job separation rates are the estimates for married couples with children under 18 in a
household search model in Flabbi and Mabli (2018). That model does not include home pro-
duction but does have leisure. Labour decisions affected by home production in my model are
explained by their estimated parameters of preference for leisure. Thus, using their estimates
for the labour shock parameters for my numerical exercise seems reasonable. The elasticity of
substitution between the wife’s and the husband’s time at home, ζ , is borrowed from Knowles
(2013).
The contribution of market goods to home production α is set to 0.4, which is close to
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Table 3.2: Parameterized Parameters
Parameter Description Values
γ Preference for having children 1
β Discount factor 0.997
z Unemployment benefit 0.7
g Goods cost of raising one child 0.5
Home production : Z(g,h f ,hm,k,ν) = ν(k ·g)α [θ ·hζf +(1−θ) ·hζm]
1−α
ζ
α The contribution of market goods to home production 0.4
ζ The elasticity of substitution between the wife’s 2/3
and husband’s time at home
θ Wife’s relative productivity in home production 0.5 or 0.55
ν ν ′ = (1−λ )ν¯+λν+ e where e∼ N(0,σ2e )
ν ∈ [1,2], λ = 0.7 , ν¯ = 1.5 , σe = 0.12
Shocks
p fu , pmu Job arrival rate when unemployed 0.2991,0.3032
p fe , pme Job arrival rate when employed 0.1556,0.1627
δ f , δm Exogenous job destruction rate 0.0211, 0.262
η Probability of a home production productivity shock 1/12
pi Probability of a fertility shock 1/48
φ Probability of a children-aging shock 1/300
G(q) Distribution of match-specific productivity lognormal
Bounded support [1, 2],
N(0.35, 1/10) to set the mean at 1.42
ω Gender wage discrimination 0 or 0.12
the calibrated parameter for the contribution of market goods to child development production
of 0.38 in Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002). The parameter for parents’ preference for
children, γ , is set to one, which is less than the calibrated value 1.26 in Erosa et al. (2010).
In my model, home production explains some of the part explained by parents’ utility from
children in their model.
The discount factor, β , is set equivalent to an annual discount rate of 4%. The probability
of a home production productivity shock, η , is chosen to deliver an annual shock, on average.
The probability of children becoming grown up, φ , is set to reproduce, on average, 25 years
of raising children. The probability of a fertility shock, pi , is selected to make couples have a
pregnancy opportunity on average in four-year-long intervals.
The distribution of match-specific productivity, G(q), to be assumed as a lognormal dis-
tribution with the support of the distribution normalized to the bounded interval [1,2]. The
standard deviation of the distribution is set to 1/10 while the mean of the match-specific pro-
ductivity is set to 1.42. The unemployment benefit, z, is set to 0.7, which is equivalent to 50%
of the mean of the match-specific productivity distribution. The goods cost for one child, g, is
53
selected to be 0.5, which is equivalent to 35% of the mean of the match-specific productivity
distribution.
The model is solved on a discrete grid of productivities. I use value function iterations
to find a fixed point. To compute the stationary equilibrium, the model is simulated with
the parameterized values in Table 3.2. Each couple starts as a couple with neither spouse
employed, with no children, and with their efficiency factor of home production, ν , randomly
drawn from the unconditional distribution. A job offer stochastically arrives to either a wife or
a husband. Then, the couple makes an acceptance decision. When accepting the offer(s), the
couple updates their employment status and an employed spouse’s match-specific productivity
in the job.
All the shocks in this model follow Poisson processes. An event history for each couple
is generated by pseudo-random number generators from exponential distributions. Each ex-
ponential distribution has probability of one possible stochastic event as the parameter of the
distribution. A random number generated from an exponential distribution for a stochastic
event is the length of time passed before the stochastic event occurs. Once a set of lengths of
time passed for all possible stochastic events at a moment is generated, the event with the short-
est time passed is the shock that affects a couple. After the shock is realized, a couple makes
decisions and updates their state variables. This procedure is repeated to generate a simulated
history for a couple until the couple retires. Once a younger becomes older, then the older
couple faces a retirement shock. Retirement makes the couple have no income any longer and
thus no utility, the older couple is replaced with a new younger couple with neither spouse
employed, with no children, and with its initial efficiency factor of home production randomly
drawn. This replacement keeps the sample size unchanged. I simulate event histories long
enough for the economy to reach the stationary equilibrium.
One advantage of a household search framework over an individual search framework in
studying married couples’ decisions is that a household search framework is able to generate
the employment patterns of couples as a result of interactions between a husband and wife in
their labour supply decisions. An individual search model where married males and married
females independently make decisions can identify a married individual’s employment state.
However, the model cannot distinguish a married couple’s employment status, such as both
spouses employed, only the wife employed, only the husband employed, or neither spouse
employed. In the following quantitative exercises, I show the employment patterns of the
couples, as well as the employment-to-population ratios.
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Table 3.3: Statistics for younger Couples in the Economy with Three Month Unpaid Leave
Benchmark U.S. Data Model II Model III
ψ=1/3, ρ=0 (2011) ψ=1/3, ρ=0 ψ=1/3, ρ=0
θ=0.55, ω=0 - θ=0.5, ω=0 θ=0.5,
ω=0.12
Fertility rate (%) 1.5 2.1 1.5 1.6
Employment patterns (%)
Both spouses employed 54.3 57.5 62.0 35.1
Only husband employed 34.3 30.5 20.4 52.6
Only wife employed 9.7 7.6 16.1 9.8
Neither spouse employed 1.7 4.5 1.5 2.6
Employment/Population ratio (%)
Male 88.6 88.0 82.4 87.7
Female 63.9 65.1 78.1 44.8
3.3.2 Results for a Benchmark Economy
The parameterized model with the parameter values in Table 3.2 can generate similar patterns
to married couples’ employment patterns in the United States when the wife’s relative pro-
ductivity in home production θ is set to 0.55. Table 3.3 presents the employment statistics for
younger couples from the parameterized model and those from U.S. Current Population Survey
in 2011. The employment patterns of married couples with children at home simulated from
the parameterized model are similar to the data. However, the model generates a lower fertility
rate than in the data.
In this model, asymmetry between a wife and a husband is allowed in several ways. First,
a wife and a husband encounter labour shocks with different probability (pme 6= p fe , pmu 6= p fu ,
δme 6= δ fe ). Second, a husband and a wife may not be equally productive in home production
(θ 6= 1/2). Lastly, even though married individuals have identical match-specific productivity
in the labour market, a wife may be paid less than is a husband in the labour market because of
gender wage discrimination (ω > 0).
When θ = 1/2 (Model II), the employment patterns of married couples are not consistent
with the data. The percentage of couples with only the wife employed is relatively similar
to that of couples with only the husband employed. Also, the percentage of couples with
both spouses employed is higher. In Model III, I consider gender wage discrimination and
assume that women are paid 12% less. For younger individuals, women’s earnings is about 90
percent of men’s earnings after controlling hours and weeks (Goldin, 2014). In this case, the
fraction of dual-earner couples is much lower than in the data. Therefore, I view the asymmetry
in the employment patterns of single-earner couples in the benchmark economy as the main
contributor to the asymmetry between the two spouses in home production in this model.
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Table 3.4: Simulation Results for younger Couples by Number of Children
The number of children All
None One Two Three Four+ couples
MODEL (Benchmark)
Percentages of couples 13.8 26.7 53.1 5.2 - 100
Employment patterns (%)
Both spouses employed 78.1 77.1 40.7 16.4 - 54.3
Only husband employed 11.1 13.4 47.0 67.7 - 34.3
Only wife employed 10.4 8.0 10.1 11.2 - 9.7
Neither spouse employed 0.4 0.9 2.2 4.6 - 1.7
Employment/Population ratio (%)
Female 88.5 85.7 50.8 27.6 - 63.9
DATA (United States, 2011)*
Employment patterns (%)
Both spouses employed - 61.1 59.8 50.1 37.9 57.5
Only husband employed - 25.6 29.5 37.7 51.1 30.5
Only wife employed - 9.0 6.5 7.3 5.3 7.6
Neither spouse employed - 4.4 4.1 4.9 5.7 4.5
Employment/Population ratio (%)
Female - 70.1 66.4 57.4 43.2 65.1
* Census, “Table FG1. Married Couple Family Groups, by labour Force Status of Both Spouses, and Race
and Hispanic Origin/1 of the Reference Person: 2011.” In this table, couples without children under the age
of 18 includes the couples which are categorized under older couples. Thus, the statistics of the couples
with no children under age 18 is not reported in this table.
Table 3.4 shows the employment patterns of married couples conditional on the num-
ber of children. The model predicts that as a married couple has more children, the female
employment-to-population ratio falls. Even though the ratios more rapidly fall in the model,
this pattern can be also found in the data.
In the model, most younger couples without children have dual earners. Because the cou-
ples have no children to care for, the percentages of the single-earner couples with only the
husband employed and with only the wife employed are similar. When couples have children,
the gap between the measures of the single-earner couples grows.
Couples with two children are more likely to prefer one spouse staying at home to produce
output from home production. The percentage of these couples with only a husband employed
increased dramatically, compared to couples with one child. More couples choose to have a
wife who is relatively advantageous in home production, stay at home. However, the percent-
age of couples with only the wife employed also increases. That is, fathers are also more likely
to stay at home. This pattern becomes stronger among couples with three children.
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Figure 3.3: Relative Home Productivity and Reservation Market Productivity
3.3.3 Asymmetry Between a Wife and a Husband in Home Production
I compare the reservation productivities of married individuals when only the probability of
labour shocks is asymmetrical to the reservation productivities when relative home productivity
is asymmetrical as well. For this part of the analysis, I assume no gender wage discrimination in
the labour market (ω = 0) to focus on the effect of the relative productivity in home production.
Also, I assume no parental leave given to a mother.
Figure 3.3 shows that the reservation productivity of non-employed spouses for two values
of relative home productivity between a husband and wife. The graph on the left side is the
reservation productivity when a husband and the wife are equally productive in home produc-
tion. That is, when θ = 0.5. The differences between the husband’s and the wife’s reservation
productivity is driven solely by the gender differences in labour shocks. The left graph suggests
that the two spouses’ labour supply decision rules are almost identical. Thus, if the parameter
θ = 1/2, the percentage of couples with the wife as breadwinner is not very different from that
of couples with the husband as breadwinner.
However, the graph on the right side is the reservation productivity when a wife is advanta-
geous in home production relative to her husband, in addition to the differences in probability
of labour shocks. For the graph, the parameter θ is set to 0.55. This graph indicates that the
wife’s reservation productivity is higher and at the same time the husband’s reservation pro-
ductivity is lower than in the left graph. This change in reservation productivities is due to the
asymmetry between a husband and a wife in home productivity. The change implies that when
θ > 1/2, married women may not accept job offers that they may accept when θ = 1/2. At the
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Table 3.5: Simulated Statistics across the Generosity of Parental Leave Policies
None Unpaid Paid 1 Paid 2 Paid 3
ψ=1 ψ=1/3 ψ=1/3 ψ=1/12 ψ=1/12
ρ=0.00 ρ=0.00 ρ=0.55 ρ=0.55 ρ=0.80
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fertility rates 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.5
Employment patterns (%)
Both spouses employed 54.7 54.3 48.8 46.5 32.3
Only husband employed 34.3 34.3 38.1 39.5 46.1
Only wife employed 9.1 9.7 10.9 11.9 18.9
Neither spouse employed 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.7
Employment/Population ratio (%)
Male 89.0 88.6 86.9 86.0 78.4
Female 63.8 63.9 59.8 58.4 51.1
On leave 0 0 0.8 2.8 12.3
At work 63.8 63.9 59.0 55.6 38.3
same time, their husbands are more likely to accept job offers that they may not accept when
θ = 1/2. Through this intra-household interaction due to the asymmetry in home productivity,
a wife may quit her job to raise her children even if the productivity of her job is higher than
that of her husband’s job. This intra-household interaction is unique in the household search
framework featuring home production. In my model, this situation is explicitly caused by mar-
ried individual’s difference in home production, while household search models without home
production explain that this situation is implied by a wife’s stronger preference for leisure than
her husband.
3.4 Policy Experiments
The generosity of parental leave policies is represented by the length and the labour income
replacement rate of statutory parental leave. In this model, an exogenous leave expiration shock
with probability ψ determines the average length of a parental leave to 1/ψ months. The labour
income replacement rate is denoted as ρ . I simulate the model by changing the two parameters
for the generosity of parental leave policies, ψ and ρ , while keeping other parameters the same
as in the benchmark economy.
Column (2) in Table 3.5 presents the results from the benchmark economy with an unpaid
three-month leave, which is the mandatory child-related leave policy in the United States at
the federal level. Column (1) shows that results from the simulation of the economy with
no maternity leave are the same as when 3 months of unpaid maternity leave are available.
It suggests that a short unpaid leave barely influences married couples’ fertility and labour
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supply decisions. In the United States, the total fertility rates barley changed between 1992
and 1994.7 Columns (3) and (4) shows the statistics from the simulation of the economy with a
paid three-month leave and twelve-month leave replacing 55 percent of usual salary (ρ = 0.55),
respectively. Column (4) mimics the statutory child-related leave policy in Canada except
Quebec at the federal level. The fertility rate increases as the parental leave policy is more
generous. When a couple is hit by a fertility shock, some couples with the wives employed
decide to have another child and take the leave after childbirth. One noticeable change in the
employment patterns of married couples with children under the age of 18 is the increase in
the percentage of couples with only the wives employed. As parental leave partially replaces a
leave-taker’s usual salary, a couple with the wife as a breadwinner is more likely sustainable.
However, the employment-to-population ratio of married females falls in the economy with
the Canadian type of paid parental leaves. This fall is driven by the increase in the fertility rate.
As a married couple, on average, has more children by taking a leave after childbirth, the couple
is able to produce more output from home production. Because the wife’s relative productivity
in home production θ is assumed greater than one half, the wife has higher reservation produc-
tivity and eventually she is less likely to return to pre-birth jobs. In addition, as more mothers
take leaves after childbirths, the rate of married females at work decreases.
The last column contains the statistics from the simulation with the policy parameters ψ
= 1/12 and ρ = 0.80. This income replacement rate mimics the generosity of parental leaves
given to mothers in Sweden.8 As parental leave benefits replace 80 percent of a mother’s usual
salary, more couples prefer having another child and thus the fertility rate increases. This
increase lowers the percentage of dual-earner couples. As a couple has more children, on
average, a couple is more likely to have a single earner and have the other spouse at home.
Also, a higher percentage of couples designate the wives as breadwinners.
In the comparisons of employment-to-population ratios across the three types of parental
leaves, the ratios of both married males and females fall. This fall is because couples in the
model economy with a more generous parental leave policy tend to have more children and
prefer to produce output from home production. In these employment ratios, the workers on
leave are also counted as employed. When the person on leave and the person at work are
distinguished, a higher percentage of married females is on leave and thus a lower percentage
of them are at work in an economy with a more generous leave policy. The lower rates of
married females at work in the model with more generous parental leaves are consistent with
the data in Figure 3.4.
7World Bank, Fertility Rate, Total for the United States [SPDYNTFRTINUSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPDYNTFRTINUSA, June 4, 2018
8This exercise does not cover a non-transferable parental leave for fathers in Sweden.
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(a) On leave (b) At work
Sources: Length of Full-Time Equivalence (FTE) paid leaves from Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt (2009) and
the maternal rates from OECD Family database (2008).
Figure 3.4: Fraction of Mothers with Children under Age 3 on Leave and at Work
The right graph in the figure shows that the maternal rate at work is negatively related to the
length of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) paid leaves. The length of FTE paid leaves is a measure
of the generosity of paid leaves. This measure is calculated by combining the length and
the labour income replacement rate of paid leaves. For example, one-year leave replacing 50
percent of a pre-birth salary is equivalent to half-year FTE paid leaves. The left graph in Figure
4 shows the positive relationship between the rates of mothers on leave and the generosity of
paid parental leaves from cross-country comparisons.
3.5 Conclusion
To investigate the effects of the generosity of child-related leave policies on married couples’
fertility and labour supply decisions, I build a household search model that includes home
production and endogenous fertility choice. The interactions between a husband and wife in
their decisions suggest that, when home productivity is asymmetric between a husband and
wife, the wife with match-specific productivity higher than the husband may quit for child-
care at home. Policy experiments suggest that more generous parental leave policies help
more married couples to have more children, whereas married women become more likely to
specialize in home production.
This paper provides a framework in which the social welfare for child-related leave policies
can be analyzed. Erosa et al. (2010) concluded losses in social welfare as the improvement
in females’ welfare is surpassed by welfare losses among males. The losses of males’ wel-
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fare comes from paying taxes for leave benefits without sharing the benefits, and from having
lower job arrival rates as more women participate in the labour market. In my household search
model, a husband and wife share the value from home production as well as utility from chil-
dren and their incomes. A paid parental leave policy affects a wife’s labour supply decisions,
and the wife’s decisions may make her husband choose to stay at home as his optimal decision.
However, my model has a few limitations. First, the labour choice and time allocation are
quite simplified. In the model, a married individual chooses to be either employed or non-
employed. An employed individual is assumed not to spend time in home production. How-
ever, in time use data, full-time workers also spend time in home production. Some married
women choose part-time jobs to spend more time in home production while being employed.
Moreover, in this model, non-participation and unemployment are categorized under the one
classification “non-employment.” It would be useful to include part-time employment or di-
vide labour states into three states so that the model would give additional implications about
participation and work hours decisions.
Second, I assume all employed mothers are eligible for maternity leave and apply this
model to mimic the U.S. economy with maternity leave under the FMLA. In Chapter 2, I doc-
umented eligibility criteria for FMLA leave and showed that not all mothers met the eligibility
criteria. Because only eligible workers can use an extended parental leave policy in reality, my
policy experiment results may overstate the aggregate impact of an extended paid parental leave
policy on employment and fertility rates. This study would be more relevant to high-educated
people who show higher eligibility rates.
Also, my model does not include human capital accumulation. Human capital accumula-
tion is related to parental leaves in two ways. First, while a worker is on leave, the worker’s
human capital may depreciate or stagnate. Human capital depreciation is one reason employ-
ers prefer to provide a shorter leave. Second, when a worker quits, the worker loses the firm-
specific or the job-specific human capital. This loss may lead to a wage loss in a new job
because the worker needs to start over in accumulating job-specific human capital in a new job.
If my model is extended to include human capital accumulation, which makes wages grow,
married women may be more likely to choose to return when their leaves expire. This would
be especially the case if a married woman has already accumulated a non-trivial amount of
human capital.
My model can be extended to investigate the effects of “daddy leave” in Sweden and Iceland
on married couples. In this paper, I assume that only employed females are entitled to child-
related leaves. In most countries, fathers’ take up rate is very low. In Sweden, Iceland, and
Quebec, a non-transferable paid child-related leave is given to a father with a newborn child to
enhance gender equality both at work and at home. As this daddy leave is based on a “take-it-
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or-lose-it” policy, about 85 to 90 percent of Swedish and Icelandic fathers take parental leave.
Patnaik (2016) found that in Quebec, which has a new paternity-leave quota, fathers are more
involved in child-care and housework after the reform.
In addition, another interesting topic related to parental leave is to study the firms’ re-
sponses to the generosity of statutory parental leave policies. If leave benefits should be paid
by employers, then more generous parental leave policies make the employers bear a higher
cost. Even if the benefits are funded by the taxes that employees pay, the provision of parental
leaves for employees requires the costs of hiring and training temporary workers. To avoid
these costs, employers may reduce demand for female workers. Moreover, to pass the costs on
to employees, employers may lower wages offered to female workers. To evaluate the effects
of parental leaves on social welfare, it would be useful to study the firm side as well.
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Chapter 4
Why Don’t Married Men Take Parental
Leave?
4.1 Introduction
Paid parental leave, including maternity and paternity leave, is a family policy that helps work-
ing parents care for a newborn or newly adopted child by guaranteeing their return to the pre-
birth job and providing financial support. In Canada, outside of Que´bec, paid parental leave
is available to employed parents through the federal program Employment Insurance (EI). In
addition to 17 weeks of maternity leave only for mothers who gave birth, 35 weeks of paid
parental leave can be shared between a mother and a father as long as eligibility criteria are
met. The intended purpose of shareable parental leave is to help working parents spend more
time with their children for successful child development (Speech from the Throne, 1999;
Cools, Fiva, and Kirkebøen, 2015) and to provide fathers the option to share more of the re-
sponsibilities of caring for babies (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2005).
Also, it may lead to more involvement of fathers in the future (Kotsadam and Finseraas, 2011).
The take-up of parental leave by fathers has two potential benefits. First, a father’s take-up
has positive effects on child development by allowing the child to spend extensive time with the
father (Addati, Cassirer, and Gilchrist, 2014). The second benefit of a father taking up parental
leave is to improve his wife’s position in her career. While a father on leave looks after his child
at home, his wife may return to work earlier and reduce the duration of her career interruption
(Pylkka¨nen and Smith, 2003).1
1A mother and father cannot receive parental benefits under EI at the same time. However, it is possible that a
mother is on maternity leave receiving EI maternity benefits and at the same time a father is on parental leave
receiving EI parental benefits. In this case, when a mother uses up 17 weeks of maternity leave, a couple may
choose for the husband to return to work, while the wife takes parental leave. Alternatively, a couple may choose
for the wife to return to work while the husband continues on parental leave.
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Despite its positive effects on child development and career development of married women,
many married couples choose to only have the wife take up the parental leave. In Canada ex-
cluding Que´bec, the take-up rate of eligible married fathers remains low at 13%, whereas that
of eligible married mothers is 91% [Employment Insurance Coverage Survey (EICS), 2004–
2011].2 In Que´bec, which has provided five weeks of paternity leave to fathers since 2006, 84%
of married fathers used paternity and/or parental leave in 2011 (Moss, 2015). In this paper, I
examine why many fathers do not use paid parental leave in the rest of Canada.
Most research about parental leave focuses on leaves specific either to a mother or a father.
One strand of research studies the effects of mothers’ use of parental leave, including maternity
leave, on child outcomes, mothers’ labour market outcomes, and social welfare.3 These studies
abstract from fathers’ use of parental leave. Recently, others have focused on the effects of
the introduction of paternity leave (Dahl, Løken, and Mogstad, 2014, Ekberg, Eriksson, and
Friebel, 2013, Rege and Solli, 2013, Patnaik, 2016). Ekerberg et al. (2013) and Patnaik (2016)
investigate empirically the effects of the introduction of paternity leave on the intra-household
division of labour in the short run in Sweden and Que´bec, respectively. I add to this literature
by taking into account parental leave that is not specific to mothers nor fathers and studying
how a husband and wife divide parental leave. My study helps to understand why shareable
parental leave has not been effective in raising fathers’ participation in parental leave.
Some studies suggest reasons for a gender difference in the take-up behaviour of parental
leave. Using the General Social Survey in Canada, Beaupre´ and Cloutier (2007) document
that financial reasons and working conditions are important factors affecting parents’ take-up
decisions. Using the Employment Insurance Coverage Survey in Canada, Marshall (2008)
finds that fathers are more likely to use parental leave if their wives have the same or higher
earnings and if their wives do not claim parental leave. Using data from Sweden, Albrecht,
Edin, Sundstrom, and Vroman (1999) find that the negative effect of career interruptions due
to parental leave on subsequent wages is four times greater for men than for women. To date,
the literature has not yet quantified the role of multiple factors in married couples’ take-up
decisions within a unified life-cycle framework.
As possible explanations for the division of paid parental leave within married couples,
I consider gender differences in wages upon entry into the labour market, wage growth pro-
cesses, wage penalties for time off from work, preferences for leisure, and relative productiv-
ities in home production. The labour market and home productivities determine whether the
husband or wife has a comparative advantage in either market or non-market activities as in a
2For women, parental leave includes maternity leave.
3Ruhm (1998), Sakiko (2005), Baker and Milligan (2008), Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009), Scho¨nberg and Lud-
steck (2014), Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2010), Lalive et al. (2014), Asai (2015), Carneiro, Løken, and Sal-
vanes (2015), Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich (2015), Thomas (2015)
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Beckerian model of the allocation of time (Becker, 1965, 1981). I provide empirical evidence
for these possible reasons and disentangle the role of these factors in a life-cycle model of
family labour supply.
My model has two key features. First, a husband and wife jointly allocate their time across
labour supply, leisure, and home production. As in Knowles (2013), I consider joint labour sup-
ply with home production and exploit time allocations for the calibration. Whereas Knowles
focuses on the importance of intra-household bargaining in marriage-divorce decisions, I let
married couples have unitary utility and a life-long marriage. The second key feature is that
human capital stochastically evolves via a learning-by-doing process. Hours of work in the
market in a period determine current earnings and the evolution of human capital. As in Guner,
Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014), a husband and wife jointly decide their labour supply at the ex-
tensive and intensive margins, and the wife’s labour market productivity endogenously evolves.
My model is distinguished from Guner et al. (2014) in that a husband’s labour productivity en-
dogenously evolves as well.4 When a child is born, a married couple makes decisions taking
into account the gender differences I consider.
I calibrate the model with Canadian data by minimizing the distance between simulated
and data moments. The baseline parental leave policy in the model mimics Canadian parental
leave policy at the federal level under EI. Targeted moments include the moments associated
with the take-up of parental leave, average hourly wage levels and growth, time allocations, and
labour market transitions by gender and education. Calibrated parameters imply that compared
to mothers, fathers have lower home productivity in the presence of an infant, higher rental
rates of human capital, and higher wage penalties for not working.
I quantify the relative importance of the different factors for the low take-up rates of married
fathers, using the calibrated model. I calculate the changes in take-up rates from the bench-
mark to the symmetry economy, where all gender differences are removed, and decompose the
changes into the possible explanations. In particular, I let men and women have same param-
eter values for the explanation under consideration and leave the other parameters the same as
in the benchmark. I then simulate the take-up behaviour of married couples and calculate the
percentage of the changes that are narrowed for each explanation. I find that the gender differ-
ences in home productivity, rental rates of human capital, and wage penalties for not working
are three major contributors to the low take-up of fathers. Due to positive interactions among
the three explanations, these three explanations together explain all the gender difference in the
take-up rates among high-educated parents.
Next, I examine the role of gender differences in paid parental leave policies and the role
of cash benefits in married couples’ decisions regarding parental leave. The baseline policy
4In their model, a couple accumulates financial assets instead of husband’s human capital.
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embodies a gender difference in maximum lengths of parental leave available to a mother and
a father due to lack of paternity leave. I find that introducing paternity leave without an increase
in cash benefits leads to only small changes in fathers’ take-up of parental leave. I show that
fathers’ take-up rates are responsive to an increase in an income replacement rate combined
with the introduction of paternity leave. In a set of policy experiments, I explore various
parental leave policies that aim to increase high-educated fathers’ take-up rates. I consider
policies that keep the total number of weeks of leave available to a couple the same as the
baseline policy. I find that, among these policies, a combination of introducing paternity leave
and providing higher replacement rates during maternity and paternity leaves increases fathers’
take-up rates with a small increase in aggregate spending.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I briefly present empirical background
about Canadian parental leave policy and supporting evidence for the possible explanations I
consider for the low take-up rates of fathers. In Section 4.3 and 4.4, I present my framework for
quantitative analyses and calibration results, respectively. Using the calibrated model, I carry
out a decomposition analysis and policy experiments in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. In
Section 4.7, I present conclusions including policy implications of the main findings.
4.2 Empirical Evidence for Explanatory Factors
This study uses paid parental leave policy in Canada at the federal level under EI as a baseline
policy. In Chapter 2, I document a stark difference in take-up rates between married fathers
and mothers under the Canadian federal EI program (Table 2.2). Whereas 91% of the eligible
mothers received maternity and/or parental benefits, only 13% of the eligible mothers answered
that their husband had used or planned to use paid parental leave. As possible explanations for
the gender gap in take-up rates of parental leave, I consider gender differences in wages upon
entry into the labour market, wage growth processes, wage penalties for time off from work,
preferences for leisure, and relative productivities in home production. Before exploring the
role of these explanations in a life-cycle framework, I provide empirical evidence for these
explanations in Canada.
4.2.1 Time Allocations Between Market and Home Work
The purpose of parental leave is to help parents take time off work and spend their time at home
with their newborn child. I conjecture that the division of parental leave is closely related to the
allocation of time within married households. As in Chapter 2, I document patterns of married
people’s time allocations across market work, home work, and leisure in Canada, using two
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Figure 4.1: Time Allocations of Married Individuals
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cycles of the GSS collected in 2005 and 2010 on the subject of time use. The sample of
interest is restricted to married people aged between 25 and 64.5 People who live in Que´bec
and whose youngest child is born in 2006 or afterwards are excluded from the sample. The
sample is grouped into three categories by the characteristics of their children: those without
any children, those with an infant less than two years old, and those with only older children.6
Figure 4.1 displays the average amount of weekly time spent by married people on market
work, home production, and leisure expressed as a percentage of the time endowment.7 This
figure shows that specialization between market and home production is much stronger among
those with an infant than those without any children or with only older children. Before having
children, compared to high-educated men, high-educated women spend less time on market
work and more time on home production, while spending the same amount of time in leisure.
When they have an infant at home, married women drastically reduce time spent on market
work and increase time on home production. Although men also increase the amount of time
they spend on home production, women spend twice as much time on home production as men
do. When married people have only older children, the specialization declines as they reduce
time spent in home production and married women return to market work. The same patterns
are seen among the low-educated, although their specialization is stronger even before having
children compared to the high-educated. Clearly, these patterns suggest that female compar-
5Public-use data provide age grouped in 5-year or 10-year bins.
6Since GSS collects the number of children living in a respondent’s household, young married couples who have
not yet had children cannot be distinguished from empty-nesters. Thus, I classify married people who are aged
45 or older and have no children at home as married people with older children.
7These statistics are not conditional on participation and include zeros in calculation. The time endowment is
discretionary time that excludes time dedicated to sleeping and other necessary personal care. It is equivalent to
112 hours per week.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Hourly Wages at Age 23
High-educated Low-educated
Men Women Ratio Men Women Ratio
Statistics (M) (W) (W/M) (M) (W) (W/M)
Median 15.3 12.5 .817 13.0 9.2 .708
Mean 17.1 13.5 .789 13.5 10.6 .785
Cross-sectional data from Survey of Labour Income Dynamics (2001–2011) are used for the calcula-
tion. The sample is restricted to married people who were not a student and worked at least 300 hours
for a year. Hourly wages are deflated to 2002 Canadian dollars.
ative advantage in home production may be a contributing factor for the gender differences
in parental leave take up rates. However, it is likely not the only factor. The next subsection
examines evidence for differences in market work factors.
4.2.2 Wages upon Entry into the Labour Market
The gender wage gap is closely related to specialization within a couple (Hersch and Stratton,
1994). I separate the gender wage gap in two parts: gender differences in rental rates of human
capital conditional on educational attainment and gender differences in human capital gained
from market experiences. The first part of the gender wage gap can impact specialization,
and the second part can be influenced by specialization. As in Olivetti (2006), I label gender
differences in the rental rates “pure” gender wage differences. I provide empirical evidence of
the pure gender wage gap using hourly wages upon entry into the labour market.
I use public-use cross-sectional data from Survey of Labour Income Dynamics (SLID)
collected between 2001 and 2011. SLID is a Canadian household longitudinal survey that
contains a broad range of information on the histories of labour market activities, educational
attainment, and demographic characteristics of individuals and families. The annual cross-
sections consist of two overlapping panels. Each panel is surveyed for six consecutive years.
Every three years, a new panel is added. For a measure of wages, I use the hourly wage from the
main job at which a respondent works for most hours during the reference year. Hourly wages
are deflated to 2002 Canadian dollars using the federal Consumer Price Index. Throughout this
paper, all monetary values are deflated to 2002 Canadian dollars unless mentioned otherwise.
Hourly wages of 23-year-old high-educated individuals are used as a proxy for rental rates
of human capital. The assumptions behind this approach are that most high-educated people
at age 23 are in their early careers and that both men and women have similar levels of human
capital gained from market experiences upon entry into the labour market conditional on ed-
ucation. Among 23-year-old high-educated married people, 99% of men and 90% of women
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were employed for any positive number of hours during the reference year, whereas 91% of
men and 78% of women were employed full-time at least for a week.
Table 4.1 reports the average and median hourly wages of married individuals at age 23.
It shows considerable differentials between men and women. Among the high-educated, the
median hourly wage of women is 82% of that of men, and the average hourly wage earned by
women is 79% of that earned by men.8 These gender differentials in the means and medians
are consistent with the presence of pure gender wage differentials. Because this study abstracts
from the choices of majors and occupations, I report the statistics that are not conditional on
occupations and fields of study. Therefore, the statistics reflect different choices in college
majors and occupations between men and women.9
4.2.3 Returns to Experience and Wage Penalty for Taking Time out of
Work
To demonstrate gender differences in returns to experience and wage penalties for taking time
off work, I run Mincerian wage regressions using the SLID data. For this estimation, I com-
bine cross-sectional data from SLID in 2001–2011. SLID contains self-reported retrospective
information about educational attainment and market experience. Hourly wages from the main
job during the reference year are used as a measure of wages. The real hourly wage rates ex-
pressed in natural logs are used as my dependent variable. Control variables include a quadratic
in market experience, the accumulated amount of time off from work, educational attainment,
the number of children, and an indicator variable for a private sector job.
SLID records a respondent’s market experience accumulated since their first full-time job
as the number of years as a full-year full-time equivalent.10 This variable is denoted by Experi-
ence. This measure of experience excludes any part-time employment before the first full-time
job. Those who have never had a full-time job have zero as its value. I measure foregone ex-
perience in two parts: potential foregone experience before the first full-time job, denoted by
TimeOut1, and actual foregone experience after the first full-time job, denoted by TimeOut2.
TimeOut1 is defined as the age at which a person started to work full-time minus the number
8Table C.2 in Appendix compares the statistics of the married sample to the same statistics for a sample of all
individuals. When the sample is not restricted to married individuals, the gender gap in the median hourly wages
of high-educated people is similar to that of the married sample and the gap in the average hourly wages is
smaller. In contrast, among the low-educated, the gap in the median wages is smaller and the gap in the average
wages is similar.
9The literature on gender wage gap and gender differences in college majors includes Altonji(1993), Brown and
Corcoran (1997), Paglin and Rufolo(1990). Section 5 and section 7 in Altonji and Blank (1999) provide the
summary of the literature.
10In Canada, full-time work means at least 30 hours of work over a period of one week.
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Table 4.2: Log Wage Regressions
Dependent variable All Low-edu High-edu
: ln(Wage) Men Women Men Women Men Women
Experience 0.0270 0.0272 0.0178 0.0163 0.0281 0.0274
(22.75) (26.06) (9.04) (9.31) (17.36) (19.57)
Experience2/103 -0.5178 -0.5273 -0.2841 -0.1818 -0.6984 -0.7229
(-15.59) (-15.73) (-5.40) (-3.40) (-14.83) (-15.72)
TimeOut1 -0.0102 -0.0065 -0.0103 -0.0081 -0.0120 -0.0129
(-18.79) (-15.22) (-12.78) (-12.90) (-15.64) (-21.22)
TimeOut2 -0.0204 -0.0156 -0.0219 -0.0155 -0.0244 -0.0217
(-21.13) (-28.83) (-14.38) (-18.17) (-18.61) (-29.65)
Constant 2.663 2.5012 2.8092 2.7027 3.076 3.0277
(200.33) (198.20) (135.54) (-29.05) (224.93) (289.34)
Adjusted R2 0.2434 0.3575 0.1102 0.2056 0.1060 0.1964
t-statistics are in parentheses. Data is from Survey of Labour Income Dynamics, 2001–2011. The sample of
interest is married people aged between 25 and 49 with paid employment who are not a student and do not
have any disability in the reference year. Hourly wages are deflated to 2002 Canadian dollars. Education is
controlled for the first two columns. The number of children and a private sector job indicator are controlled
for all columns. A complete table is reported in Table C.4 in Appendix C.
of years of schooling minus six.11 TimeOut2 is defined as the number of years since the first
full-time job minus Experience. Because TimeOut1 does not distinguish part-time employment
from non-employment and thus overstates the amount of time off from work, the coefficient on
TimeOut2 is my preferred estimate of wage penalties for foregone experience.
The sample of interest is limited to married people aged between 25 and 49 with paid
employment who are not students and do not have any disability in the reference year. Obser-
vations that have any missing information about education and experience are excluded from
the sample. The final sample consists of 35,826 male observations and 36,692 female obser-
vations. Men had accumulated 3.37 more years of market experience compared to women,
whereas women had taken 1.76 more years off of work since their first full-time job. These
gender differences in market experience and foregone experience are related to the fact that in
most case mothers take time off work due to childbirth and childcare and the fact that part-time
employment is more common among women than among men. Other main characteristics of
the sample are reported in Table C.3 in Appendix C.
Table 4.2 presents the estimation results. The negative coefficients on variable TimeOut2
show wage losses for an additional year of foregone experience after the first full-time job. Both
men and women receive statistically significant penalties for taking time out. The absolute
values of the coefficients for men are greater than those for women. That is, for the same
11I replace negative values of TimeOut1 with zero under the assumption that these respondents started their first
full-time job before receiving the highest level of degree or went back to school in the midst of their career.
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amount of time off from work, married men face greater wage penalties than married women
do. When log wage regressions are separately estimated by educational group, the results
are similar. However, there are some differences between the two education groups. In both
education groups, men and women have similar returns to experience and receive statistically
significant wage penalties for taking time out. Meanwhile, the adverse effect of time out of
work on subsequent wages is larger among the high-educated, compared to the low-educated.
For gender differences in the wage penalties, men have a larger wage penalty than women do
for taking time off in both educational groups, whereas the gender difference is bigger among
the low-educated. This is because high-educated women face a wage penalty that is as high as
that for high-educated men.
To sum up, 13% of eligible married fathers use parental leave whereas 91% of eligible
married mothers use maternity and parental leave. Married men and women allocate their time
differently when they have children, especially an infant. Men have higher average hourly
wages upon entry into the labour market than women do. Finally, men receive higher wage
penalties for taking time off work than women do.
In the remainder of the paper, all these possible explanations are incorporated into a unified
life-cycle framework. In addition, I consider a gender difference in preferences for leisure as
possible reasons. In the framework, parameters related to the possible explanations are allowed
to differ by gender. By calibrating the model, I can quantitatively assess the role of each gender
difference in married couples’ decisions on how to divide parental leave between a husband and
wife.
4.3 Model
This section describes a life-cycle model of married couples. This model is a partial equi-
librium model. The period length is annual. In the model, I take various gender differences
as exogenously given and quantify their contribution to a couple’s take-up of parental leave.
These gender differences are the result of choices, social norms, and history, which are be-
yond the scope of this research. For simplicity, the model abstracts from the formation and
dissolution of marriage and educational and occupational choices.12
12As the model abstracts from marriage and divorce decisions, this model misses the effect of the fathers’ take-up
on marriage stability or family structure. Bernal and Fruttero (2008) use a general equilibrium model of mar-
riage and divorce to assess the effects of maternity leave on intra-household decision making, family structure,
and the distribution of income. Also, my model abstracts educational and occupational choices. As the job
protection provided by parental leave helps women retain their pre-birth employment after childbirth, parental
leave encourages women to anticipate longer work lives. The expanded horizon of career influences human
capital investment and occupational choices (Goldin, 2006). Although their focus is on female’s labour supply,
Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) take career decisions into account quantifying the career costs associated
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4.3.1 Economic Environment
Demographics. The model economy is populated by married households. Each married
household consists of a husband and a wife. A marriage is lifelong, and a married couple has
a working life of 40 years from age 23 to age 62. Each person is either high-educated, hi,
or low-educated, lo. While preferences and home production technology are assumed to be
the same across education types, human capital evolution processes and fertility shocks will
depend on education types. A household’s education type is a pair of husband’s and wife’s
education types. In each period, a married couple jointly makes decisions.
Children do not make any decisions. However, the decisions of a married couple are in-
fluenced by the characteristics of their children, especially the number of children and the age
of the youngest child. The age of the youngest child, a, is tracked until the age of two.13 We
define a child under two an “infant” and a child who is two years old or older an “older child.”
When a couple has an infant at home, a = 1. When a couple has only older children, a = 2.
Children stay with their parents throughout their parents’ whole life.
Fertility is exogenous and stochastic. Based on fertility, the life-cycle is split into three
stages: the pre-fertile, fertile, and post-fertile stages. A married couple without any children
begins in the “pre-fertile” stage. In this stage, the married couple does not face any birth
shock. A married couple in the pre-fertile stage enters the fertile stage with probability pi f . The
concept of fertility in this set-up does not relate to the biological ability to reproduce but rather
to the state of considering having a child. The pre-fertile stage is needed in this model, where
all couples begin married at age 23, to match the timing of having the first child in the data.
In the fertile stage, a couple faces a birth shock at the beginning of each period. The
probability of a birth, pib(t,k,a,εw), depends on the age of the couple, t, the number of children,
k, the age of the youngest child, a, and the wife’s education level, εw. A birth shock occurs
every period until the couple enters the post-fertile stage in which a birth shock no longer
occurs.
A couple enters the post-fertile stage in three ways. First, a couple enters when a couple be-
comes 43 years old. Thus, a couple can be in the fertile stage for at most 20 periods. Although
the fertility rate of women aged 40 or higher is positive, the probability of a birth beyond age
43 is small. My estimation results show that the probability of having a newborn child at age
with children using a dynamic life cycle model incorporating occupational choices with different human capi-
tal growth and atrophy paths. My model misses the effects of parental leave on educational and occupational
choices especially in policy experiments. Instead, I take these choices as given in quantifying the contribution
of various factors to the take-up of parental leave. I directly takes the distribution of couples across household
educational types from the data. I implicitly assume that gender differences in occupations are reflected in
gender differences in rental rate distributions and human capital evolution processes.
13I choose the age of two to keep the state space small. Due to this assumption, my model misses gradual changes
in married women’s behaviour until their children start school.
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42 is less than two percent when a married couple has no child or one child. The probability is
almost zero when a couple has two or more children (Table C.7). Second, couples stop being
able to have children once the number of children in a married household reaches three. Lastly,
couples under the age of 43 with only older children enter the post-fertile stage with probability
pipost . The transitional probabilities into the fertile stage pi f and into the post-fertile stage pipost
depend on a wife’s educational level.
Preferences. A married couple has unitary utility from consumption, c, husband’s and wife’s
leisure, lh and lw, respectively, and output from home production, z. Per-period household
utility, u(ct , lht , lwt ,zt), is additively separable and concave. Consumption and output from
home production are public goods within a household. Let the set of parameters γc, γh, γw
and γz denote weights on consumption, husband’s leisure, wife’s leisure and output from home
production. The functional form used in the quantitative analysis is:
u(c, lh, lw,z) = γc
cσc
σc
+ γh
lhσl
σl
+ γw
lwσl
σl
+ γz
zσz
σz
.
The parameters σc, σl and σz denote elasticity parameters on consumption, leisure, and output
from home production, respectively. Each period, an individual is endowed with discretionary
time E and allocates it across three activities: paid work, n, home production, e, and leisure,
l. Household incomes consist of labour earnings and parental leave benefits. Married couples
live hand to mouth. They do not save nor borrow. Most people in their 20s and 30s have
small amount of net worth and add only a small amount to their net worth (Macdonald 2015).
To focus on the role of husband’s and wife’s human capital accumulation in their decisions, I
abstract asset accumulation from the model.14
Couples with an infant at home must purchase childcare services for every hour that both
parents are simultaneously working in the labour market. As in Domeij and Klein (2013), the
amount of market childcare services to be purchased is determined as min{nh,nw} where nh
and nw denote husband’s and wife’s hours of work, respectively. Let κ represent an hourly rate
for market childcare services for an infant.15 Although some parents have an option of unpaid
childcare services provided by grandparents or siblings, unpaid childcare services are beyond
14Guner et al. (2014) have a model where a couple accumulates financial assets instead of husband’s human
capital. Mazzocco, Ruiz, and Yamaguchi (2013) and Bayot and Voena (2015) have a model include wealth and
husband’s and wife’s human capital accumulation. As Mazzocco et al. (2013) emphasize the wealth dynamics,
they use two points for experience.
15This model tracks the age of the youngest child up to two and categorizes all older children into one group.
Because I assume all children stay with their parents though their parents’ whole life, I assume the childcare
costs for the older children are relatively negligible. A weakness of the assumption is that the model understates
the benefit of a parent staying at home to save childcare costs especially for older children.
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the scope of this paper.16 In the cases in which either a husband or a wife does not work in the
market, a couple does not purchase market childcare services but produces childcare services
as a part of home production.
Home production technology. The output from home production includes not only general
household chores such as cleaning, maintenance, and cooking but also childcare.17 Home
production requires inputs of market goods, g, and time from each spouse, eh and ew. The
productivity of the husband’s time in home production relative to the wife’s time is denoted by
η(k,a). The wife’s relative home productivity is denoted by 1−η(k,a). If the husband’s time
and the wife’s time are equally productive, η(k,a) = 1/2. If the wife’s time produces more
output than the same amount of her husband’s time, η(k,a) < 1/2. This relative productivity
may vary upon the presence of an infant in a family. When a couple has an infant, η(k,a) = η1;
otherwise, η(k,a) = η0.
For the quantitative analysis, I use a nested Cobb-Douglas function for the home production
technology:
z = z(g,eh,ew,k,a) = (1+ kζ (k,a))g1−α
(
eη(k,a)h e
1−η(k,a)
w
)α
,
where k is the number of kids and a is the age of the youngest kid. The efficiency factor of
home production, (1+kζ (k,a)), increases with the number of kids. Also, the efficiency factor
is allowed to vary by the presence of an infant at home. If a couple has an infant ζ (k,a) = ζ1
with ζ (k,a) = ζ0 otherwise.
Rental rates of human capital. A worker earns an hourly wage which is defined as the prod-
uct of a quantity of human capital and a rental rate per unit of human capital. Let pi denote the
rental rate of human capital for spouse i. A rental rate is randomly drawn from an exogenous
gender-specific log-normal distribution. The means of husbands’ rental rates, µh, and wives’
rental rates, µw, are allowed to differ. I call this gender difference in the means of rental rates
the “pure” gender wage gap. The argument about why the pure gender wage gap exists upon
the entry into the labour market is beyond the scope of this paper, but one explanation is oc-
cupational gender segregation. Intended fertility and career interruptions influence women’s
occupational choices and lead to self-selection into more child-friendly occupations (Adda,
Dustmann, and Stevens, 2017, Go¨rlich and de Grip, 2009). Although occupational gender
16Bick (2016) builds a model in which a married couple chooses the type of childcare services to evaluate the
effect of childcare subsidy on parental labour supply, fertility, and social welfare.
17Cardia and Gomme (2018) develop a life-cycle model where childcare is distinguished from household chores
and show that childcare plays an important role in matching the life-cycle patterns of women’s market work in
the U.S. In this chapter, both childcare and household chores are included in home production.
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segregation has declined since 1970s, it still remains present in the labour market (Blau, Brum-
mund, and Liu, 2013). For my quantitative analysis, the distribution of rental rates follows a
log-normal distribution Gi(pi)∼ lnN(µi,σ2i ) for i = h,w.
A person draws a new rental rate from the same distribution Gi after a full year of non-
employment or after a wage shock. A full year (period) of non-employment is either due to
one’s voluntary choice or due to a full-year non-employment shock at the end of the preceding
period. A non-employment shock occurs at the end of a period with probability νe to an
employed person and with probability νn to a non-employed person. If this shock is realized,
then the person is involuntarily non-employed for a full year in the following period. After
the period, a worker draws a new rental rate. In addition, a wage shock may occur to an
employed worker with probability λ at the end of a period. This shock is independent of the
non-employment shock. If a wage shock is realized, a worker redraws a new rental rate at the
beginning of the following period. This shock allows employed workers to change their rental
rates without experiencing a full year of non-employment.
Evolution of human capital. Human capital, x, depends on formal education and market
experience. An educational type, ε , remains fixed at either low-educated, lo, or high-educated,
hi, over the life cycle. Human capital gained from market experience, xexp, stochastically
evolves via a learning-by-doing process.
The level of human capital from market experience takes a value on the finite setX exp(ε)=
{xexp0 ,xexp1 , ...,xexpmax(ε)}. Each level is expressed not as the number of years but rather as the ef-
ficiency units of human capital gained from market experience. In the finite set, xexp1 represents
a baseline experience level which a worker at age 23 has upon entry into the labour market.
Human capital may depreciate below the baseline level to the lowest level xexp0 . The baseline
level xexp1 is normalized to one. There is a constant growth rate between the lowest level, x
exp
0 ,
and the maximum level, xexpmax. By allowing the maximum level, x
exp
max, to vary by education
level, ε , the finite setX exp differs between the two educational levels.
Transition probabilities of human capital depend on its level, xexpj , and time worked in the
labour market, n, in a period. The human capital evolves by one grid point at a time. The
following functional form is a variant of a stochastic process of labour productivity in Caucutt,
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Guner, and Knowles (2002): for ε ∈ {lo,hi} and i ∈ {h,w},
Pr(U p) = Xεi (x
exp
j+1 | xexpj ,ni) = ψεi n˜i
/
(xexpj )
τ , j ∈ {1, ...,N−1},
Pr(Down) = Xεi (x
exp
j−1 | xexpj ,ni) = (1− n˜i)δ εi , j ∈ {1, ...,N},
Pr(Same) = Xεi (x
exp
j | xexpj ,ni) = 1−Pr(up)−Pr(down), j ∈ {1, ...,N−1},
Pr(Same) = Xεi (x
exp
0 | xexp0 ,ni) = 1−Xεi (xexp1 | xexp0 ,ni),
Pr(Same) = Xεi (x
exp
N | xexpN ,ni) = 1−Xεi (xexpN−1 | xexpN ,ni),
(4.1)
where n˜ is hours of work expressed as a fraction of the maximum amount of time available for
market work, n¯, which is set to 40% of time endowment. That is, n¯ = 0.4E and n˜i = ni/n¯.
The transitional probabilities incorporate two key parameters. Let ψεi denote the maximum
probability of human capital growth. It is the likelihood of human capital increasing when a
person spends all available time for market work n¯ in the labour market. Let δ εi represent the
maximum probability of human capital depreciation. It is the likelihood that human capital
falls when a person is non-employed for a year. The parameter τ is related to the rate at which
returns to experience diminish. As the possible explanations I consider for the gender gap in
take-up rates, ψεi and δ
ε
i are allowed to be gender-specific.
Parental leave policy (PL). Upon the birth of a child, an employed parent who meets the
requirements for entitlement to EI is guaranteed paid parental leave. An eligible parent deter-
mines the number of weeks of paid parental leave to take. When a parent takes d weeks of
parental leave, the parent is available for market work during at most 52−d weeks during the
period. The maximum number of weeks available for market work restricts the total amount of
time available for market work to (52−di52 )n¯.
Given the job protection provided by parental leave, a mother who uses a full year of
parental leave retains her pre-birth rental rate. I assume that a mother on a full year of parental
leave does not search for a new job, her probability of drawing a new rental rate is zero, and
a full-year non-employment shock occurs with probability νe. If a parent uses less than a full
year of parental leave and does not return to work during the period, I view this as voluntary
non-employment and let the parent draw a new rental rate with probability one at the beginning
of the following period. If a parent does not use parental leave or if a parent uses less than a
full year of parental leave and returns to work during the period, I let the parent draw a new
rental rate with probability λ and a full-year non-employment shock occur with probability νe.
The function of job protection is summarized by the probability of drawing a new rental rate,
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denoted by λ˜i, as follows:
λ˜i =

0 if ni = 0 and di = 52 (Job protection after a full year of PL),
1 if ni = 0 and di < 52 (Voluntary non-employment after a part year of PL),
λ if ni > 0 and 0≤ di < 52 (Return to work after a part year of PL or not using PL).
(4.2)
The second function of parental leave is financial support through cash benefits. The
amount of weekly benefits, B, is determined based on hours worked and earnings in the previ-
ous period. Specifically it is given by the following updating rule:
B′ = 1{nit ≥ 600}min
{
ρ
pitxitnit
52
, B¯
}
, (4.3)
for i ∈ {h,w}. To be eligible for paid parental leave under EI, a parent must meet the minimum
requirement of 600 hours of work within the last 52 weeks. The indicator variable 1{nit ≥ 600}
is equal to one if person i meets the requirement and zero otherwise. Conditional on being
eligible, the parental benefits replace the pre-birth earnings, pitxitnit , at a rate of ρ with a
maximum amount B¯. As a state variable, Bi = 0 if person i is not eligible for EI. A positive
value of Bi represents the weekly benefit amount that person i can receive.
4.3.2 Household Problem
I present in detail the household problem in a fertile period in which a married couple faces a
birth shock. Because household problems in pre-fertile and post-fertile periods are similarly
defined except for the continuation values, only continuation values are presented in these
cases.
A couple starts a fertile period with a given set of state variables S = (p,x,ε,B,k,a,ϒ, t)
indicating the rental rates of human capital, p = (ph, pw); levels of human capital from market
experience, x = (xexph ,x
exp
w ); education types, ε = (εh,εw); the weekly amounts of parental
benefits, B = (Bh,Bw); the number of children at home, k; the age of the youngest child, a;
non-employment risks, ϒ; and the age of the couple, t.
Non-employment risks are exogenous and stochastic. A spouse experiences a part-year
non-employment shock with probability χ at the end of a period. In this case, a person can
work up to 12 n¯ during half of the following period. This state is denoted by P. If a spouse
experiences a full-year non-employment shock, the person cannot participate in the labour
market in the following period. This state is denoted by F . The probability of a full-year
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Figure 4.2: Timeline of Events in a Fertile Period
t+1t
Birth shock, pib
Allocation of time and income;
take-up decisions
Updates of human capital
and benefit levels
Wage shocks, λ
Drawing a new
rental rate Non-employment
shock, χ , νe, or νn
Fertility stage
transition shock, pipost
non-employment shock depends on an individual’s current employment status. The shock for
an employed person is realized with probability νe and for a non-employed person is with
probability νn. If neither non-employment shock is realized, denoted by N, a person can work
in the labour market up to n¯ hours of work.
The non-employment risks at the household level, denoted by ϒ, are a pair of husband’s and
wife’s non-employment risks. For example, ϒ=PN represents a state where the husband expe-
riences a part-year non-employment shock and the wife experiences neither non-employment
shock. Assuming that the husband’s and wife’s non-employment risks are dependent, I allow
ϒ to take one of the five states: {NP,NF,PN,FN,NN}, where for each state the first and the
second letters stand for the husband’s and wife’s non-employment risks, respectively.
ϒ=

NP with probability χw (part-year non-employment shock to the wife)
NF with probability νw (full-year non-employment shock to the wife)
PN with probability χh (part-year non-employment shock to the husband)
FN with probability νh (full-year non-employment shock to the husband)
NN with probability 1−χw−νw−χh−νh,
where χi = χ and νi is either νe or νn for i = h,w.
Figure 4.2 displays the timeline of decisions and stochastic events during a fertile period.
A birth shock is realized at the beginning of a fertile period. If a birth does not occur, b = 0,
a couple jointly allocates their time and income. If a birth occurs, b = 1, and parents are
eligible for parental leave, they also make decisions on how to use their parental leave. After
a couple makes decisions, levels of human capital are updated, and a new rental rate is drawn
if applicable. Next, non-employment shocks are realized. Lastly, if a couple has only older
children, a transition shock into the post-fertile stage is realized with probability pipost .
Given a set of state variables, S , the value to a couple in which both a husband and wife
experience neither non-employment shock, denoted by ϒ = NN, before the realization of a
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birth shock is
W fNN(S ) = pib(t,k,a,εw)V
b=1
NN (S )+(1−pib(t,k,a,εw))V b=0NN (S ),
where V b=1NN is the value to a couple when a birth occurs, and V
b=0
NN is the value to a couple
when a birth does not occur. The value to a couple when a birth occurs, V b=1NN , is given by
V b=1NN (ph, pw,x,ε,B,k,ak, t)
= max
dh,dw,nh,nw,
c,g,eh,ew,lh,lw≥0
u(c, lh, lw,z(g,eh,ew); k+1,1)
+β
{
λ˜hλ˜wEp′h,p′w
[
W f (p′h, p
′
w)
]
+ λ˜h(1− λ˜w)Ep′h
[
W f (p′h, pw)
]
+(1− λ˜h)λ˜wEp′w
[
W f (ph, p′w)
]
+(1− λ˜h)(1− λ˜w)W f (ph, pw)
}
subject to
c+g+
(
52−dh−dw
52
)
κmin{nh,nw}= phxhnh+ pwxwnw+Bwdw+Bhdh,
dh ≤ 35, dw ≤ 52, dh+dw ≤ 52,
ni ≤ (52−di52 )n¯, ni+ ei+ li = E,
where W f (ph, pw) = Eϒ′,x′,B′
[
W fϒ′(ph, pw,x
′,ε,B′,k+1,1, t+1)
]
and the probability of
drawing a new rental rate, λ˜i, is determined by equation (4.2).
Parents with Bi > 0 determine the length of their parental leave, dh and dw, from a menu
of 0, 6.5, 17, 26, and 35 weeks for a father and a menu of 0, 6.5, 17, 26, 35, 45.5, and 52
weeks for a mother. A parent who chooses to use parental leave allocates time taken away
from market work between home production and leisure. As a result, a couple gains increased
output from home production and increased leisure time. Additionally, while a spouse is on
leave, a couple does not pay childcare costs. When a couple does not use all 52 weeks, the
couple must purchase market childcare services for every hour that both parents work in the
market at an hourly rate κ . In this case, the childcare services cost
(
52−dh−dw
52
)
κmin{nh,nw}.
When a parent uses parental leave to care for children, the parent gives up work experience.
The couple incurs costs from this reduction in hours of work. First, as the reduction in hours
of work raises the likelihood of human capital depreciation according to a learning-by-doing
process, a parent on leave is more likely to experience a wage penalty. All other things being
equal, a couple would choose to have the spouse with the lower wage penalty take time off
through parental leave. Also, as the reduction in hours worked lowers the probability of human
capital accumulation, the couple anticipates wage losses in the future due to the foregone expe-
rience. All other things being equal, a couple would choose to have the spouse with the lower
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return to experience use parental leave. The other cost is an income loss in the current period.
Because cash benefits replace 55% of the pre-birth earnings with a cap, to minimize household
income losses, a couple is likely to let the spouse with with lower wage rate use parental leave.
The value to a couple in a fertile period without the realization of a birth shock, V b=0t , is
similarly defined. For a couple with only older children, a stochastic transition into the post-
fertile stage is realized with probability pipost . Their continuation value is pipostE [W post(St+1)]+
(1− pipost)E
[
W f (St+1)
]
, where W post is the value to a couple in a post-fertile period. The
value, W post , is similarly defined as V b=0t . In a pre-fertile period, a couple makes a transition
into the fertile stage with probability pi f , and their continuation value is pi fE
[
W f (St+1)
]
+
(1−pi f )E [W pre(St+1)], where W pre is the value to a couple in a pre-fertile period.
4.4 Calibration
The goal of the calibration is to provide a unified framework to quantify the relative impor-
tance of the various factors I consider for the low take-up rates of fathers and to carry out
policy experiments. The model is calibrated to match Canadian data. Given a set of the param-
eters determined outside the model, the remaining parameters are jointly determined within
the model by minimizing the sum of squared errors between simulated and data moments. The
calibrated economy is set as the benchmark economy.
4.4.1 Externally Determined Parameters
Table 4.3 displays the parameters determined outside the model. Parameters related to the
parental leave policy are set to mimic Canadian parental leave policy under EI. The maximum
duration is 52 weeks for a mother and 35 weeks for a father.18 The income replacement rate
ρ is 0.55, and the weekly benefit maximum B¯ is $413 as it was between 2001 and 2006. I let
the weekly benefit amount Bi take a value on the finite setB =
{
0, 13 B¯,
2
3 B¯, B¯
}
.19 The discount
factor is set to 0.96. I set the utility curvature parameters σc and σl to -1. There is little guidance
in the literature on the value of the curvature parameter for home output σz. I set the curvature
parameter for home output σz to the utility curvature parameter for human capital investment
on children as in Caucutt et al. (2002). Although their environment is not the same as here,
18A mother and a father cannot take leave simultaneously, so the maximum duration of leave per couple is 52
weeks.
19As I use a discrete menu for parental leave choices, I choose to let the state variable of weekly benefits be
discrete as well. In quantitative analysis, I let the weekly benefit amount Bi take a value on the finite set
B = {B1,B2,B3, B¯} and be stochastically updated on the finite set. Transitional probabilities of the weekly
benefits amount depend on the updating rule in equation (4.3). If B′ = B¯, Bi,t+1 = B¯ with probability 1. If
B′ ∈ [B j,B j+1] for j = 1,2,3, Bi,t+1 = B j with probability B j+1−B
′
B j+1−B j and Bi,t+1 = B j+1 with probability
B′−B j
B j+1−B j .
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Table 4.3: Externally Determined Parameters
Parameters Description Sources
d¯PL = 35 Maximum length of parental leave (weeks) EI
ρ = 0.55 Income replacement rate EI
B¯ = 413 Maximum weekly benefits ($) EI
β = 0.96 Discount rate -
σc =−1.0 Elasticity of consumption -
σl =−1.0 Elasticity of labour supply -
σz = 0.3 Elasticity of output from home production Caucutt et al. (2002)
γc = 1.0 Weight on consumption Normalization
α = 0.67 Elasticity of substitution between goods and time -
κ = 6.69 Hourly cost of childcare services ($) -
pib(t,k,a,xeduw ) Stochastic fertility process Estimates from SLID
pi f = 0.417 Prob. a transition to the fertile stage (low) Estimates from SLID
pi f = 0.277 Prob. a transition to the fertile stage (high) Estimates from SLID
pipost = 0.029 Prob. a transition to the post-fertile stage (low) Estimates from SLID
pipost = 0.069 Prob. a transition to the post-fertile stage (high) Estimates from SLID
lnN(µh,σ2) Dist. log rental rates at age 23 MLE from SLID
ph ∼ lnN(2.69,0.392) (men) ph ∈ {9.39,12.97,16.63,23.00}
pw ∼ lnN(2.52,0.372) (women) pw ∈ {8.10,11.06,14.05,19.19}
ωedu = 0.850 Relative efficiency of the low-educated (men) MLE from SLID
ωedu = 0.814 Relative efficiency of the low-educated (women) MLE from SLID
xεmax Maximum experience level Wage regressions
= 2.276 (low)X exp = {0.81,1.00,1.23,1.51,1.85,2.28} for males
= 2.296 (high)X exp = {0.81,1.00,1.23,1.52,1.87,2.30} in Table 4.2
pix = 1.00 Fraction of men beginning with x2 SLID
Γ(εh,εw) Distribution of household education levels SLID
= {21.0,20.6,15.5,42.9} {(lo, lo),(lo,hi),(hi, lo),(hi,hi)}
using their parameter value is not unreasonable in the sense that home production in my model
includes childcare activities and requires goods and time inputs as with their children human
capital production.
The share of goods input to time input is set to 0.67. There is little guidance in the literature
on this parameter value. I assume that this share is the same as the labour income share that
is commonly used for the aggregate production technology in the macroeconomics literature.
The hourly rate for childcare services is set to $6.69 dollars. Macdonald and Friendly (2016)
reported the median monthly fees for full-time childcare in big cities in Canada in 2016. The
average of the reported median fees for an infant, excluding cities in Quebec where low-cost
subsidized day care has been available since 1997, is $843 in 2002 dollars. By assuming the
full-time care corresponds to 126 hours per month (30 hours per week), I get the hourly rate of
$6.69.
The probability of a birth and the transitional probabilities between fertility stages are esti-
mated using SLID outside the model. Details are presented in Section C.2 in Appendix.
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Lastly, parameters related to hourly wage levels are determined outside the model using
SLID. Assuming that rental rates of human capital follow a log-normal distribution, I estimate
the means and variances with wage data of 23-year-old married individuals (Table C.9 in Ap-
pendix). For quantitative analysis, the 12.5, 37.5, 62.5, and 87.5 percentiles of the estimated
distribution for the high-educated are used as four possible rental rates {p1, p2, p3, p4} with
equal probability 1/4, for each gender. The estimation results show that the average hourly
wages of the low-educated are 85% and 81% of that of the high-educated for men and women,
respectively.
The upper bound of human capital gained from market experience, xexpmax, is set to replicate
the maximum experience premium of married men in the data for each educational group. I cal-
culate the maximum experience premium using the wage regression estimates reported in Table
4.2. The maximum experience premium is 130% for the high-educated and 128% for the low-
educated, respectively.20 For each education group, the finite setX exp = {xexp0 ,xexp1 , ...,xexpmax}
is set such that with the normalization of xexp1 to one, the elements have a constant growth rate
between x0 and the maximum x
exp
max.
In my sample of married couples between 23 and 62 in SLID, the median age difference
between husband and wife is two years. I use the wife’s age as the age of the couple in quan-
titative analyses. I let the wife’s experience level be x1 and the husband’s experience level be
x2 to reflect a possible difference in experience level due to an age difference between husband
and wife.21 For the distribution of household educational types, Γ(εh,εw), I use the empirical
distribution of married couples by educational types in the cross-sectional sample of SLID.
4.4.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters
Given the set of externally determined parameters, the remaining 20 parameters are jointly de-
termined within the model. These include preference parameters (γh, γw, γz), home production
technology parameters (ζ1, ζ0, η1, η0), parameters governing the transitional probabilities of
human capital gained from market experiences (τ , ψεh , ψ
ε
w, δ εh , δ
ε
w for ε ∈ {hi, lo}), and wage
and non-employment shocks (λ , χ , νe, νn).
These parameters are jointly determined to minimize the distance between the simulated
and data moments. The measure of distance I use is the sum of squared percentage deviations
of the simulated moments from the data moments: ∑ j
(
d j−m j
d j
)2
where d j is the jth data mo-
20According to the wage regression in Table 4.2, the experience premium is peaked at 19 years of market experi-
ences for the high-educate, while it continues growing for the low-educated. I assumed that experience premium
is peaked at 19 years of market experience for both education groups.
21In the data the ratio of the average hourly wage of 25-year-old men to that of 23-year-old men is 1.24, which is
greater than the parameterized value of x2 in the model. w¯wi f e23/w¯own23 = 1.244
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ment and m j is a corresponding simulated moment. I use the number of targeted moments that
is larger than the number of parameters to be calibrated. The targeted moments include take-up
rates, average hourly wages and employment rates by age group, wage growth rates condi-
tional on continuous employment and conditional on foregone experience, time allocations
by children characteristics, and labour market transitions. All of the moments are calculated
separately by sex and educational attainment.
Because there is not an one-to-one mapping from a parameter to a data moment, I provide a
brief argument about how each parameter to be calibrated is affected by subsets of the targeted
moments. Parameters in preferences (γh, γw, γz) are related primarily to married individuals’
time allocations across market work, leisure, and home production by sex, especially those
without any children (Table C.10).
Parameters in home production technology, ζ1, ζ0, η1, η0, are pinned down primarily by
matching average amounts of time spent on home production. The efficiency parameters of
home production technology as a function of the number of children, ζ1 and ζ0, guide the model
to match the average amounts of time spent on home production by the number of children and
the presence of an infant at home (Figure 4.3). Husbands’ relative home productivities, η1 and
η0, help the model match gender ratios of the amount of time spent on home production. For
example, the relative home productivity in the presence of an infant, η1, guides the gender ratio
in the presence of an infant.
Parameters in human capital accumulation technology, τ , ψεh , ψ
ε
w, δ εh , δ
ε
w for ε ∈ {hi, lo},
jointly govern the dynamic decisions on household labour supply. The parameter governing the
probability of an increase in human capital, ψεi , is pinned down by matching the five-year wage
growth rate conditional on working full-year full-time for five consecutive years (Table C.11).
The parameter governing the probability of a decline in human capital, δ εi , is determined by
the five-year wage growth rate of those who have experienced at least one year of full-year-
full-time equivalent non-employment within five years.
In addition, together with the parameters in the transition probabilities of human capital,
part-year and full-year non-employment shocks, χ , νe, νn, help the model match the labour
market transition rates across non-employment, part-year employment, and full-year employ-
ment (Table C.12). The probability of a wage shock, λ , is pinned down by the fraction of peo-
ple who experience negative wage growth after full-year full-time employment (Table C.13).
Given the externally determined distributions of rental rates and the finite set of human capital
levels,X exp, all of these parameters together shape the average hourly wages and employment
rates by age group.
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Table 4.4: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Description Values
γh Weight on a husband’s leisure 0.777
γw Weight on a wife’s leisure 0.629
γz Weight on output from home production 1.718
ζ1 Home productivity per children with an infant 61.846
ζ0 Home productivity per children without an infant 3.196
η1 Relative home productivity of husband’s time with an infant 0.262
η0 Relative home productivity of husband’s time without an infant 0.491
τ Curvature of HC growth probability 4.883
ψlo Probability of HC growth (low, husbands) 0.350
ψlo Probability of HC growth (low, wives) 0.150
ψhi Probability of HC growth (high, husbands) 0.706
ψhi Probability of HC growth (high, wives) 0.717
δlo Probability of HC depreciation (low, husbands) 0.840
δlo Probability of HC depreciation (low, wives) 0.421
δhi Probability of HC depreciation (high, husbands) 0.429
δhi Probability of HC depreciation (high, wives) 0.156
χ Probability of a part-year unemployment shock 0.040
νe Conditional prob. of a FY nonemployment shock (employed) 0.017
νn Conditional Prob. of a FY nonemployment shock (non-employed) 0.735
λ Probability of a wage shock 0.223
Table 4.5: Take-up Rates by Education Level
Individual Household (Husband’s, Wife’s)
Fathers Mothers (lo, lo) (lo, hi) (hi, lo) (hi, hi)
Low High Low High Husb Wife Husb Wife Husb Wife Husb Wife
Data 11.8 13.6 90.6 90.8 11.2 89.6 12.3 91.2 10.2 91.8 14.2 90.7
Model 11.4 10.2 93.4 93.4 6.8 93.5 14.1 89.9 6.4 93.2 11.0 95.3
4.4.3 Calibration Results
Table 4.4 displays the calibrated parameter values. Table 4.5 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show
selected sets of simulated moments and their empirical counterparts. Other moments that are
continued in Appendix C (Section C.4).
Combined with time allocations of married people in Table C.10, Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3
show that the model replicates decisions regarding take-up of leave and time allocations. Table
4.5 contains the take-up rates by sex and educational level. Although the calibrated model
slightly overpredicts mothers’ take-up rates and underpredicts take-up rates of fathers with a
high-educated wife, it matches overall levels of take-up rates in the data. In particular, the
model can clearly capture the pattern that fathers take up far less than mothers. Figure 4.3
shows the average amount of time married people spend on home production by number of
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Figure 4.3: Average Time Allocation on Home Production by Number of Children
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children and presence of an infant. Although the calibrated model slightly underpredicts the
statistics of mothers with only older children, the model is able to match the pattern that fathers
spend much less time on home production with an infant at home, compared to mothers.
The model does less well at matching the average durations of leave conditional on take-
up. The model predicts that fathers use longer leave and mothers use shorter leave compared to
the data. For example, the model predicts the average duration of 25 weeks for high-educated
fathers and 41 weeks for high-educated mothers, whereas the empirical counterparts are 14 and
46 weeks, respectively.
The model matches the targeted moments related to the labour market activities. Figure 4.4
display the age-profiles of average hourly wages and employment rates by sex and education
level. Due to abstracting from savings, the model does not replicate a rapid decline in employ-
ment rates near the end of a working life. For this reason, statistics by age group are reported
up to age 54. This figure indicates that this model is able to replicate the life cycle profiles of
hourly wages and employment rates, except those for low-educated women. For this subgroup,
the model predicts a slight flattening of average wages and a continuous decline in employment
relative to the data.
Next, let us look at the calibrated values of the parameters of interest. I find the calibrated
weights on a husband’s leisure and a wife’s leisure show a small difference. A couple puts
20% more weight on the husband’s leisure time than on the wife’s leisure time; γh/γw = 1.24.
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Figure 4.4: Age Profiles of Hourly Wages and Employment Rates
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(b) Employment Rates
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This explains why husbands enjoy roughly the same leisure as their wives although they on
average have a higher wage than their wives, especially among couples having no infant at
home. Second, the calibrated relative home productivity of a husband’s time without an infant
at home, η0, is close to 0.5, which means that the husband’s time and the wife’s time are almost
equally productive in home production when they do not have an infant at home. The ratio of
the husband’s home productivity to the wife’s is η0/(1−η0) = 0.96. The calibrated value is
similar to the value in Knowles (2013).
In contrast, the calibrated relative home productivity with an infant at home shows a stark
gender difference. The ratio of husband-to-wife’s home productivity η1/(1−η1) = 0.36. That
is, when a newborn child is born, the husband’s time is much less productive in home pro-
duction than the wife’s time. In addition to the parameters in transition probabilities of human
capital, this parameter influences the accumulation of human capital for mothers through career
interruptions due to motherhood.
While gender differentials in rental rates are externally determined, the remaining gen-
der differences in the calibrated transitional probabilities of human capital determine gender
88
differences in the evolution of human capital. Among the high-educated, the calibrated val-
ues of the probability of human capital accumulation show almost no difference. Husbands’
expected return from full-year full-time employment are almost the same as wives’ return:
ψhih /ψ
hi
w = 0.98. In contrast, the calibrated values for the probability of human capital depre-
ciation show a large difference. In particular, the parameters imply that husbands face higher
wage penalties than wives do for taking time off. For the high-educated, husbands have a wage
penalty 175% higher than wives do: δ hih /δ
hi
w = 2.75. This result is qualitatively consistent with
the empirical evidence demonstrated in Section 4.2 and the findings in Albrecht et al. (1999).
Although my model abstracts from career choices, I can relate this gender difference to the
gender difference in career choices. The calibrated parameter values are consistent with the
findings that because of potential time off for children, women choose occupations with low
skill depreciation (Polachek, 1981, Adda et al. 2017).
4.5 Explaining the Gender Gap in the Use of Parental Leave
In this section, I conduct counterfactual exercises to decompose the division of paid parental
leave into the different explanations. Among the various gender differences featured in the
calibrated model, I focus on those in 1) preferences for leisure, 2) relative home productivity
with an infant, 3) rental rates of human capital, 4) probabilities of an increase in human capital,
and 5) probabilities of a decrease in human capital. First, I describe the take-up behaviour of
married couples when men and women are symmetric. Second, I quantify the contributions
of the above gender differences to the gender gap in the take-up rates. Third, I examine the
interactions among these explanations.
4.5.1 Take-up Behaviour When All Gender Differences Are Removed
In this symmetry scenario, all the gender differences in the model are removed.22 I present
two scenarios of eliminating gender differences: 1) when everyone has men’s parameter values
and 2) when everyone has women’s parameter values.23 Compared to the second scenario, in
the first scenario married couples have higher household incomes and put more emphasis on
leisure. Also, both husbands and wives have a higher probability of a decline in human capital
when taking time off work.
22In addition to the five listed before, these also include relative home productivity with no infant at home, edu-
cation premium, educational composition, and initial human capital gained from market experience due to the
average age gap within a couple.
23I have the baseline policy of maternity and parental leave unchanged for these counterfactuals.
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Table 4.6: Take-up Rates When All Gender Differences Are Removed
Benchmark 1) Men’s values 2) Women’s values
Education Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers
Individual type
Low 11.4 93.4 60.3 57.1 69.5 65.4
High 10.2 93.4 50.8 49.8 60.2 64.6
Household type
(lo, lo) 6.8 93.5 46.2 46.0 51.7 51.3
(lo,hi) 14.1 89.9 72.3 28.2 83.8 36.7
(hi, lo) 6.4 93.2 27.2 73.2 27.4 85.6
(hi,hi) 11.0 95.3 56.8 59.4 68.2 76.9
Table 4.6 shows that, for both scenarios, the gender gap in take-up rates is almost closed.
However, the two scenarios show different patterns. First, take-up rates of fathers and mothers
converge to different values. Both fathers’ and mothers’ take-up rates are higher in the sec-
ond scenario. Among the high-educated, the take-up rates of fathers and mothers converge to
around 50% when women have men’s values, while they converge to around 62% when men
have women’s values. Second, the two scenarios show differences in the sum of husbands’ and
wives’ take-up rates. When everyone has men’s values, the sum is less than or just above 100%,
whereas in the other scenario the sum exceeds 100%. This pattern implies that in the first sce-
nario many couples choose to have only one spouse use parental leave or to leave parental leave
on the table, compared to the second scenario.
The divergence between the two scenarios is mainly due to differences in probabilities
of human capital depreciation. When everyone has the men’s values for the probabilities of
human capital depreciation, wage penalties for taking time off work are high for both fathers
and mothers. The high dynamic costs of taking time off work lead to fewer parents taking
parental leave to avoid a fall in human capital. In a scenario where everyone has women’s
values for the probabilities of human capital depreciation and men’s values for the remaining
parameters, take-up rates converge to values that are higher than when everyone has men’s
values for all parameters.24
One thing to note is that even when a husband and wife have the same educational attain-
ment, especially when both spouses are high-educated, the wives’ take-up rate is still higher
than the husbands’ take-up rate. The remaining gap in the take-up rates is explained by a
gender difference embodied in the baseline parental leave policy. The maximum durations of
parental leave available to a father and a mother are different due to maternity leave. I explore
alternative gender-neutral parental leave policies in Section 4.6.
24See Table C.15 in Appendix C.
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4.5.2 Decomposition
To quantify the roles of the possible explanations I consider, I examine each explanation sepa-
rately. Table 4.7 shows results from the decomposition analysis. The first two columns report
the take-up rates in the benchmark economy and in the symmetric economy where everyone
has men’s values from Section 4.5.1. Column (3) displays the changes in take-up rates from the
benchmark to the symmetric economy. The changes are decomposed into five possible factors.
In particular, I let women have men’s parameter values for the explanation under consideration
and leave the other parameters the same as in the benchmark. An exception is relative home
productivity. Due to the specification of the home production technology, relative home pro-
ductivity is set to 1/2 when both men and women are equally productive. Given a change in a
parameter specification, I then simulate the take-up behaviour of married couples and calculate
the percentage of the change that is narrowed for each explanation. Each cell in columns (4) to
(8) presents a simulated take-up rate and in parentheses a percentage of the change in column
(3) that is accounted for by each possible explanation for education groups. The last two rows
report gender differences in the take-up rates for each education group. Panels (a) and (b) show
the results by individual educational type and by household educational type, respectively.
First, I examine the role of relative home productivity in the presence of an infant at home.
The calibrated value of η1 implies the ratio of husbands’ to wives’ productivities, η1/(1−η1),
equals 0.35. I eliminate the gender difference in relative home productivities by setting η1 =
0.5 so that η1/(1− η1) = 1. Among the five factors considered, this factor results in the
largest changes in both fathers’ and mothers’ take-up rates. Fathers’ take-up rate increases
from the benchmark from 10% to 29% for the low-educated and from 11% to 29% for the
high-educated. At the same time, mothers’ take-up rate decreases from 93% to 82% for the
high-educated. The largest proportion of the change in take-up rates is explained by this factor.
In particular, among the high-educated, this factor accounts for 46% of the change for fathers
and 27% of the change for mothers. Also, this factor makes up about 36% of the overall gender
gap among the high-educated (column (4), row (6)). The remaining gender gap in take-up rates
is explained by gender differences in labour market factors and presence of maternity leave that
only mothers can use.
Couples with a high-educated wife contribute greatly to the significant changes in the take-
up behaviour (Panel (b)). When husbands and wives become equally productive in the presence
of an infant, the take-up rate of husbands with a high-educated wife increases from 14% to
40% for the low-educated and from 11% to 33% for the high-educated. These changes make
up about half of the change in column (3) for these husbands. For high-educated wives, a
resulting decrease in their take-up rate explains a third and a fifth of the change for those with a
low-educated husband and with a high-educated husband, respectively. Among these couples,
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removing the gender difference in η1 accounts for 36% of the overall gender gap in take-up
rates.
It is noteworthy that when I condition on the wife’s educational attainment, the husbands’
take-up rate does not show significant variation given their own educational attainment. In
other words, in terms of husbands’ take-up rate, their wives’ educational attainment is the first-
order determinant, and their own educational attainment is the second-order determinant. This
result remains the same in other columns as well.
Gender differentials in rental rates explain the second largest proportion of the change in
the take-up rates for fathers (column (5)). When these differentials are removed, high-educated
mothers draw a rental rate from a distribution with a higher mean than that in the benchmark.
It implies that now mothers have a higher opportunity cost of taking time off work. As a re-
sult, slightly fewer high-educated mothers take parental leave. The reason why the change in
their take-up rate is small is that their husbands, who are mostly high-educated, are still more
likely to have higher hourly wages because of age differences between a husband and wife. In
contrast, husbands’ take-up rates considerably increase in reaction to the change. In particu-
lar, the interaction within married couples is strong among couples with a high-educated wife
and husband. While wives’ take-up rate barely decreases, an increase of their high-educated
husbands’ take-up rate makes up one fifth of the change for the husbands.
The third most significant contributor is gender differences in the probability of human cap-
ital depreciation. Column (6) reports how take-up behaviour reacts to making mothers face as
a high probability of losing human capital as fathers do. In this scenario, mothers face a prob-
ability more than twice as high as in the benchmark. This change causes significant reactions
of fathers’ take-up behaviour to the change. Because of higher wage penalties for taking time
off, the mothers’ take-up rate falls to 90% for the low-educated and 86% for the high-educated.
In reaction to the changes in wives’ take-up behaviour, the husbands’ take-up rate slightly in-
creases. As in columns (4) and (5), couples with a high-educated wife contribute greatly to the
significant changes in husbands’ take-up rates. The husbands’ take-up rate increases from 14%
to 20% for the low-educated and from 11% to 15% for the high-educated.
One thing to note is that in terms of absolute values the decrease in high-educated wives’
take-up rate is greater than the increase in their husbands’ take-up rate. This pattern implies
that some couples substitute a mother with a father or even give up using paid parental leave
because increasing the dynamic cost of mothers taking time off work makes taking parental
leave too costly for these couples. If instead, fathers have low probabilities of losing human
capital similar to mothers, mothers’ take-up behaviour barely changes while fathers’ take-up
rates almost double. In this case, this explanation accounts for the second largest proportion of
the gender gap in the take-up rates.
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Lastly, eliminating the gender differences in probabilities of human capital growth and in
preferences for leisure has very small impacts on take-up rates. However, it is noteworthy
that when the weight on a wife’s leisure is raised to the level of the weight on a husband’s
leisure, the gender gap in the take-up rates widens. Because a couple gains more utility from
a wife’s leisure time compared to the benchmark, more couples choose to have a wife use
parental leave. Among high-educated couples, while the wives’ take-up rate goes up, their
high-educated husbands’ take-up rate goes down. That is, some of these couples switch the
parent in charge of caring for their baby from husband to wife.
4.5.3 Interactions among Explanations
The above results indicate that gender differences in relative home productivity, rental rates
of human capital, and the probability of a decline in human capital are the more influential
determinants of the gender gap in the take-up rates of parental leave among the explanations I
consider. Clearly none of the explanations can fully explain the gender gap in parental leave
take-up. In the following exercises, I examine interactions among these three explanations
by removing two or more differences simultaneously. I show three combinations of the three
explanations in Table 4.8.
First, gender differences in relative home productivity and the means of rental rates are
simultaneously removed (column (4)). The percentage of the change explained by combining
these two factors is greater than the sum of the percentages explained by each factor. This im-
plies a large positive interaction between the two factors. Because a husband and wife become
equally good at home production in the presence of an infant and their wages become similar,
comparative advantage and specialization between a husband and wife become substantially
weaker than in the benchmark. Due to weak specialization, a higher fraction of married cou-
ples choose to have a husband at home with a newborn child. Among the four household
educational types, the positive interaction is largest among couples with a high-educated hus-
band and wife, because these couples have the smallest gender differences in hourly wages.
Next, I remove the gender difference in the probability of human capital depreciation,
which is related to the dynamic costs of taking parental leave (column (6)). Combining the
probability of human capital depreciation and the two other explanations exhibits a large pos-
itive interaction. For high-educated people, combining these three explanations accounts for
more than 100% of the gender gap in take-up rates. That is, high-educated fathers’ take-up
rate exceeds high-educated mothers’ take-up rate. The reason for this pattern is that, given the
gender parity in the three major factors, the remaining gender differences make parental leave
more favorable to a father in some couples.
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Table 4.8: Interactions among Explanations
(a) by Individual Educational Type (%)
Benchmark All
Removed
Change
(2)-(1)
η1+µ η1+δ η1+µ+δ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fathers’ take-up rates (%)
Low-edu (a) 11.4 60.3 48.9 43.3( 65.4) 37.4( 53.2) 51.1( 81.3)
High-edu (b) 10.2 50.8 40.6 46.0( 88.3) 37.2( 66.4) 54.9(110.2)
Mothers’ take-up rates (%)
Low-edu (c) 93.4 57.1 -36.3 83.1( 28.4) 82.0( 31.3) 70.5( 62.9)
High-edu (d) 93.4 49.8 -43.6 65.8( 63.3) 62.0( 72.1) 43.0(115.7)
Gender differences (%p)
Low-edu (c)-(a) 82.0 -3.2 -85.2 39.7( 49.6) 44.7( 43.8) 19.4( 73.4)
High-edu (d)-(b) 83.2 -0.9 -84.2 19.8( 75.4) 24.9( 69.3) -11.9(113.0)
(b) Take-up Rates by Household Educational Type (%)
Benchmark All
Removed
Change
(2)-(1)
η1+µ η1+δ η1+µ+δ
(εh,εw) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(lo, lo)
Husband (a) 6.8 46.2 39.5 19.1( 31.2) 14.4( 19.2) 24.8( 45.6)
Wife (b) 93.5 46.0 -47.5 80.1( 28.3) 78.9( 30.7) 65.3( 59.3)
(lo,hi)
Husband 14.1 72.3 58.2 61.5( 81.4) 52.0( 65.1) 71.1( 97.9)
Wife 89.9 28.2 -61.7 47.8( 68.2) 48.4( 67.2) 27.6(100.9)
(hi, lo)
Husband 6.4 27.2 20.8 14.9( 41.1) 10.3( 18.8) 18.2( 56.8)
Wife 93.2 73.2 -20.0 88.4( 24.0) 88.0( 25.7) 80.4( 64.0)
(hi,hi)
Husband (c) 11.0 56.8 45.7 52.7( 91.2) 42.9( 69.6) 62.7(113.0)
Wife (d) 95.3 59.4 -35.9 74.7( 57.4) 69.2( 72.8) 50.6(124.5)
Gender differences (%p)
(lo, lo) [(b)-(a)] 86.7 -0.3 -87.0 61.0( 29.6) 64.5( 25.5) 40.5( 53.1)
(hi,hi) [(d)-(c)] 84.3 2.7 -81.6 22.0( 76.3) 26.3( 71.1) -12.1(118.1)
Values in parentheses present percentages of the change in column (3) that is explained by each column.
Parameter η1, µ , and δi denote relative home productivity in the presence of an infant, means of rental rates,
and probabilities of a fall in human capital, respectively.
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4.6 Policy Experiments
In this section, I explore the role of paid parental leave policies in the division of parental leave
within married households. Specifically, I study the role of gender differences in paid parental
leave policy and the role of cash benefits, especially income replacement rates. Then, based on
the lessons from this analysis, I explore various paid parental leave policies to increase fathers’
participation in parental leave.
4.6.1 Role of Gender Difference in Parental Leave Policy
The baseline policy in the benchmark economy embodies a gender difference in maximum
lengths of parental leave available to a mother and a father. While a mother can use at most
52 weeks of parental leave including maternity leave, a father can use at most 35 weeks of
parental leave. To explore the role of gender differences in parental leave policy, I consider
three alternative parental leave policies. They feature a smaller or no gender difference in
maximum lengths of parental leave while keeping the total number of weeks of leave available
to a couple the same as the baseline policy.
First, I consider a policy featuring a short paternity leave of 6.5 weeks with 17 weeks of
maternity leave and a total of 52 weeks of leave available to a couple. Although this policy still
has a gender difference in the maximum durations, it provides non-transferable leave to fathers
as well.25 The other two alternative policies feature an equal number of weeks available to a
mother and father. In that sense, these two policies are gender neutral. One policy includes
an equal length of maternity and paternity leave. I let both the mother and the father have 17
weeks of non-transferable leave. The maximum durations of leave available to a mother and a
father are the same at 35 weeks.26 The other policy allows a couple to share all 52 weeks at
their discretion.27 Under this policy, their maximum durations are the same at 52 weeks.
Table 4.9 demonstrates two sets of simulated take-up rates. In these simulations, the in-
come replacement rate and the maximum insured earnings remain the same as the baseline
policy. The first set of take-up rates are from the policy experiments with the calibrated param-
eter values, and the other set of take-up rates are from the policy experiments with all gender
25In the simulations, fathers choose a duration of parental leave from the menu of 0, 6.5, 17, 26, and 35 weeks,
and mothers choose it from the menu of 0, 6.5, 17, 26, 35, and 45.5 weeks. The sum of the mother’s and father’s
durations cannot be more than 52 weeks. As in the benchmark economy, assuming that a mother and father
use parental leave sequentially, I let the reduction in market childcare costs be proportional to the sum of the
mother’s and father’s durations.
26In the simulations, both the husband and wife choose a duration of parental leave from the menu of 0, 6.5, 17,
26, and 35 weeks.
27 In the simulations, both a husband and wife choose a duration of parental leave from the menu of 0, 6.5, 17,
26, 35, 45.5, and 52 weeks, keeping the sum of their durations less than or equal to 52 weeks.
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differences removed. Statistics in the first row with the baseline policy are the same as those
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.7, and the remaining rows report the statistics from policy
experiments.
The results with the calibrated parameter values show only small changes in take-up rates
in response to changes in parental leave policies. The main reason for this result is that the
introduction of paternity leave does not provide most couples with enough incentive to change
in the environment where specialization within married couples with an infant is strong.
When all 52 weeks are shareable and all gender differences are removed, the high-educated
mothers’ take-up rate is lower than in the case with the baseline policy. Specifically, among
high-educated couples, wives’ take-up rate decreases while husbands’ take-up rate remains un-
changed. This means that in some couples a high-educated wife uses maternity leave because
the time is not transferable to her husband under the baseline policy. When all leave is share-
able, those couples choose to have a wife stay at her work and her husband take longer parental
leave.
To sum up, some couples’ choices are constrained by the baseline parental leave policy. The
introduction of a gender-neutral policy leads to small increases in fathers’ take-up of parental
leave. However, the small changes are in contrast to evidence from the countries and states
which have introduced paid paternity leave, as they show much higher take-up rates of fathers.
For example, after Que´bec introduced paid paternity leave in 2006, fathers’ take-up rate in-
creased from 28% in 2005 under EI to 56% in 2006 and 78% in 2014 (Doucet, Tremblay, and
Lero, 2010, Statistics Canada, 2015).28 A key feature of paid parental leave policies in these
places is higher cash benefits, especially higher income replacement rates. For example, dur-
ing parental leave parents in Que´bec and Sweden are paid 70–75% and 80% of their pre-birth
income, respectively. I examine the role of cash benefits in the following section.
4.6.2 Cash Benefits
In this subsection, I explore the role of cash benefits in the division of parental leave within
married households. Under the baseline policy, parental benefits replace the pre-birth earnings
at the baseline rate of 55% with a weekly cap. Those who earn more than $39,000 a year
receive the capped amount of weekly benefits. Thus, a worker who uses parental leave loses
at least 45% of earnings every week on leave. Such income losses could be critical to their
decisions regarding parental leave. Because in many couples a husband usually outearns his
wife, the amounts of parental benefits may be too low for a couple to have a husband take
parental leave. Taking the maximum insurable earnings of $39,000 a year as given, I explore
28These statistics are unconditional on eligibility.
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Table 4.10: Take-up Rates by Income Replacement Rate
(a) Baseline Policy (b) Short Paternity Leave
Fathers (F) Mothers (M) Gap (M-F) Fathers (F) Mothers (M) Gap (M-F)
Replacement rate Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Baseline (0.55) 11.4 10.2 93.4 93.4 82.0 83.2 11.4 10.2 93.4 93.4 82.0 83.2
0.01 10.9 8.7 89.0 85.5 78.2 76.9 11.1 8.5 89.0 85.6 77.9 77.1
0.33 10.7 9.4 91.9 90.3 81.1 80.9 11.0 9.5 91.8 90.2 80.8 80.7
0.70 11.2 11.2 94.6 96.5 83.3 85.3 13.6 15.9 95.1 96.4 81.5 80.5
0.85 12.5 13.8 96.1 97.7 83.6 83.9 16.1 21.9 96.3 97.8 80.2 75.9
1.00 13.9 17.0 97.0 98.9 83.1 81.9 19.9 29.3 96.8 98.8 77.0 69.5
“High” denotes the high-educated who are college graduates. “Low” denotes a lower education level.
five different levels of income replacement rates, denoted by ρ .29
Table 4.10 displays take-up rates from simulations with income replacement rates of 1%,
33%, 55%, 70%, 85%, and 100%. Panel (a) reports the statistics from simulations with the
durations of maternity and parental leave the same as the baseline policy. Panel (b) reports
the same statistics from simulations under an alternative parental leave policy with short paid
paternity leave as in the preceding subsection.
The case of ρ = 0.01 is close to unpaid parental leave. When a worker is barely paid
during parental leave, slightly fewer parents take parental leave for all subgroups while the
overall division of parental leave remains more or less the same as in the benchmark. Although
parental leave is almost unpaid, many mothers still use it, but for a shorter period. Under the
baseline policy, 92% of mothers use parental leave for more than 40 weeks. Under unpaid
parental leave, 89% of low-educated mothers use parental leave, on average, for 33 weeks, and
85% of high-educated mothers do so, on average, for 29 weeks. Given the gender differences
in the benchmark economy, once a couple has a newborn child, a mother is much more likely
to be the parent who specializes in home production.
In contrast, when parents receive 100% of their pre-birth earnings up to the maximum
insurable earnings, take-up rates go up for all subgroups. Mothers’ take-up rates become close
to 100%, and fathers’ take-up rates increase by 22% to 14% for the low-educated and by 62%
to 17% for the high-educated. Because increasing a replacement rate does not change the
comparative advantages between a husband and wife, mothers are still much more likely to
take parental leave than fathers. Also, husbands are more likely to have earnings higher than
the maximum insurable earnings. Many husbands with high earnings have an effective income
replacement rate below 100%.
29Because the maximum insurable earnings are fixed at $39,000, as the income replacement rate increases, the
maximum weekly benefit amount increases proportionally.
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In terms of percentage changes in take-up rates, the change is greatest among high-educated
fathers. Even though they are more likely to earn more than the threshold amount, among all
subgroups, they gain the most benefits from a fully paid parental leave policy because their
earnings are the highest. Also, compared to low-educated fathers, they are more likely to have
a high-educated wife. Fathers with a high-educated wife are more responsive to changes in
income replacement rates.30 As more fathers use parental leave even for a short period, the
average duration of fathers’ use becomes shorter than in the benchmark.
In the simulations for panel (b), an eligible father has an option of taking 6.5 weeks off
or leaving it on the table, reducing the maximum duration of shareable parental leave by 6.5
weeks. In this case, fathers’ take-up behaviour becomes more responsive to changes in income
replacement rates than under the baseline policy. Under a parental leave policy with short
paternity leave, an increase of the income replacement rate from the baseline rate to 100%
results in a 75% increase to 20% for the low-educated and a 187% increase to 29% for the
high-educated. Meanwhile, mothers’ take-up rates remain the same as with Table 4.10.
To sum up, providing greater financial incentives through an increase in the income re-
placement increased both mothers’ and fathers’ take-up rates. In addition, the results showed
that when increasing the income replacement rate is combined with introducing short pater-
nity leave, an increase in fathers’ take-up rates becomes more responsive to an increase in
the income replacement rate. In particular, high-educated fathers are more responsive to these
changes than others.
4.6.3 Parental Leave Policies to Increase Fathers’ Take-up of Leave
An aim of sharable parental leave is to provide fathers the option to be more involved in caring
for new babies. However, the take-up rate of fathers remains low even after parental leave
was extended. Putting the findings in the two preceding subsections together, I conduct policy
experiments to increase fathers’ take-up of parental leave. I set a target for fathers’ take-up rates
and explore various combinations of durations and replacement rates that can achieve the target.
Because high-educated fathers are more responsive to policy changes, I set the target of high-
educated fathers’ take-up rate to be 20%. This target is almost twice the rate in the benchmark
economy. In the experiments, I also consider policies that provide different replacement rates
among maternity, paternity, and shareable parental leaves and between fathers and mothers. As
before, the maximum insured earnings remain the same as in the benchmark policy. I compare
the policies that meet the target in terms of their monetary costs by looking at percentage
changes in aggregate parental benefit expenses from the benchmark economy. Also, I look at
30See Panel (b) of Table C.18 in Appendix C.
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changes in the amount of time newborn children spend with their parents during the first year
of their life. In this set of simulations I take all the gender differences, including the three
major contributors, in the benchmark economy as given. Table 4.11 summarizes the results.
I find that under a policy with baseline maximum durations, a parental leave policy to
achieve the target need to provide a higher replacement rate for fathers than for mothers. With-
out paternity leave, even applying a 100% replacement for all does not meet the target (Table
4.10). When the replacement rate for mothers remains at the baseline rate of 55%, the replace-
ment rate for fathers must be at least 90%. The higher replacement rate for fathers is necessary
to increase the husband’s marginal benefit of taking leave relative to the wife’s marginal benefit.
Compared to the benchmark, this policy increases aggregate EI spending by 12%.31 Children
spend more time with their fathers. On average, children receive 1.5 more weeks of full-time
care from their father. Although they spend less time with their mother, overall, they receive
1.1 more weeks of full-time care from parents. A drawback of this policy is that it may not be
politically viable.32
As mentioned above, a combination of introducing paternity leave and raising replacement
rates for all can increase fathers’ take-up rates. However, this policy is costly. The replacement
rate of 80% increases high-educated fathers’ take-up rates to 20%. The policy costs about 1.5
times the benchmark aggregate spending. This policy might be unaffordable without a large
increase in the EI premium.33
A more affordable option is to increase replacement rates only during non-transferable
leaves. For example, increasing the replacement rate to 80% only during paternity leave dou-
bles high-educated fathers’ take-up rate, while it requires less aggregate spending than the
benchmark level. Increasing a replacement rate during paternity leave to 100% still costs less
than the benchmark policy, while high-educated fathers’ take-up rate is tripled to 30%.
Finally, a policy that offers higher replacement rates during maternity and paternity leaves
may be politically viable and an affordable option to increase fathers’ take-up of leave. Com-
bined with a short paternity leave, providing 80% of income replacement during maternity
and paternity leaves increases high-educated fathers’ take-up rates to 20%. Implementing this
policy implies a 13.5% increase in aggregate spending on parental benefits. Under a policy
with an equal length of maternity and paternity leaves, a replacement rate of 76% achieves the
target. This policy only increases aggregate spending by 1%. A caveat of these policies is
31No general equilibrium effect is considered in this exercise.
32However, considering a gender-based public policy is not unusual in economics. Gender-based taxation has
been studied in the optimal taxation literature. Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011) argue that because
women’s labour supply is more elastic due to higher male wages and higher female home productivity, imposing
higher marginal tax rates on men is optimal.
33Because the experiments here do not mandate balanced EI budget, the indirect effect of increasing replacement
rates on labour supply decisions through an increase in the EI premium is not included in this analysis.
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that the average amount of time parents spend with their newborn child slightly declines. The
policies with short paternity leave and with longer paternity leave reduce the number of weeks
parents provide full-time care during the first year of their child’s life by 2 and 5 weeks, re-
spectively. This is because many fathers do not use the non-transferable paternity leave, while
many mothers who used to take a full year of leave now take shorter leaves.
Haas and Rostgaard (2011) compared parental leave policies and take-up from five Nordic
countries. They suggest that introducing paternity leave is more important than generous com-
pensation during paternity leave in promoting fathers’ take-up of parental leave.34 All five
countries have income replacement rates that are higher than the Canadian benchmark policy.
Based on my results from the policy experiments, I argue that fathers’ take-up rates in the
Nordic countries might not be as high as in the data if paternity leave is not accompanied with
generous income replacement rates.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine quantitatively the contribution of several possible explanations for
the division of paid parental leave within married households in a life-cycle model of family
labour supply. I document that despite its availability only a small fraction of married men use
parental leave and demonstrate empirical evidence for explanatory factors to understand the
low take-up rates of married men. Then, I calibrate a life-cycle model of family labour sup-
ply that features labour/leisure/home production choices and learning-by-doing human capital
accumulation. In the quantitative analyses, I find that lower home productivity in the presence
of an infant, higher rental rates of human capital, and higher wage penalties for not working
for fathers than for mothers are major contributors to the low take-up rates of fathers. Among
high-educated people, the three gender differences account for about 36%, 15%, and 13%, re-
spectively. Eliminating gender differences in the three factors results in fathers’ take-up rate
exceeding mothers’ take-up rates among the high-educated. Also, I find that when increasing
the income replacement rate is combined with introducing short paternity leave, an increase in
fathers’ take-up rates becomes more responsive to an increase in the income replacement rate.
This study is motivated by the low take-up rate of fathers even after parental leave was
extended. The aims of the extension were to help working parents spend more time with their
children for successful child development and to provide fathers the option to share more of the
responsibilities of caring for babies. My findings suggest policies to achieve these goals. First,
the policy experiments show that a combination of introducing paternity leave and offering
34The five countries are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Policies and fathers’ take-up in 1998,
2007, and 2010 are compared.
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higher replacement rates during maternity and paternity leaves is an effective way of promoting
fathers’ participation in parental leave. Despite a slight decrease in the total amount of time
newborn children spend with their parents, this policy could increase fathers’ take-up with a
small increase in aggregate spending.
Further, the findings on the three major factors determining the low take-up rates of fathers
have policy implications for fulfilling the goal of encouraging fathers to take parental leave.
First, initiatives to reduce gender differences in the rental rates of human capital would increase
fathers’ take-up rates. In many countries, employment and pay discrimination by gender has
been prohibited by law such as the Canadian Human Rights Act in Canada and the Equal Pay
Act in the U.S. Although there has been a large increase in women’s labour force participation
and a decline in gender wage gaps over the past several decades, gender wage gaps still remain
(Goldin, 2014).
Another key finding is that a large gender difference in home productivity with an infant
is the most significant contributor to the division of parental leave. Eliminating the difference
leads to a substantial increase in fathers’ take-up rates. This finding implies that an initiative to
improve men’s skill in caring for a newborn child before their child is born can increase fathers’
take-up rates. For example, parenting education for fathers may improve their parenting skill
(Doherty, Erickson, and LaRossa, 2006). Early parenting education programs for new parents
have a significant positive effect on parenting and child development (Pinquart and Teubert,
2010). Nonetheless, nearly all education programs about parenting primarily target mothers,
and very few parent education programs are father-oriented (Matusicky and Russell, 2009,
Gilmer et al., 2016).
Lastly, I find that men have a higher probability of human capital depreciation and that
this probability matters for married couples’ take-up decisions. The wage penalty for taking
time off work may be partly because taking leave is perceived as signaling weak commitment
to work (Wayne and Cordeiro, 2003). As statutory maternity leave reduced the motherhood
penalty (Correll, 2013), providing statutory paternity leave may lessen the stigma effect of
taking leave for fathers. We can anticipate a gradual increase in fathers’ take-up rates in the
long run due to the peer effects in taking paternity leave (Dahl et al., 2014).
While this study demonstrates that the gender difference in wage penalties for not working
is a significant contributor to the low take-up of fathers, it still leaves some important areas for
future research. In calibration, the probability of human capital depreciation is determined by
the wage growth rates for those who have not worked for at least one year (full-year full-time
equivalent) within five years. Only a few married men in my sample from SLID had such
experience of non-employment. Therefore, the relative importance of the explanation may
be due to selection based on unobserved heterogeneity, which is not considered in this paper.
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Although Albrecht et al. (1999) find that the negative effect of men’s career interruptions is
greater for parental leave than for unemployment using a rich data set from Sweden, this has
not been studied in the Canadian context due to lack of data. It would be useful to examine
gender differences in wage penalties for not working using new administrative data in Canada.
A limitation of my model is that it does not include income taxation which is also closely
related to labour supply decisions. EI benefits pay 55% of the pre-tax earnings and are taxable.
As Canada has a system based on individual taxation of spouses, the division of parental leave
within a married couple influences spouses’ earnings and marginal tax rates and thus a total of
after-tax incomes for the couple. Incorporating income taxation is an interesting area for future
research.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, I examine how married couples’ decisions regarding time allocations, job search,
fertility, and take-up of parental leave are related to parental leave policies. In Chapter 2, I
document that parental leave policies and take-up behaviour in Canada and the U.S. are very
different. Mothers in Canada, which has a longer paid parental leave, take longer leaves than
mothers in the U.S., which has a short unpaid parental leave. Canadian working mothers
allocate time off work across child care, household chores, and leisure. I also show that the
two countries exhibit a large difference in high-educated mothers market work only in the
presence of an infant, whereas Canada-U.S. differences in low-educated mothers market work
are significant until the youngest child is aged 6 or older. These findings suggest that high-
educated mothers in the U.S. maintain similar job continuity rates as those in Canada, whereas
low-educated mothers in the U.S. may have difficulties in securing jobs after the birth of a child
possibly due to lower eligibility rates for a FMLA leave.
In Chapter 3, I develop a unique household search model and study married couples’ de-
cisions regarding job search, household labour supply, and take-up of maternity leave. This
household search model generates an interesting household interaction in job search through
specialization based on comparative advantages between market work and home production
within a married couple. Using the model, I find that a policy reform from short unpaid leave
to longer paid leave increases fertility rates, lowers the fraction of dual-earner couples, and
increases the fraction of single-earner couples. This model predicts that not only the fraction
of couples with only a husband employed increases, but also the fraction of couples with only a
wife employed increases. Married couples are more likely to specialize between market work
and home production due to an increase in the number of children. This chapter demonstrates
that married couples’ fertility and labour supply decisions can be responsive to the generosity
of maternity leave policies.
In Chapter 4, I examine what prevents fathers from taking paid parental leave under EI
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despite its availability. I find both market and home production factors contribute to married
couples’ specialization between market work and home production and their take-up of parental
leave. In policy experiments, I find that an increase in the income replacement increases fa-
thers’ take-up rates. Fathers’ take-up behaviour is more responsive to an increase in an income
replacement rate when it is combined with the introduction of paternity leave. When paternity
leave is available with small cash benefits, fathers’ take-up rates barely change in my model.
These policy experiment results suggest not only the availability of parental leave for fathers,
but also money, is important to incentivizing fathers’ take-up of parental leave.
My studies in this thesis have a few limitations and still leave some important areas for
future research. First, exploring interactions between a parental leave policy and other policies
and their impact on married couples’ decisions is an interesting area for future research. Al-
though I focus on parental leave policies in this thesis, other policies such as universal child
care benefits, taxation, or the supply of child care services are also closely related married cou-
ples’ labour supply decisions after the birth of a child. Such policies may complement or offset
each other in terms of their impact on married couples’ labour supply.
Second, the inclusion of child quality will be an important extension of the models in
Chapters 3 and 4 for future research. One of the reasons why fathers’ take-up of parental leave
draws policymakers’ interest is that not only mothers’ time but also fathers’ time spent with
their children contribute to their baby’s development. The lack of child quality production
makes my analyses disregard a trade-off among mother’s time, father’s time, and money in a
married couple’s take-up decisions. In particular, this trade-off is crucial if mothers and fathers
have different home productivity in child quality production. Also, the trade-off between the
number and quality of children is crucial in understanding fertility decisions (Becker, 1960).
Adding child quality production into the models will allow for these two important trade-offs
in a married couple’s decisions regarding labour supply, fertility, and take-up of parental leave.
Another interesting topic is to study firm responses to parental leave policies. In this thesis,
I focus on only the relationship between parental leave and labour supply. However, labour
demand may also respond to a parental leave policies. One of arguments against statutory
paid parental leave in the U.S. is that paid parental leave will make employers bear a higher
cost leading to a reduction in labour demand. Understanding the firm side, along with married
couples’ joint labour supply decisions, would be useful to evaluate the effects of changes in
parental leave policies on social welfare.
112
Bibliography
Becker, Gary S. 1960. “An Economic Analysis of Fertility.” In Demographic and Economic
Change in Developed Countries. Columbia University Press.
113
Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendix
114
Table A.1: Results from OLS Regressions of Hours per Week – High-educated, Canada
Market Work Child Care Household
chores
Leisure
30-34 2.494 1.945 -1.568 -2.871
(2.193) (1.231) (1.370) (2.073)
35-39 4.310+ 2.446* -1.614 -5.143*
(2.251) (1.189) (1.419) (2.083)
40-44 5.796* 2.657* -1.672 -6.781**
(2.484) (1.250) (1.610) (2.258)
45–49 3.026 2.905* -1.680 -4.251+
(2.782) (1.278) (1.885) (2.526)
50–54 1.597 3.643** -1.141 -4.099
(3.261) (1.344) (2.274) (2.859)
Wife -24.513** 17.261** 8.347** -1.095
(2.761) (1.520) (1.793) (2.412)
Two 1.101 2.059** -1.812 -1.348
(2.030) (0.665) (1.234) (1.724)
Three+ 0.588 0.643 1.761 -2.993
(2.575) (0.682) (1.537) (2.075)
Wife#Two -3.254 0.025 4.845** -1.617
(2.570) (1.001) (1.644) (2.156)
Wife#Three+ -8.665** 2.170 5.649** 0.846
(3.229) (1.340) (2.113) (2.709)
2–3 3.796 -1.342 -0.434 -2.020
(2.818) (1.275) (1.568) (2.376)
4–5 -3.218 -2.854* 1.896 4.176
(3.233) (1.370) (1.825) (2.616)
6–8 0.623 -6.219** -0.199 5.795*
(2.987) (1.270) (1.691) (2.659)
9–11 0.413 -10.447** 1.353 8.681**
(3.298) (1.240) (1.995) (2.824)
12–14 -2.492 -12.170** 4.437* 10.224**
(3.354) (1.254) (2.183) (2.876)
15–17 4.607 -14.368** 4.022 5.739+
(4.026) (1.192) (2.954) (3.253)
Wife#2–3 5.938+ -8.972** -2.238 5.272+
(3.523) (1.930) (2.099) (2.975)
Wife#4–5 14.585** -13.869** -1.879 1.163
(3.989) (1.932) (2.480) (3.254)
Wife#6–8 12.880** -12.577** 0.113 -0.415
(3.557) (1.769) (2.152) (3.094)
Wife#9–11 14.517** -12.630** 0.168 -2.056
(3.817) (1.746) (2.394) (3.267)
Wife#12–14 14.688** -14.215** -1.468 0.995
(3.939) (1.952) (2.653) (3.345)
Wife#15–24 12.146** -17.654** -2.246 7.754*
(4.602) (1.517) (3.364) (3.818)
Constant 35.389** 10.172** 16.031** 50.408**
(2.861) (1.262) (1.638) (2.583)
Data: General Social Survey (2005, 2010). Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. **Significant at the 1%
level. *Significant at the 5% level. +Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.2: Results from OLS Regressions of Hours per Week – Low-educated, Canada
Market Work Child Care Household
chores
Leisure
30-34 -1.246 3.277* 1.300 -3.332
(3.261) (1.430) (1.751) (3.007)
35-39 5.421 3.465* -1.678 -7.208*
(3.369) (1.490) (1.854) (3.050)
40-44 -0.685 3.728* 1.392 -4.435
(3.522) (1.472) (1.981) (3.330)
45–49 1.284 1.911 0.987 -4.182
(3.877) (1.423) (2.240) (3.697)
50–54 -3.425 3.600* 2.408 -2.584
(4.727) (1.618) (2.741) (4.327)
Wife -29.606** 18.954** 16.786** -6.134
(4.270) (2.483) (2.605) (4.052)
Two -2.087 0.813 1.299 -0.025
(2.855) (0.793) (1.506) (2.538)
Three+ 0.591 -1.089 0.860 -0.363
(3.437) (0.924) (2.026) (3.149)
Wife#Two 0.131 0.692 -0.367 -0.455
(3.707) (1.408) (2.353) (3.236)
Wife#Three+ -5.165 2.537 3.875 -1.247
(4.436) (1.789) (3.030) (3.983)
2–3 0.993 -2.086 1.360 -0.266
(4.754) (1.780) (2.183) (4.403)
4–5 2.111 -5.460** 1.458 1.891
(4.698) (1.731) (2.501) (4.473)
6–8 5.257 -6.921** 1.516 0.147
(4.284) (1.514) (2.110) (4.158)
9–11 2.279 -8.027** 4.037+ 1.711
(4.590) (1.549) (2.407) (4.486)
12–14 2.890 -10.146** 1.247 6.010
(4.569) (1.486) (2.374) (4.472)
15–17 2.340 -12.056** 5.312+ 4.403
(4.970) (1.439) (2.986) (5.041)
Wife#2–3 11.438* -8.152** -7.642* 4.357
(5.671) (3.140) (3.488) (5.410)
Wife#4–5 11.204+ -11.017** -2.539 2.352
(5.733) (3.027) (3.791) (5.422)
Wife#6–8 7.257 -10.418** -3.850 7.012
(5.013) (2.793) (3.223) (5.029)
Wife#9–11 10.068+ -14.829** -6.244+ 11.005*
(5.156) (2.851) (3.424) (5.105)
Wife#12–14 19.467** -17.255** -1.679 -0.533
(5.350) (2.649) (3.274) (4.911)
Wife#15–24 16.981** -19.706** -5.682 8.408
(5.907) (2.426) (3.952) (5.573)
Constant 37.578** 9.087** 11.750** 53.586**
(4.183) (1.550) (1.970) (3.784)
Data: General Social Survey (2005, 2010). Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. **Significant at the 1%
level. *Significant at the 5% level. +Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.3: Results from OLS Regressions of Hours per Week – High-educated, The U.S.
Market Work Child Care Household
chores
Leisure
30–34 0.160 0.795 0.498 -1.453+
(1.090) (0.584) (0.588) (0.872)
35–39 -0.148 1.375* 1.469* -2.695**
(1.109) (0.572) (0.595) (0.881)
40–44 -1.330 2.019** 2.201** -2.890**
(1.185) (0.590) (0.656) (0.950)
45–49 -2.330+ 2.413** 3.452** -3.535**
(1.292) (0.607) (0.718) (1.028)
50–54 -1.655 1.955** 4.284** -4.584**
(1.447) (0.633) (0.819) (1.148)
Wife -16.843** 13.320** 6.972** -3.449**
(1.230) (0.640) (0.656) (0.960)
Two 2.405** 1.228** -0.514 -3.119**
(0.870) (0.319) (0.450) (0.712)
Three+ 3.879** 1.408** -0.375 -4.913**
(1.042) (0.397) (0.560) (0.843)
Wife#Two -4.711** 1.426** 2.468** 0.817
(1.146) (0.464) (0.640) (0.913)
Wife#Three+ -9.845** 3.386** 5.763** 0.696
(1.385) (0.640) (0.813) (1.105)
2–3 1.452 -3.221** -0.563 2.331**
(1.126) (0.483) (0.599) (0.899)
4–5 1.209 -5.030** -0.661 4.482**
(1.298) (0.510) (0.683) (1.023)
6–8 -0.064 -6.193** -0.057 6.314**
(1.226) (0.508) (0.642) (1.001)
9–11 4.227** -8.916** -0.242 4.931**
(1.294) (0.506) (0.732) (1.012)
12–14 2.185 -10.391** 0.054 8.152**
(1.447) (0.518) (0.813) (1.160)
15–17 5.879** -11.584** -0.705 6.410**
(1.810) (0.558) (0.914) (1.500)
Wife#2–3 2.313 -5.203** 1.364 1.526
(1.514) (0.774) (0.851) (1.187)
Wife#4–5 4.360* -8.043** 1.623+ 2.059
(1.702) (0.774) (0.932) (1.321)
Wife#6–8 7.215** -9.878** 0.418 2.244+
(1.559) (0.735) (0.846) (1.271)
Wife#9–11 4.599** -9.687** 1.877+ 3.211*
(1.625) (0.734) (0.959) (1.258)
Wife#12–14 7.464** -10.779** 2.647* 0.668
(1.776) (0.747) (1.043) (1.418)
Wife#15–24 4.366+ -11.698** 3.800** 3.533*
(2.232) (0.767) (1.266) (1.786)
Constant 38.845** 11.751** 12.875** 48.529**
(1.255) (0.604) (0.636) (0.996)
Data: American Time Use Survey (2003-2016). Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. **Significant at the
1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. +Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.4: Results from OLS Regressions of Hours per Week – Low-educated, The U.S.
Market Work Child Care Household
chores
Leisure
30-34 1.406 -0.424 0.833 -1.815*
(0.919) (0.463) (0.547) (0.805)
35-39 1.036 0.121 2.248** -3.405**
(0.946) (0.471) (0.571) (0.812)
40-44 1.642 -0.282 2.913** -4.273**
(1.028) (0.481) (0.619) (0.879)
45–49 -0.855 -1.045* 4.333** -2.432*
(1.136) (0.493) (0.688) (0.978)
50–54 -2.671* -1.682** 4.555** -0.202
(1.352) (0.515) (0.811) (1.180)
Wife -20.571** 11.062** 9.448** 0.061
(1.546) (0.781) (0.947) (1.351)
Two 0.664 0.629* 0.308 -1.601+
(0.985) (0.288) (0.524) (0.826)
Three+ -1.154 0.883* 0.538 -0.267
(1.142) (0.436) (0.605) (0.966)
Wife#Two -3.374* 0.767 2.687** -0.081
(1.331) (0.481) (0.826) (1.129)
Wife#Three+ -5.655** 2.056** 5.792** -2.193+
(1.493) (0.667) (0.945) (1.299)
2–3 -0.747 -1.263* -0.709 2.718*
(1.351) (0.616) (0.702) (1.134)
4–5 0.978 -2.720** -0.527 2.269+
(1.437) (0.553) (0.764) (1.193)
6–8 0.264 -3.754** -1.104 4.594**
(1.368) (0.526) (0.710) (1.158)
9–11 0.954 -5.718** -1.308+ 6.072**
(1.436) (0.504) (0.774) (1.213)
12–14 0.518 -6.481** -0.734 6.696**
(1.601) (0.523) (0.849) (1.343)
15–17 1.509 -7.180** -0.606 6.276**
(1.896) (0.530) (1.042) (1.608)
Wife#2–3 2.207 -4.574** 2.476* -0.109
(1.761) (0.972) (1.101) (1.577)
Wife#4–5 0.919 -5.069** 2.039+ 2.112
(1.862) (0.919) (1.215) (1.648)
Wife#6–8 5.649** -5.615** 2.005+ -2.039
(1.781) (0.860) (1.105) (1.549)
Wife#9–11 6.135** -6.748** 1.783 -1.169
(1.836) (0.829) (1.168) (1.603)
Wife#12–14 7.533** -8.268** 2.359+ -1.624
(2.003) (0.856) (1.228) (1.717)
Wife#15–24 7.718** -8.985** 2.536+ -1.269
(2.411) (0.849) (1.522) (2.042)
Constant 37.575** 9.602** 13.151** 51.672**
(1.255) (0.567) (0.677) (1.075)
Data: American Time Use Survey (2003-2016). Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. **Significant at the
1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. +Significant at the 10% level.
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Value Functions of older Couples. An older does not have children to take care of and thus does
not derive utility from children and home production (k=0, ν=0). Also, an older couple is non-fertile
and thus the couple cannot be eligible for child-related leaves (l=0). For simplicity, the state variables
of (k, l,ν) are omitted in the value functions because they are all zeros for all older couples.
An older couple makes only labour decisions. Only labour shocks affect an older couple. The
labour shocks include retirement as well as job arrivals and job destruction. A retirement shock occurs
with a probability δR. When the shock affects a couple, they retire together and have a constant value.
For the simulation exercises the the paper, the value to a retired couple is set to zero.
The value of an older couple with both spouses employed, denoted as V o, is defined as follows:
V o(q f ,qm) =(β +δ f +δm+ p fe + p
m
e +δR)
−1
{
w f +wm
+δ f T o(0,qm)
+δmW o(q f ,0)
+ p fe Eq′ f
[
max{V o(q′ f ,qm),V o(q f ,qm)}]
+ pme Eq′ f
[
max{V o(q f ,q′m),V o(q f ,qm)}]
+δR ·0
}
The value to an older couple with only a wife is employed, denoted as W o, is defined as follows:
W o(q f ,0) =(β +δ f + p fe + p
m
u +δR)
−1
{
w f + z
+δ fUo(0,0)
+ p fe Eq′ f
[
max{W o(q′ f ,0),W o(q f ,0)}]
+ pmu Eqm
[
max{V o(q f ,qm),W o(q f ,0)}]
+δR ·0
}
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The value to an older couple with only a husband is employed, denoted as T o, is defined as follows:
T o(0,qm) =(β +δm+ pme + p
f
u +δR)
−1
{
z+wm
+δmUo(0,0)
+ pme Eq′m
[
max{T o(0,q′m),T o(0,qm)}]
+ p fu Eq f
[
max{V o(q f ,qm),T o(0,qm)}]
+δR ·0
}
The value to an older couple with neither spouse employed, denoted as Uo, is defined as follows:
Uo(0,0) =(β + p fu + p
m
u +δR)
−1
{
2z
+ p fu Eq f
[
max{W o(q f ,0),Uo(0,0)}]
+ pmu Eqm [max{T o(0,qm),Uo(0,0)}]
+δR ·0
}
For the simulation exercises in this paper, the unemployment beneft z is set lower than the lowest
match-specific productivity of the offer distribution. Therefore, an older married individual who receives
a job offer always accept it. Also, because an older couple does not derive utility from home production,
the reservation productivity of an older couple in this household search model is equivalent to that in an
individual search model.
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Appendix C
Chapter 4 Appendix
C.1 Empirical Evidence
Table C.1: Employment-to-population Ratios at Age 23
High-educated Low-educated
Employment Men Women Men Women
1{ni ≥ 300} 98.3 83.5 95.8 54.3
1{ni ≥ 1,560} 81.6 55.5 83.4 27.4
All year 71.8 61.9 71.5 33.2
Part-year or more 93.6 79.7 92.1 53.1
Ever in the year 98.8 90.1 97.2 58.3
Annual hours worked is denoted by ni. The first group is based on variable ”alhrp28” for total hours
paid all jobs during the reference year. The second group is based on variable ”alfst28” for annual
labour force status. Cross-sectional data from Survey of Labour Income Dynamics (2001-2010) are
used for the calculation.
Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics of High-educated People’s Hourly Wages at Age 23
Married Any marital status
Men Women Ratio Men Women Ratio
(M) (W) (W/M) (M) (W) (W/M)
High-edu
Median 15.3 12.5 .817 14.9 12.1 .812
Mean 17.1 13.5 .789 16.1 13.6 .845
S.D 8.9 5.1 7.5 6.3
Low-edu
Median 13.0 9.2 .708 12.3 9.6 .780
Mean 13.5 10.6 .785 13.4 10.8 .806
S.D 4.4 4.2 5.8 4.1
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Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics
All Low-educated High-educated
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ln(Wage) 3.07 0.44 2.83 0.47 2.90 0.40 2.58 0.41 3.16 0.42 2.93 0.45
Age 38.9 6.57 38.3 6.75 39.1 6.80 39.5 6.67 38.5 6.44 37.8 6.72
Years of schooling 14.2 3.20 14.4 2.89 11.5 2.06 11.8 2.05 15.5 2.62 15.4 2.51
Education - 2 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Education - 3 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49
Education - 4 0.25 0.44 0.29 0.45
Experience (years) 16.5 7.93 13.1 7.69 18.5 8.07 14.0 8.39 15.5 7.66 12.7 7.35
TimeOut1 (years) 2.49 4.49 3.51 5.93 2.99 4.91 5.53 7.56 2.23 4.24 2.68 4.88
TimeOut2 (years) 0.87 2.11 2.63 4.01 0.83 2.22 2.97 4.60 0.89 2.06 2.48 3.73
Number of children 1.51 1.10 1.48 1.07 1.55 1.13 1.52 1.07 1.49 1.09 1.46 1.07
Private sector 0.80 0.40 0.69 0.46 0.88 0.32 0.84 0.36 0.76 0.43 0.63 0.48
Number of obs. 35,826 36,692
Source: Survey of Labour Income Dynamics, 2001-2011 (Restricted Data).
Education is grouped into four categories: those who did not graduate high school (baseline group), high
school graduates and college dropouts (Education-2 ), people with post-secondary certificates and university
degrees below a bachelor’s degree (Education-3), and those with a bachelor’s degree or higher (Education-
4). “High-educated” includes Education-3 and -4. “Low-educated” is its complement.
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Table C.4: Log Wage Regressions
Dependent variable All Low-edu High-edu
: ln(Wage) Male Female Male Female Male Female
Experience 0.0270 0.0272 0.0178 0.0163 0.0281 0.0274
(22.75) (26.06) (9.04) (9.31) (17.36) (19.57)
Experience2/103 -0.5178 -0.5273 -0.2841 -0.1818 -0.6984 -0.7229
(-15.59) (-15.73) (-5.40) (-3.40) (-14.83) (-15.72)
TimeOut1 -0.0102 -0.0065 -0.0103 -0.0081 -0.0120 -0.0129
(-18.79) (-15.22) (-12.78) (-12.90) (-15.64) (-21.22)
TimeOut2 -0.0204 -0.0156 -0.0219 -0.0155 -0.0244 -0.0217
(-21.13) (-28.83) (-14.38) (-18.17) (-18.61) (-29.65)
Education - 2 0.0965 0.1606
(12.76) (18.07)
Education - 3 0.2299 0.2894
(12.76) (33.51)
Education - 4 0.5078 0.5862
(64.97) (63.23)
Number of children 0.0245 0.0064 0.0273 0.0143 0.0239 0.0006
(12.90) (3.34) (9.15) (4.26) (9.16) (0.22)
Private sector -0.1249 -0.2599 -0.1384 -0.2816 -0.1670 -0.3172
(-24.35) (-58.19) (-13.34) (-29.05) (-26.70) (-60.04)
Constant 2.663 2.5012 2.8092 2.7027 3.076 3.0277
(200.33) (198.20) (135.54) (-29.05) (224.93) (289.34)
Adjusted R2 0.2434 0.3575 0.1102 0.2056 0.1060 0.1964
t-statistics are in parentheses. Data is from Survey of Labour Income Dynamics, 2001-2010. The sample of
interest is married people aged between 25 and 49 with paid employment who are not a student and do not
have any disability in the reference year. Hourly wages are deflated to 2002 Canadian dollars.
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C.2 Estimation of a Fertility Process
The probability of a birth shock, pib(t,k,a,xeduw ), is estimated using a logit model. The dependent variable
is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has a newborn baby in the survey year. I estimate
a logit regression of a birth as a function of a quadratic in a married woman’s age, t, the number of
children, k, and the age of youngest child, a, separately for each educational group. Married women
between 23 and 42 years old in SLID between 2001 and 2010 are used as the sample of interest.
The estimates and the predicted probability of a birth shock by age of a mother, number of children,
and age of the youngest child are displayed in Tables C.6 and C.7.
Table C.5: Distribution of Mothers by Number of Children (%)
At age 30 At age 35 At age 40
N. of kids data model data model data model
Low- None 22.9 23.1 12.3 13.1 11.4 9.2
educated One 23.9 19.0 17.5 20.7 19.4 22.4
Two 34.5 35.5 43.2 39.0 42.5 40.3
Three + 18.8 22.5 27.0 27.3 26.6 28.0
High- None 40.1 36.7 17.5 17.8 14.6 12.0
educated One 26.6 22.8 19.9 20.4 18.6 19.0
Two 25.9 25.9 44.7 37.3 45.1 41.7
Three + 7.4 14.6 17.8 24.4 21.7 27.3
Given the estimated processes of a birth shock, the transitional probabilities between fertility stages,
pi f and pipost , are determined by minimizing the sum of squared errors between the simulated and em-
pirical distributions of mothers by their age and the number of children in Table C.5. The simulated
distribution is generated by simulating birth histories of married women using the estimated birth shock
process and the empirical distribution of married women at age 23 by children characteristics (Table
C.8). In the simulation, whereas 23-year-old women with children start in the fertile stage, childless
women begin in the pre-fertile stage. The transitional probabilities are also estimated separately for each
educational group. The estimated probability pi f implies that high-educated women who were childless
at age 23 do not consider having a child on average until 3.6 years later, and low-educated women wait
on average for 2.4 years. In Canada, the average age of first-time mothers between 2001 and 2011 is
28 years old.1 The estimated probability pipost implies that, on average, high-educated women choose to
have no more child at an earlier age than low-educated women do.
The specification of the logit model for the probability of the birth shock:
Pr(birth = 1) = Λ
(
β0+β1age+β2age2
+β31{k = 1,a = 1}+β41{k = 1,a = 2}+β5age×1{k = 1,a = 2}
+β61{k = 2,a = 1}+β71{k = 2,a = 2}+β8age×1{k = 2,a = 2}
)
,
1Author’s own calculation using the raw data from “Fertility:Fewer children, older moms” http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2014002-eng.htm
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where Λ(·) denotes the logistic function.
Table C.6: Estimates for the Probability of Having a Newborn Child
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8
Low-educated -12.866 7.573 -1.281 -.104 4.430 -1.297 -.878 3.623 -1.435
s.e. . 1.931 1.259 .203 .228 .730 .244 .307 .880 .284
High-educated -16.874 10.003 -1.636 -.602 2.858 -.638 -1.584 3.495 -1.274
s.e. 1.327 .845 .134 .142 .492 .155 .214 .782 .239
Table C.7: Predicted Probability of a Birth, pˆib(t,k,a,xeduw ), (%)
Mother’s age
24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42
Low- k = 0 11 14 15 16 15 13 10 7 4 3
educated k = 1,a = 1 10 13 14 14 14 12 9 6 4 2
k = 1,a = 2 32 31 29 24 19 13 8 4 2 1
k = 2,a = 1 5 6 7 7 7 6 4 3 2 1
k = 2,a = 2 13 13 11 9 6 4 2 1 1 0
High- k = 0 9 13 16 17 17 14 11 8 5 2
educated k = 1,a = 1 5 7 9 10 10 8 6 4 3 1
k = 1,a = 2 28 33 35 34 31 25 18 11 6 3
k = 2,a = 1 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 0
k = 2,a = 2 14 15 15 13 10 7 4 2 1 0
Table C.8: Distribution of Women Aged 23 by Children Characteristics (%)
N. of children None One One Two Two Three+
Have an infant - Yes No Yes No Either
Low-educated 55.85 8.85 18.02 6.26 8.49 2.53
High-educated 73.31 8.18 11.47 3.96 1.55 1.54
The sample is not restricted to the “married”.
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C.3 Estimation of Rental Rates Distributions
For the distribution of rental rates, I use the hourly wage at age 23 as a proxy for the rental rate as
in Section 4.2. A sample is restricted to married individuals aged 23 who are paid employee and not
student. Assuming that the price of human capital follows a log-normal distribution, I estimate the mean
and variance of the distribution using Maximum Likelihood. The following specification is estimated
separately for men and women:
ln pi = µ0+µ1I(LowEdui)+ εi, εi ∼ N(0,σ2).
The estimates are reported in Table C.9. In this paper, I view this gender wage gap as exogenously
present upon the entry into the labour market. A discussion about what causes this exogenous gender
wage gap is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table C.9: Estimates for the Distribution of Rental Rates
Estimates µ0 µ1 σ
Married only (men) 2.714 -0.155 0.375
s.e. (.044) (.058) (.020)
Married only (women) 2.546 -0.263 0.364
s.e. (.026) (.035) (.013)
Any marital status (men) 2.687 -0.162 0.390
s.e. (.016) (.021) (.007)
Any marital status (women) 2.523 -0.206 0.375
s.e. (.014) (.021) (.007)
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C.4 Calibration Moments
The procedure to calculate simulated moments is as follows. First, for a given set of parameter values,
the household problem is numerically solved backward from age 62 to age 23. Then, 1,600,000 couples’
life-cycles are simulated. Each couple begins with a set of initial state variables that is randomly selected
based on the parameterized distributions. A couple makes decisions using the decision rules solved
from the model, and their state variables are updated based on their decisions and the realizations of a
series of stochastic shocks. I construct simulated cross-sectional data by letting the cross-sectional age
structure of the simulated sample replicate the empirical counterpart in SLID. Also, I generate simulated
six-year-long longitudinal data of the cross-sectional sample as in SLID.
Using the simulated data, I calculate simulated moments and the distance between the simulated
and data moments. The measure of distance I use is the sum of squared percentage deviations of the
simulated moments from the data moments: ∑ j
(
d j−m j
d j
)2
where d j is the jth data moment and m j is a
corresponding simulated moment.
Table C.10: Time Allocations by Children Characteristics
Without kids With an infant Older kids only
M H L M H L M H L
High-edu data 33.6 13.7 52.7 35.6 24.6 39.8 34.0 18.9 47.1
Men model 36.2 11.9 51.9 36.6 21.6 41.8 34.3 19.2 46.6
High-edu data 30.3 17.0 52.7 9.8 50.4 39.8 23.3 29.5 47.2
Women model 31.0 16.0 52.9 12.9 52.2 34.9 26.8 25.7 47.5
Low-edu data 32.7 12.8 54.5 34.0 21.9 44.1 33.8 16.4 49.8
Men model 35.5 11.9 52.6 35.4 21.9 42.7 32.3 19.7 47.9
Low-edu data 24.4 22.7 52.9 6.4 54.9 38.7 19.7 30.2 50.1
Women model 26.5 17.5 56.0 7.5 56.0 36.5 18.8 29.6 51.6
M=market work, H=home work, and L=Leisure. Unit: % of Time Endowment. Time endow-
ment=5,840 hours per year.
Table C.11: Five-year Wage Growth Rates Conditional on Five Years of Full-year Full-time
Employment
Men Women
Age group 25-34 35-44 45-54 25-34 35-44 45-54
Low-educated data 7.7 5.4 4.9 10.6 6.7 5.4
model 7.6 5.5 4.8 6.7 5.3 4.3
High-educated data 14.3 11.1 6.3 17.6 12.7 9.0
model 9.3 5.4 3.9 11.9 6.5 4.0
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Table C.12: Employment Transition Rates
Low-edu Men Low-edu Women High-edu Men High-edu Women
t→ t+1 N PY FY N PY FY N PY FY N PY FY
N data 79.6 10.2 10.2 86.2 10.2 3.6 76.8 8.1 15.1 79.2 12.1 8.7
model 79.0 7.0 14.0 84.1 7.1 8.8 74.2 5.7 20.0 70.4 12.1 17.5
PY data 10.4 31.4 57.7 12.4 58.4 29.1 8.1 33.9 58.0 7.3 64.2 28.5
model 12.7 24.1 63.2 22.0 49.9 28.1 4.8 22.2 73.0 11.0 51.3 37.7
FY data 1.4 5.4 93.2 2.2 10.8 87.0 0.8 3.3 95.9 2.1 9.8 88.2
model 2.1 5.2 92.7 6.8 10.4 82.7 1.8 4.9 93.3 5.0 9.9 85.1
N= Non-employment, PY= Part-Year employment, and FY= Full-Year employment.
Table C.13: Fraction of People Having Negative Wage Growth after Full-year Full-time Work
Men Women
Lo Hi Lo Hi
Data 12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0
Model 8.9 8.8 10.5 10.0
Figure C.1: Average Time Spent in Leisure by Number of Children
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Table C.14: Employment Rates of Married Women by Number of Children
None One Two Three+
Low-edu (data) 77.1 70.4 66.0 53.7
(model) 76.6 62.6 61.7 54.7
High-edu (data) 91.0 82.4 78.8 71.4
(model) 92.2 81.5 79.8 77.2
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C.5 Numerical Exercises
The Role of Probabilities of Human Capital Depreciation. I examine the role of the probabil-
ity of human capital depreciation δ in the decomposition analysis and policy experiments. The results
presented in the main text use the counterfactual economy where both men and women have men’s
parameter values. In the calibrated economy, men’s δ is much higher than women’s one. With the
parameter values, many married couples decide to choose to have only one parent use parental leave. In
this section, I present results of a decomposition analysis to explain the gap of take-up rates between the
benchmark economy and a counterfactual economy where both men and women have men’s parameter
values, except for the probabilities of human capital depreciation δ . I let all people to have women’s δ .
I let both men and women have women’s values for that parameter.
Table C.15: Take-up Behaviour When All Gender Differences Are Removed
Benchmark Men’s values Women’s values Men’s values but δ
Education Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers
Individual type
Low-educated 11.4 93.4 60.3 57.1 69.5 65.4 67.9 67.4
High-educated 10.2 93.4 50.8 49.8 60.2 64.6 68.2 72.7
Household type
(lo, lo) 6.8 93.5 46.2 46.0 51.7 51.3 55.0 57.9
(lo,hi) 14.1 89.9 72.3 28.2 83.8 36.7 78.5 54.1
(hi, lo) 6.4 93.2 27.2 73.2 27.4 85.6 45.7 80.7
(hi,hi) 11.0 95.3 56.8 59.4 68.2 76.9 73.9 80.8
A pair of husband’s and wife’s education, (εh,εw), represents a household education type. hi denotes the
high-educated who are college graduates, and lo denotes a lower education level.
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Table C.17: Interactions among Explanations
(a) by individual educational type
Benchmark All
Removed
Change
(2)-(1)
η1+µh η1+δw η1+µh+δw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fathers’ take-up rates (%)
Low-edu (a) 11.4 69.5 58.1 41.9( 52.6) 45.5( 58.8) 60.1( 83.8)
High-edu (b) 10.2 60.2 50.0 44.7( 69.0) 54.6( 88.8) 70.6(120.8)
Mothers’ take-up rates (%)
Low-edu (c) 93.4 65.4 -28.0 82.7( 38.2) 85.5( 28.2) 75.8( 62.9)
High-edu (d) 93.4 64.6 -28.8 69.0( 84.7) 79.3( 49.1) 67.1( 91.3)
Gender differences (%p)
Low-edu (c)-(a) 82.0 -4.1 -86.1 40.8( 47.9) 40.0( 48.9) 15.7( 77.0)
High-edu (d)-(b) 83.2 4.4 -78.8 24.3( 74.7) 24.7( 74.3) -3.5(110.0)
(b) Take-up rates by household educational type (%)
(εh,εw) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(lo, lo)
Husband (a) 6.8 51.7 45.0 18.8( 26.7) 21.1( 31.9) 34.5( 61.7)
Wife (b) 93.5 51.3 -42.2 79.8( 32.6) 83.6( 23.6) 70.8( 53.7)
(lo,hi)
Husband 14.1 83.8 69.6 57.6( 62.4) 60.9( 67.2) 77.1( 90.5)
Wife 89.9 36.7 -53.1 52.6( 70.2) 68.1( 41.0) 52.5( 70.4)
(hi, lo)
Husband 6.4 27.4 21.0 15.5( 43.3) 19.6( 62.9) 33.8(130.8)
Wife 93.2 85.6 -7.6 87.6( 74.1) 89.2( 52.5) 83.9(122.1)
(hi,hi)
Husband (c) 11.0 68.2 57.2 50.9( 69.8) 61.9( 89.0) 78.4(117.9)
Wife (d) 95.3 76.9 -18.4 77.3( 97.9) 85.0( 56.0) 74.3(114.3)
Gender differences (%p)
(lo, lo) [(b)-(a)] 86.7 -0.5 -87.2 61.0( 29.5) 62.4( 27.9) 36.3( 57.8)
(hi,hi) [(d)-(c)] 84.3 8.8 -75.5 26.4( 76.6) 23.2( 80.9) -4.1(117.0)
Values in parentheses present percentages of the gap in column (3) that is explained by each column. Pa-
rameter η1, µ , and δi denote relative home productivity in the presence of an infant, means of rental rates,
and probabilities of a fall in human capital, respectively.
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Table C.18: Take-up Rates by Income Replacement Rate
(a) Benchmark Durations: 17/0/35 weeks of Mat./Pat./Par. Leaves
(εh,εw) (lo, lo) (lo,hi) (hi, lo) (hi,hi)
Replacement rate Husb. Wife Gap Husb. Wife Gap Husb. Wife Gap Husb. Wife Gap
Baseline (0.55) 6.8 93.5 86.7 14.1 89.9 75.8 6.4 93.2 86.8 11.0 95.3 84.3
0.01 6.0 88.6 82.6 13.8 79.0 65.2 6.1 89.9 83.8 9.2 89.1 79.8
0.33 6.6 92.1 85.5 13.3 85.8 72.5 5.8 91.6 85.8 10.2 92.7 82.6
0.70 7.4 94.1 86.7 13.5 94.7 81.2 6.7 95.4 88.7 12.2 97.4 85.2
0.85 7.5 95.9 88.3 15.5 96.3 80.8 7.7 96.5 88.8 15.0 98.4 83.4
1.00 8.4 96.8 88.4 17.2 98.1 80.9 8.8 97.3 88.6 18.7 99.3 80.6
(b) Short Paternity Leave: 17/6.5/28.5 weeks of Mat./Pat./Par. Leave
(εh,εw) (lo, lo) (lo,hi) (hi, lo) (hi,hi)
Replacement rate Husb. Wife Gap Husb. Wife Gap Husb. Wife Gap Husb. Wife Gap
Baseline (0.55) 6.8 93.5 86.7 14.1 89.9 75.8 6.4 93.2 86.8 11.0 95.3 84.3
0.01 6.3 88.3 82.0 14.0 79.0 65.1 6.1 90.3 84.2 9.0 89.2 80.2
0.33 6.5 91.8 85.3 13.7 85.8 72.1 6.0 91.7 85.7 10.2 92.5 82.3
0.70 6.8 94.8 88.1 17.6 94.3 76.6 7.1 95.5 88.4 17.7 97.5 79.8
0.85 7.7 96.2 88.4 21.0 96.4 75.4 9.0 96.5 87.5 24.5 98.5 74.0
1.00 9.6 96.6 87.0 26.1 97.8 71.8 12.8 97.3 84.5 32.7 99.3 66.6
A pair of husband’s and wife’s education, (εh,εw), represents a household education type. hi denotes the
high-educated who are college graduates, and lo denotes a lower education level.
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